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ABSTRACT
A recognition of the fundamental and pervasive nature of decision 
making has resulted in the decision making process assuming an im­
portance that is quite distinct from the detail of any particular 
problem. A logical and systematic approach developed over many 
years that shifted the emphasis away from the terminal act of sel­
ecting one course of action to an examination of the structure of 
the whole decision.
This decomposition of decisions highlighted problems associated with 
various components. One such difficulty was the manner by which the 
consequences of selecting a course of action were to be represented.
With monetary outcomes the use of the real value of money does not 
always represent a person's true preference pattern and Utility Theory 
has been put forward as a substitute by which direct preferences and 
attitudes towards risk can be codified and transformed into a numer­
ical scale.
In this study Utility Theory was viewed as a normative decision making 
aid and two sets of experiments, involving twenty-nine business managers, 
were carried out, firstly to create personal utility functions and se­
condly to gauge to what extent they were workable.
A self administered utility test was specially developed to obtain pound- 
utile co-ordinates and a least squares regression approach adopted to fit 
a quartic function to them. This method avoided many problems experienc­
ed by previous researchers, particularly the length of time demanded of
VI
each subject and the mathematical description of the pound - utile re­
lationship.
As a test of the workable nature of the derived functions a second set 
of experiments were carried out where each manager was presented with 
twenty-four hypothetical business decision problems, contained in narra­
tive form. Testing the effectiveness of the utility functions could not 
be done simply by comparing actual and prescribed behaviour alone as the 
functions were being looked upon as normative and not necessarily pre­
dictive of what each subject would do. The managers were therefore 
assigned to one of three groups. Group one were given details of their 
utility prescriptions prior to tackling the decision problems. Group 
two were given their prescriptions after they had provided answers to 
the decisions and were then given the opportunity to make any altera­
tions and group three were given no information about their prescrip­
tions.
A significant variation was detected between the three groups with 
those having knowledge of their prescriptions displaying the smallest 
differences between actual and prescribed behaviour. While the timing 
of this knowledge did not seem to be important the managers, all mature 
executives, made considerable use of the information they were given,
A wide monetary range was covered by the decision problems but for sub­
jects, with knowledge of their prescriptions, the mean difference be­
tween actual and prescribed behaviour, over the twenty-four decisions, 
was as low as £492. For subjects with no knowledge this figure rose 
to £9,223.
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As Utility Theory was being looked upon as representative of under­
lying risk taking attitudes it was decided to measure such attitudes 
as distinct from any measurement contained in the utility functions.
A formula was derived to obtain a risk taking score for each manager, 
based on their response to the twenty-four decision problems, and 
these scores confirmed what had been visible from the utility curves, 
that the most prevalent attitude was risk aversion.
The prescriptive as opposed to predictive power of the functions was 
also confirmed when the only relationship between the measured attitude 
towards risk and the attitude described by the functions was found 
among those who had been given knowledge of their prescriptionso
The decision problems had been divided equally between those only in­
volving degrees of loss and those only holding out the prospect of pro­
fit in order that the attitudes of managers with different backgrounds 
could be compared. Fifteen of the subjects were employed as insurance 
managers by their companies and dealt, daily, with situations involving 
potential losses. Rather than their experience leading them to be less 
cautious, their familiarity with loss led them to be significantly more 
risk averse than the remaining subjects and also far more homogeneous 
as a group. There was no detectable difference between management type 
where profit was involved, suggesting perhaps a greater ability to adapt 
to profit than to loss decisions.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO DECISION MAKING.
Decision making is one human process in which everyone acquires a 
good deal of experience. From early childhood, through school,
career, marriage and into retirement we are faced with choice
after choice. It is difficult to imagine an existence where no 
decisions have to be made and even if such a situation could be 
brought about, few of us would relish the curtailment of freedom 
and initiative that it would imply.
The process of how decisions are made is so fundamental to our 
progress and well being that it assumes an importance that is quite 
distinct from the detail of any particular problem. The recognition 
of this fact has prompted many, from a variety of disciplines to
examine the way in which choices are made.
This present study has been similarly motivated and is concerned 
with managerial decision making in a business environment. Peter 
Drucker (I968) captures the pervasive nature of business decision 
making when he writes, " Whatever a manager does he does through 
decision making. Those decisions may be made as a matter of routine.
Indeed, he may not even realise that he is making them........ Hut
management is always a decision making process," (p. 419)
There is little doubt that decision making is intertwined with all
business activity. Whether such decisions are routine or of con­
siderable significance they exist, and the manager is compelled to 
act in some way.
The term "decision making" will appear again and again throughout 
this study and it may be valuable to place a slightly different 
construction on it than normal. To the majority of people, decision 
making may imply a final step, the terminal act in selecting one 
option from a range of possible options.
If, however, decision making is looked upon in the sense of decision 
building then we can begin to see the importance of examining the 
decision process to ensure that each stage of the decision is con­
structed soundly. What this way of looking at decision making does, 
is to shift the emphasis away from the final choice to the broader 
process of constructing the decision itself.
This change in emphasis has taken place slowly and from the mid 
1950's onwards, the work of Savage (1954), Luce and Raiffa (1957), 
Chemoff and Moses (1959) and Schlaifer (1959), helped to form the 
theoretical framework of what was coming to be known as "Decision 
Theory Analysis", These writers were certainly not the first to 
turn their attention to the question of decision making but they 
did mark a change in approach. Previous texts had dealt with the 
problem mainly from an economic standpoint, looking at how indivi­
duals behaved in the face of competing, mutually exclusive alter­
natives. What was now emerging was an analysis of the decision itself, 
with the decision being broken down into manageable parts.
The development of this systematic and logical approach to decision 
making continued and by the late 1960's the various theories and 
techniques that had appeared were given weight by the publication 
of works by Raiffa (1968) and Schlaifer (1969), that eventually 
were to be looked upon as classics in the field of decision analysis. 
By 1970 Brown (1970) was able to write, "Rare are the instances in 
which successful use of Decision Theory Analysis is held up through 
shortcomings in the purely technical state of the art" (p.89).
Although the consequent growth in the development and application of 
Decision Theory Analysis is largely attributable to the work of 
Raiffa and Schlaifer at Harvard Business School, it is important to 
remember the valuable part played by Howard (1968), Bindley (1970), 
Aitchison (l97l), Moore (1972) and Brown et.al. (1974)*
OUTLINE OP THESIS
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the 
decision process as a discussion on the process of how decisions 
are made will enable us to identify the direction of this present 
study.
Chapter two concentrates on Utility Theory and following a brief 
account of its development as a decision making aid goes on to re­
view the literature relating to normative utility theory, the measure­
ment of utiles and the various applications that have been recorded. 
The chapter concludes by locating this present work in relation to 
previous research.
The research problem is stated in chapter three together with the 
hypotheses that are to be tested. Chapter four describes and justi­
fies the methodology employed in testing the hypotheses while chapter 
five presents the results and an interpretation of them.
The final chapter provides the conclusions to the study in addition 
to suggesting scope for further research.
THE DECISION PROCESS
The basic philosophy behind Decision Analysis is that most decision 
problems are so complex that they place too much of a cognitive 
strain on the decision maker. The decision maker is only able to 
deal with details of a decomposed problem, and it is argued that the 
total benefit of examining parts of the decision and then re-assembl­
ing the whole problem is greater than any benefit derived from tackl­
ing it as a whole.
The advantages of decision decomposition were recognized long before 
formal procedures of decision analysis had been developed. Benjamin 
Franklin (1772) wrote, " My way of making decisions is to divide half 
a sheet of paper by a line into two columns, writing over one Pro and 
over the other Con. Then, during three or four days' consideration,
I put down under the different heads short hints of the different 
motives, that at different times occur to me, for or against the
measure and where I find two, one on each side, that seem equal
I strike them both out..,..I think I can judge better and am less 
liable to make a rash step, and in fact, I have found great advantage
from this kind of equation in what may be called moral or prudential 
algebra".(p.786* )
The study of the process by which decisions are made has come a long 
way since then and in doing so has cut across disciplines such as 
economics, psychology, sociology and statistics.
Toda (1976) looks upon the decision process as the sum of all the 
subprocesses related to the selection of a course of action and its 
execution. He goes on to say that, " Most of these subprocesses ex­
cept some very well formalized ones like Decision Analysis are covert 
processes taking place exclusively in someone's mind, and are hither­
to paid relatively little attention "(p.79)* This emphasizes the role 
of Decision Analysis as a formal framework for the logical analysis of 
decisions and not just as another technique that might throw some 
light on any given problem.
Decision Analysis, therefore, starts by highlighting the decisional 
process itself, quite apart from the detail of any particular problem. 
When the various stages that make up a decision are brought into the 
open, aspects of the problem come to light that otherwise could easily 
be overlooked. This research is concerned with one such aspect but 
prior to identifying it we will look at the process itself as this 
will enable us to locate the subject matter of this study in the general 
framework of the business decision.
Many writers have provided descriptions of the decisional process. 
Hull, Moore and Thomas (1973), p*226, limit the process to identify­
ing the alternative courses of action, using judgement to evaluate 
the consequences of each alternative and selecting the alternative 
considered to be preferable. Vlek and Wagenaar (1979) p.292 identify 
the same three phases but while these descriptions may be concise, 
their brevity conceals certain parts of the process that merit in­
dividual mention. A more expansive definition of the decision pro­
cess is given by Elbing (1970) p.13, Thomas (1972) p.31 and Keeney 
and Raiffa (1976) p.5*
In order to identify that part of the process with which this re­
search is concerned the following paradigm of decision making is put 
forward.
PRE-ANALYSIS
SOLUTION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION
STATEMENT OF 
OBJECTIVES
MEASUREMENT 
OF OUTCOMES
SEARCH FOR 
ALTERNATIVES
EVALUATION OF 
UNCERTAIN EVENTS
Fig.l
The diagnosis of elements or symptoms of a problem is followed by a 
statement of the decision objectives together with the attributes by 
which the degree of attainment of the objectives is to be measured.
This leads on to the structural analysis of the problem in terms of - 
alternative courses of action, evaluation of uncertain events and the 
measurement of outcomes. The solution strategy follows and finally 
the implementation stage ensures that the result of the decision is put 
into effect. Implementation also implies the continual monitoring of 
the system and the feeding back of new variables.
Each aspect of the process described above has been the subject of 
study but by far the greatest volume of work has been in the evalua­
tion of uncertain events and measurement of outcomes. This research 
is concerned with the latter of these two areas, the measurement of . 
outcomes, and wherever decisions are posed in this study no search 
will be required on the part of managers to discover alternative 
actions, uncertain events or outcomes.^
To this extent we are not directly concerned with the work of those 
like Simon (1957), Miller and Starr (1967) and MacCrimmon (I969) who 
have directed their attention at times, to the more qualitative as­
pects of décision making.
Evaluation Of Uncertain Events.
1
No mention has been made of decision making under certainty, i.e., 
where each alternative is known to result invariably in a specific con­
sequence as the decisions posed later in this study involve problems 
where each alternative leads to one of a set of possible consequences, 
each consequence occurring with a known probability.
The evaluation of the uncertain events that may play upon any pro­
blem is not central to the main theme of this study but a short de­
scription of what is involved is a necessary lead in to the measure­
ment of outcomes.
Decision making under uncertainty can be likened to a game against 
nature, where nature is looked upon as some mechanism that produces 
events that occur in the real world. For this reason uncertain 
events are often 'referred to as states of nature. These states of 
nature will then play upon whatever alternative course of action is 
adopted.
In a simplified insurance purchasing decision a manager may be con­
sidering the two alternatives, buy or not to bty insurance against 
fire damage. The states of nature or uncertain events in such a 
problem could be the occurrence or non-occurrence of a fire.
The evaluation of the likelihood that a particular state of nature 
will occur has been the subject of much work. Where some relative 
frequency probability is calculable or a ratio of favourable events 
to the total number of equally likely events is known, such a number 
could be used to evaluate the likelihood of states of nature. Some 
would limit the application of probability theory to these two in­
stances and we could refer to such people as objectivists.
In the business world there are very few situations that would 
satisfy completely the objectivists criteria and in the majority of 
cases, therefore, we are still left with the problem of measuring
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2uncertain events. Faced with this problem, the Bayesian or sub­
jectivist emerged with his solution.
The subjectivist maintains that probabilities measure degrees of be­
lief in the likelihood of a particular event occurring, and he tries 
to bring to the surface his deepest feelings about each uncertain 
event. While the objectivist deals only with real, observable, 
countable facts, the subjectivist deals in the subjective assessment 
of reality.
Subjective probabilities can be used on a whole range of problems 
wherever some judgement has to be made as to the likelihood of an 
event occurring or of a proposition about the future being true.
The fact that so few real world situations satisfy the objectivists' 
criteria has prompted many to consider the use of subjective assess­
ment techniques. Howard Raiffa (1968) justifies his own subjectivist 
stance when he writes, " I for one, adopted the subjectivist, Bayesian 
platform (use of subjective probabilities and utilities) gradually 
and begrudgingly in the early 1950's. It is not easy to give up an 
identification with scientific objectivity. But my intellectual 
conversion from the objectivist to the subjectivist school did not 
carry any emotional convictions until I began working with Robert
2
A distinction is sometimes drawn between decision making under risk 
and decision making under uncertainty with the latter referring to 
those situations where no probability estimate is available. In this 
study we will not maintain such a distinction and will look upon the 
terms as interchangeable, both implying that some probability estimate 
is used regardless of how it was calculated. A more apt description of 
those decisions where no probabilities are either available or meaning­
ful has been used by Harrison (1977) when he referred to decision making 
in conditions of extreme uncertainty.
Schlaifer on concrete decision problems in business ". (p.278).
The reliability and validity associated with placing some probability 
estimate on our degree of belief about the future revolves around the' 
methodology adopted to measure this belief. Among the main contri­
butors to the theory of measuring subjective probabilities are 
Winkler (1967a 1967b), Good (1965), Smith (1967), Raiffa and Alpert 
(1969) and Stael von Holstein (1970).
The work of these scholars is continually being re-examined with the 
effect that the techniques available for the measurement of uncertain 
events are becoming less frau^t with problems and increasingly more 
sophisticated. The work of Vlek (1973), Pitz (1974), Selvidge (1975) 
and Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) indicate the depth to which the 
study of subjective probabilities has gone. One major difficulty 
still remains in that while the techniques of arriving at subjective 
probabilities are being studied very little work has been done on the 
question of making managers familiar with basic concepts and, more 
importantly, having them consider their application.
Having assigned a probability estimate to each uncertain event the 
decision maker can gauge the attractiveness of the alternative 
courses of action by calculating the expected monetary value (EMV) 
of these alternatives.
The E M V is found by adding the monetary consequences of each al­
ternative after having multiplied each consequence by the correspond­
ing probability of it occurring.
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Measurement Of Outcomes*
In the insurance purchasing decision such a procedure would not yield 
an intuitively appealing solution. Let us assume that there are only- 
two possible states of nature, a total loss or no loss. The cost 
associated with a total loss is £10,000 for which the fire insurance 
premium is £35- The probability of a 'total' loss will be very low, 
say 0.001* The ' decision is whether or not to purchase insurance 
and the figures are displayed in the decision matrix below.
Total No
loss loss
(O.OOl) (0.999)
Insure -235 -235
Not
Insure -£10,000 0
The E M V of the insure option is - £55 and for the non-insurance 
alternative is - £10.
Basing a decision solely on these calculations the manager would not 
insure but such a decision is unrealistic as there are few people who 
would not pay a £35 premium to purchase insurance protection against 
a risk of £10,000, The combination of probabilities and monetary 
outcomes produced a result that had little or no intuitive appeal. 
This combination did not reflect the managers' true preferences and
11
it is this realisation that has led to the replacement of the real 
value of money by a substitute that more adequately reflects a 
person's attitude towards risk and his preference ordering for 
different monetary values.
One such substitute is found in Utility Theory and it is on this 
theory that the remainder of this thesis is based.
Vlek and Wagenaar (1979) define utility as, " a  psychological quantity 
which indicates a person's strength of preference for something
(p.272). In the insurance example the decision maker would normally
have a preference for no loss but when faced with the chance of loss 
would be prepared to pay more than the expected value of the loss to
avoid the risk.^ In other words while he preferred no loss he was
willing to experience a small but certain loss, the insurance premium, 
in order to be relieved of the possibility of incurring a larger one.
3
This view of Utility Theory is an important factor in explaining the 
economic growth of insurance. Without the concept of utility why 
should a person pay £35 for insurance against a loss that has an E M V 
of £10 (£10,000 X 0.001). The answer is that to most people the po­
tential loss of £10,000 is so great that they are willing to pay much 
more than £10 to avoid it.
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CHAPTER 2
UTILITY THEORY : PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND
RELEVANCE OP THIS STUDY.
This chapter opens with a brief account of the historical develop­
ment of Utility Theory and then concentrates on the literature re­
lating to normative utility theoiy, the measurement of utilities and 
reported applications of the theory. It concludes by identifying 
some unresolved problems and indicating the relevance of this present 
research.
What has been suggested in the previous chapter is that the decision 
maker has various possible alternatives open to him; that he has one 
or more objectives which he hopes to achieve; and that states of 
nature will occur which, for each of the alternatives, will result in 
a range of outcomes or consequences. As was evidenced by the insurance 
purchasing example on page 11, the real value of each alternative 
and state of nature combination may not represent a manager’s true 
preference pattern over the range of outcomes.
Using the real value of money as a measure of each outcome resulted, 
in that example, in a solution to the decision that neither described 
how the manager normally acted in similar situations nor how he would 
act in the future.
In a ^neral decision making problem preferences are of two types, as
13
explained by Hull, Moore and Thomas (1975) p.226,
a) The direct preference of one outcome over the other, e.g., 
the preference for no loss over a loss of €10,000 should the 
factory be destroyed by fire.
b) Attitudes to risk where a person prefers a certain outcome 
to the chance of securing one of two possible outcomes at 
given probabilities, e.g., the preference for the certain 
loss of £55, being the insurance premium, rather than the 
chance of losing £10,000 if the factory bums down or break­
ing even if there is no fire.
While direct preferences of the type shown in (a) are less of a pro­
blem when monetary outcomes are used, most people preferring pro­
gressively larger amounts, the type (b) preferences are no less com­
plex when money is the measurement being employed. In our insurance 
purchasing example it was the type (b) preference that was not taken ' 
account of when only the real value of the monetary outcomes was con­
sidered.
When considering the question of decision making under risky conditions 
we are concerned with both forms of preference and if a theory of choice 
behaviour in such situations is to be established then it must reflect 
preferences about the outcomes in a certain given situation. In this 
way it will reflect not only how the manager feels about the outcomes 
per se but also how he feels about them in the context, with the 
associated probabilities, of a particular problem.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.
The criterion that historically had been developed to deal with 
risky choices was the maximisation of mathematical expectation. It 
had been developed during the l6th and 17th centuries by those con­
cerned with dice, cards, roulette, and other games of chance. The 
outcomes of each alternative were multiplied by their respective 
frequency of occurrence and then summed. The alternative having the 
largest value was then selected as the most attractive.
During the early part of the 18th century people gradually realised 
that the use of mathematical expectation did not, in fact, produce 
results that conformed with the experience of everyday life, Daniel 
Bernoulli^ and Gabriel Cramer were among those who questioned the use 
of money values as a valid method of explaining choice behaviour and 
Bernoulli (1758) in his explanation of the St. Petersburg Paradox 
suggests the concept of "moral expectation".
The St. Petersburg Paradox highlighted the inadequacies of the mathe­
matical expectation theory. Consider a situation where A has entered
into an agreement with B. whereby A is to toss a coin and if it lands
heads up he is to receive £1 from B, further that if a head does not
appear until the second toss he is to receive £2, if a head does not
appear until the third toss he is to receive £4 and so on. What, 
then, is the mathematical expectation of A's gamble? As the out­
comes increase with each subsequent flip of the coin the probability 
of maintaining a stream of tails get progressively lower. The result 
is as shown below:
1
It is interesting to note that Bernoulli used, as an example, the 
marine insurance purchasing behaviour of merchants.
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1st Flip 2nd Flip 5^d Flip 4th Flip ..Nth Flip
.5 X £1 .25 X £2 .125 X £4 .0625 x £8 P x £R
Where N = an infinitely high number of flips.
P = the probability of gaining a head on the Nth flip.
R = the amount offered if a head does not appear until
the Nth flip.
The expected value of this gamble is infinitely great and on this 
basis A should be willing to pay a large sum of money to be allowed
to play. In fact most people would only pay a relatively low amount.
The paradox is, therefore, that the mathematical expectation did not 
yield a result that conformed with common sense.
Bernoulli explained A's unwillingness to take advantage of the gamble 
offered to him by suggesting that a given amount of money is not of 
equal importance to people having different amounts of wealth to 
start with. Utility for money increases at a decreasing rate.
Bernoulli went on to suggest that the logarithm of income is an 
appropriate utility function and many people look upon this aspect 
of his work as being the most important. Bernoulli held that the 
relative value of an increment of money varies directly with the in­
crement and inversely with the original sum possessed, i.e.,
y = k log X + c
Where y - the total utility of wealth
k « a constant
X = the original sum of money
c the constant of integration.
This theory can be represented graphically and is shown in Fig.2.
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Pig.2
•H
rH
tH
A
F IH G
Money, wealth or income.
The line A D represents the mathematical expectation that each in­
crease in wealth yields an equal utility to the individual. Line E E C  
is the total utility curve representing Bernoulli's moral expectation. 
For values between F and G the expected utility of any given amount of 
money exceeds its actuarial value and as a result the individual has 
expressed a preference for a greater degree of certainty than is held 
out by the probabilities upon which the mathematical expectation is 
based. In other words the individual used in Fig, 2 would accept H 
rather than take the chance of gaining the larger amount I,
As was said earlier, most people remember Bernoulli's work for the 
logarithmic transformation of the utility function, but a second as­
pect of his work could be said to be of equal importance and that is 
his view that the mathematical expectation of utility should be used 
in place of simple mathematical expectation when considering choices
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involving risk.
Later in the same century Bayes (l?6$) touched upon the same issue of 
utility and probability in choices involving risk but it was not until 
1951 that the two concepts of utility and personal probability were 
finally brought together by Earnsey (1951)• Ramsey developed what he 
called " a logic of partial belief " and in so doing laid the founda­
tions upon which a criterion of maximising expected utility could be 
developed.
Although the theory of risky choices had been enhanced greatly by the 
work of those scholars it was certainly a long way from being free of 
paradox. Bernoulli's St. Petersburg Paradox and his theory of moral 
expectation, in itself, gave rise to a paradox. This one was not 
accorded the respectability of a name but could easily have been termed 
the " Insuring Gamblers' Paradox ".
Friedman and Savage (1948) deal with it by suggesting a utility curve 
that is both concave and convex over different income amounts for the 
same individual. The problem arises because of Bernoulli's assump­
tion of diminishing marginal utility which certainly accords with the 
actions of a person prepared to pay a definite amount of money by way 
of insurance to be released from his uncertainty about some larger 
amount he may or may not have to pay out in the future, it does not, 
however, describe the actions of that same person should he purchase 
a lottery ticket and in so doing risk the loss of income in the hope 
of a large gain.
The moral expectation curve of the person willing to purchase a lottery
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ticket must be below the strai^t line of mathematical expectation. 
In Pig.2 a concave curve would have to be drawn to represent the 
gambler. Pig 3 shows Priedman and Savage's solution to the in­
suring gambler's paradox.
Fig. 3
rH
•H
S
i-t
HA P G
Money, wealth or income.- 
In words Priedman and Savage conclude that an individual exhibits 
diminishing marginal utility of money income for incomes below some 
income (below income level G), increasing marginal utility of money 
for incomes between that income and some larger income (between in­
comes G and H) and diminishing marginal utility of money income for 
all higher incomes (incomes greater than H).
NOEMATIVE UTILITY THEORY.
The debate on the shape of utility curves continued but it was John 
Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1947) who paved the way for the
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eventual application of utility theory in the field of decision mak- 
2
ing • Their approach to utility theory differed significantly from 
earlier writers and the fact that their treatment of it did differ 
may be related to the main body of their book, which was concerned 
with the theory of games. Rather than dealing with utility as a de­
scriptive concept they looked upon it as a prescriptive theory i.e., 
it suggested ways of acting in order to arrive at an optimal solu­
tion.
#
Von Neumann and Morgens tern suggested that if a person was able to 
express preferences between pairs of gambles where the gambles in­
corporated basic outcomes, then it was possible to introduce utility 
equivalents of these basic outcomes in such a way that if a person 
was guided solely by the utility expected value he would be acting in 
accordance with his true tastes. The proviso to this was that there 
existed an element of consistency in the person’s tastes.
This consistency requirement was considered in some detail by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstem and they put forward a number of axioms, or 
postulates, of rational behaviour. Luce and Raiffa (1957), Ackoff 
(1962), MacCrimmon (I965), Krantz et.al. (l97l) and others have also 
presented an axiomatic treatment of utility.
2 •
Von Neumann and Morgenstem state their "excuse" for examining utili­
ties to be, " the application of a classical preliminary device
of scientific analysis ; to divide the difficulties "(p.l6) This
relates well to our earlier discussion on decomposition of decision 
problems.
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The Axioms.
The principal axioms are listed below, with the phrases "is preferred 
to" and "is indifferent to" being represented by the symbols ^ and 
respectively,
a) Comparability. All consequences, C^yOg C^ , can be ordered
according to their attractiveness. For each pair (C^ , Cg); 
C^^Cg, Cg )■ or C^'^Cg.
b) Transitivity. If > Cg and Cg^Cy then C^> C^ . Similarly 
if Cg and Cg^C^ then C^~C^.
c) Probability Mixtures. A gamble with probability p, C^,p,Cgj, 
can be formed by a mixture of consequences and when C, > Cp>C,
r 1 ^a value of p can be found such that C^,p, C^ j ^ Cg and a 
further probability q , such that Cg)> |^ C^ , q , C^ j .
d) Dominance. The fact that C^^Cg^C, implies that C^ )x
r” "1
Cq and that Cg, p, C^ ^C%. In other words a gamble is un- 
attractive when it may worsen but not improve a person's posi­
tion. On the other hand a gamble is always preferred when it
may improve but not worsen the person's position.
e) Sure-thing. When C^ ). Cg it implies that ^C^, p, C^ |^ Cg,
P, Cj The preference relation among gambles is independent 
of the value of any fixed consequence, 'sure-thing'.
When a person is consistent, he obeys these axioms, then it can be 
said that there exists a preference ordering function, called a utility 
function, that assigns real numbers u(C) in such a way that;
C ^ C g  if and only if u(C^) ^  u(Cg).^
5
Notice that it would not be accurate to say that C^ )> Cg because C^ had 
the higher utility. Preferences existed prior to them being represented 
by utiles. C^ has a larger utility than Cg because it is more preferred, 
the opposite is not the case.
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and u p, Cg = pu(C^) + (l - p) u(Cg).
This last result is the expected utility hypothesis stating that ex­
pected utility is calculated as the sum of the utiles of consequences 
with each consequence being multiplied by its probability of occurrence^,
Creating axioms will not,in itself, turn people into rational decision 
makers. Mosteller and Nogee (l95l)> Davidson et.al.,(1957) Fellner 
(1961) and Ellsberg (I96I) all showed that many individuals were irra­
tional when making decisions. The inconsistencies were apparent de­
spite the variety of research methodologies employed e.g., dice, lott­
eries and urns. After Ellsberg's’ publication Raiffa (1961) commented, 
inter alia, that the various experimental findings, particularly the 
findings of Ellsberg where subjects displayed behaviour that seemed 
contrary to "common sense" and persisted with it even when their in­
consistencies were pointed out to them, did not negate the value of 
utility theory but rather, underlined the need for such a theory.
It is natural that most people will not always behave according to these 
axioms. Some will exhibit intransitiveness in preference orderings, 
many will enter gambling situations 'for the fun of it' even when it is 
highly unlikely they will gain. In certain cases all possible steps 
will be taken to avoid a gamble. Axiom (C), Probability Mixtures,is a 
good example of this last point. It is stated that a probability p can
be found such that ^ Cg substituting the consequences from
4
This conclusion is often referred to by saying the utility function is 
linear. This can lead to confusion, in view of the many uses of the 
word 'linear' and as we will be using the word later for a distinct 
purpose its use at this point has been avoided.
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the insurance purchasing decision at the end of chapter one of = 0 ,
Cg = -£35 and C^ - -£10,000 we can see that p would have to be 1 before
most people would prefer not to purchase insurance.
Edwarcfe et.al,(19&5) Aumann (1962) and later MacCrimmon (1968) and 
Slovic and Tversky (1974) have looked at each axiom in detail. The 
general result has always been that decision makers do not abide by 
the basic postulates. In MacCrimmon’s study most subjects accepted 
that they had violated reasonable postulates about consistent be­
haviour and were prepared to revise their choices when the inconsisten­
cies were pointed out.. From a practical point of view the axioms can 
be looked upon as no more than testable hypotheses about human be­
haviour.
The value of the utility function, in ordering preferences over conse­
quences, is that it may minimise or eliminate breaches of the consistency 
axioms by prescribing the way in which a person should act in a manner
consistent with his basic judgements and preferences.
Normative - Predictive - Descriptive.
In other words, Utility Theory suggests how a person should act, not 
how he does act or how he will act. It is normative as opposed to de­
scriptive or predictive. The normative/descriptive dichotomy is easy to 
see in that Utility Theory can be used either to represent how men should 
act or it can be used, after a decision, to describe how they did act. 
This type of dichotomy is not uncommon in other real life situations 
with moral codes telling us how we should act and the news media telling
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how we do act, with the law laying down rules as to how we should be­
have and court records describing how we do.
The normative/predictive dichotomy is not just as clear as the nor­
mative/descriptive. Some would say that to state how a man will act 
in a decision making situation is the same as suggesting how he should 
act. To many, to predict and prescribe are synonymous and there seems 
to be no consensus as to whether utility theory is normative or pre­
dictive*
Raiffa (I96I) (p.690) writes "Savage's theory (the theory of maximis­
ing expected utilities) is not a descriptive or predictive theory of 
behaviour, it is a theory which purports to advise any one of its be­
lievers how he should behave in complicated situations". On the other 
hand Borch (I965) refers to the same concept of maximising expected 
utilities as being a method of predicting decision making behaviour.
In this research we take the view that Utility Theory is Normative.
The value of a normative utility theory can be summarised by saying 
that it codifies preferences thus allowing the opportunity to alter 
any choices that deviate from "rational" preference postulates, it 
greatly eases the problems associated with determining preferences 
between alternatives made complex either by the multidimensional 
nature of the alternatives themselves or the fact that the preference 
is only one stage in a sequential choice process and finally it en­
ables the decision maker to transform his preferences into a num­
erical scale with the consequent advantages of being able to reduce 
many alternatives to a common form prior to determining the optimum.
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Later in this chapter we review the literature relating to the appli­
cations of Utility Theory, in particular prescriptive Utility Theory, 
but one important point that rarely appears in the literature is 
whether or not the use of normative Utility Theory does provide the 
"best" preference orderings. It certainly provides the rational de­
cision maker with a set of preferences to which he should adhere, 
assuming he does not want to deviate from the axioms upon which the 
theory is based. Most would agree that this is a good thing as it 
introduces the opportunity to be consistent. The use of prescriptive 
Utility Theory may lead to the "best" decision as far as the indivi­
dual is concerned, but it is still questionable whether such a de­
cision will be best for the firm as a whole. If we assume that cor­
porate decision makers do deviate from prescriptive Utility Theory 
axioms, as the literature would seem to suggest, one has to question 
if this degree of apparent irrationality is not the essence of entre­
preneurial activity or at least a major factor in it.
What is rational behaviour will differ for each man and if Utility 
Theory is looked upon as a means of representing how a man should 
act then the prescriptive powers of the function have to be vali­
dated by the individual. If deviations from the prescribed course of 
action seem more acceptable than the prescribed behaviour then the 
model must be rejected as not being a good normative model. This 
assumes that the person has given considerable thought to what is 
acceptable and also that the function is looked upon as being with­
out fault.
Neither of these two assumptions can readily be relied upon,
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the former for reasons of human nature and the latter due to the 
"state of the art" of constructing utility functions. While human 
nature may inhibit attempts to ensure that people are completely 
aware of all the implications of rejecting the normative model's 
solution to choices, only the boundaries of our own knowledge of the 
measurement of utilities can inhibit our attempts at ensuring that 
the utility function is flawless.
THE MEASUREMENT OF UTILITIES.
Our knowledge and understanding of the measurement of utilities has 
been enhanced by many studies over the years. An examination of the 
literature relating to normative Utility Theory does reveal an almost 
even division between studies concerned with the measurement of utilities 
and those involved with the behavioural aspects of the theoiy.
If the literature is further classified then the behavioural studies 
can be divided into those concerned with the axioms and other doctrinal 
aspects of utility theory and a somewhat smaller number having to do 
with the applications of the theory either in the laboratory or in the 
field. Many of the studies referring to the axioms and other funda­
mentals of utility theory have been touched upon earlier and reports 
on the practical applications of the theory will be dealt with later 
in this chapter. In the meantime we will look at the literature bear­
ing upon the measuring of utilities.
There would certainly be little point in formulating a normative 
utility theory if there was no satisfactory method open to us for the
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measurement of utilities. Viewed this way the measurement problem 
assumes an importance that is not altogether reflected in the liter­
ature. The question of satisfaction with a method of measurement is 
inevitably impermanent as our knowledge expands with each experiment 
making use of a new method.
The measurement of utilities is a problem that continues to occupy the 
attention of those concerned with the application of utility theory.
It is not possible to lay down a set of rules that, if followed, will 
lead eventually to the construction of a utility function, .thus the 
measurement of utility differs significantly from the measurement of, 
for example, heat or sound. This does not imply that utility functions 
cannot be constructed for most problems and as we will see later in this 
chapter a wide range of problems have been approached using a utility 
function as an aid.
One result of the absence of a comprehensive system of measurement is 
that the literature on the creation of utility functions has tended to 
emphasize the value of a method of measurement in relation to the par­
ticular experiments or problems being tackled. Seldom, except perhaps 
in the field of investment analysis, are guidelines suggested to the 
reader which lead to a measurement technique capable of wide applica­
tion. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) suggest a reason for this by saying, 
"this is mainly because the assessment of utility functions is as 
much of an art as it is a science and, therefore, no single set of 
rules can be laid down that invariably results in a utility function"
(p.188.) We will look at five methods that have been employed to measure 
qtility.
27
a ) Direct Rating Method,
The most straight forward method of measuring utilities is to ask the 
subject to rate the commodity in question either by selecting a number 
on a scale or by placing a mark on some straight line scale. This form 
of measurement is restricted to problems where the outcomes are discrete 
as it is difficult to see an application where continuous outcomes 
apply. Torgerson (1958) discusses this method of direct assessment 
and explains a number of variations on the original idea. Apart from 
the restriction to problems involving discrete outcomes, there is one 
other major drawback. The direct assessment technique could be used to 
construct a utility scale relating to a consumer and, say, his views of 
washing machines but if that same consumer was given different amounts 
of money and asked to rate them on a particular scale he would have the 
greatest difficulty in understanding what was being asked of him. The 
reason for his difficulty is not solely the direct assessment method, as 
he could use it quite well when thinking of the washing machines. What 
has caused the difficulty is that money is capable of being measured on 
other scales and the consumer would be confused concerning what scale to 
use. Would he rate them according to their absolute value, value to him 
or in any of a number of ways? Even if the consumer did produce some 
rating it would not be possible to state that the resultant utility 
scale represented his attitude to"risk.
In cases where outcomes can be measured by some other scale another 
method must be employed. Three methods have been devised that are all 
based on the Von Neumann and Morgenstem (1947) concept of the "stan­
dard gamble".
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The approach that each takes is slightly different but in essence they 
all involve establishing a relationship between a series of probabilities 
and a number of outcomes. The form of this standard gamble is shown in 
Fig.4* The subject is being asked to compare Z with pA + (l - p) B, 
where p is the probability associated with achieving A, a given outcome, 
and (l - p) is the probability of securing B, the other outcome, A 
questioner can elicit either the value of Z, p, A or B that result in 
the subject being indifferent between Z and pA + (l - p) B.
choose a
certain
amount
or
à gamble between 
A and B at probabilities 
of p and 1 - p respectively
Fig.4
B) Sure Thing Method.
The first of the three methods based on the standard gamble principle 
can be referred to as the ’Sure Thing' method and involves the subject 
in selecting the particular value of Z where he is indifferent between
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receiving it and entering a gamble where he will receive A, p number 
of times and B, (l - p) number of times. In a simple example we could 
consider an investor who is trying to select the optimum investment 
alternative from a list of several options. He decides to substitute- 
utiles for the absolute values of the interest rates offered on the 
various alternatives. He first selects the extreme outcomes, e.g., Ijfo  
and Gfo and arbitrarily assigns the utility of one to be 1 and of the 
other to be 0. There is no significance in the scale chosen, he could 
equally well have assigned 47*55 and 97*82, for the two extremes, as 
no meaning attaches to the absolute utile value. Most experiments have 
used scales of 0 - 1 or 0 - 100. To find the utile value of the inter­
est rates he must find an amount that will make him indifferent to the 
chance of securing Ijfo  with a probability of p and 6^ with a probability
of (l - p). Let us assume that the respective probabilities have been
calculated as 0.75 and, consequently 0.25. lu other words:
Z - p. A + (l - p), B 
Z = 0.75*15# + 0.25.6#
At this stage the subject decided that he would be indifferent between 
receiving 11# as a sure thing and running the risk of getting either 15# 
or 6#, Substituting 1 and 0 for 15# and 6# we have:
U(Z) = p. U(A) + (1 - p). U(b )
U(Z) = 0.75*1 + 0.25*0 
TJ(Z) = 0.75 
ïï(ll#) = 0.75
Knowing the utile value of 11# will then assist him in finding other 
utile values and in eventually constructing a utility function.
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Some writers, such as Becker and McClintock (196?) refer to this 
method as the ’selling' method. This description has an appeal when 
considering outcomes that are positive, in the sense that they do not 
involve the subject in losing. In the previous example we could talk 
of the investor selling his chance of possibly getting a 15# or 6# 
return on his investment. If the interest rates were such that the in­
vestor was losing money no matter which alternative he' selected it would 
be unusual to refer to him as selling his chance at losing either'£X or 
£Y. It would be more common to say that he is trying to buy his way out 
of this situation by paying someone to take the chance for him rather 
than to say he sold the gamble for minus £W.
Describing the method as the ’sure thing' or 'certainty equivalent’ 
method not only helps to explain the technique but resolves the pro- 
lem of referring to buying and selling gambles. Krantz and Tversky 
(1965) raised the important point that it may not always be justifi­
able to relate the utility of a buying price with the utility of the 
wager being purchased and this caused many to reconsider findings 
based solely on buying prices, such as the work by Mosteller and Nogee 
(1951) and Edwards, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1962).
C) The B R L T Method.
This method, developed by Raiffa (I968), reverses the problem facing 
the decision maker. In the sure thing method the decision maker se­
lected his sure thing that made him indifferent to a gamble, Raiffa 
proposes a system that compels the subject to select a gamble that 
makes him indifferent to a given sure thing. The method has become
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known as the B E L T  (pronounced *brilt’) method. The letters B E L T  
stand for basic reference lottery ticket and refer to the hypothetical 
gamble that the decision maker is asked to imagine. Of all the measure­
ment techniques B E L T  may, at first, be the most difficult to grasp 
but it does in its own way highli^t the very problem it attempts to 
solve.
The method relies on a person being able to equate each one of the out­
comes in a decision problem with some imaginary lottery so that he can 
say he is indifferent between playing the imaginary lottery or getting 
the real payoff as represented by the outcome in the problem itself.
In doing this the decision maker sets the probabilities associated with 
the lottery. He may think of the lottery as a perfect wheel of fortune, 
an u m  filled with different coloured balls or any other game of chance 
involving events that are equally likely, mutually exclusive and ex­
haustive.
The basic reference point is the establishment of two reference payoffs,
one which is at least as good as the best outcome in the real problem
and another which is at least as bad as the worst. The lottery or re­
ference gamble could involve anything that the decision maker really 
likes or would find attractive. He may decide that either life member­
ship of the opera, an expensive new stereo set or a world cruise is at 
least as good as the most favourable outcome in the real problem and 
that a free subscription to a magazine he detests is at least as bad as
the least favourable outcome. Working on a scale of 0 to 1 this means
that one of the outcomes to the real problem, the most favourable one, 
is indifferent to a 1.0 B R L T and that one other of the outcomes, the
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least favourable, is indifferent to a 0.0 B E L T .  By probing his 
preferences for all outcomes between these two he can find what 
B R L T’s will make him indifferent to the other outcomes in the real 
problem.
Pig.5 shows a decision problem represented by a simple decision tree. 
0^ and 0^ have been assigned B E L T  values, as already explained, and 
after considerable questioning the decision maker considers that he 
feels indifferent between^
°2 and a .4 B E L T
°5
and a .7 B E L T
°4
and a .6 B E L T
and a .9 B E L T
Or
1.0
0.4
0.7
0.6
0.9
0.0
Fig. 5
The B E L T*s are shown at the tip of each branch in place of the 
real payoffs, whatever they may have been. By averaging out and
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rolling back to the chance nodes it appears that alternative a^ repres­
ents a ,64 B R L T while ag represents a .60 B R L T. The decision 
maker would obviously prefer the higher B E L T ,  the greater chance of 
securing his ideal prize, and would block off ag.
This brief description of B R L T summarises more than a chapter of 
Raiffa's (1968) basic text. Descriptions of the B R L T method are 
also to be found in works by Becker and McClintock (1967) Hull, Moore 
and Thomas (1973) and Moore and Thomas (1973)* We can envisage two 
problems with this method. Firstly the system is complicated and 
difficult to operate with people who are unfamiliar with the concept 
of utility. The explanations necessary may suppress a decision maker's 
true feelings and the method may end up becoming an end in itself as 
opposed to a means to an end. Secondly there is the problem of asking 
a person to select a gamble that makes him indifferent to a sure thing, 
rather than asking him to select a sure thing that makes him indifferent 
to a gamble. The latter, as was mentioned above, can be utilised in 
either a buying or selling situation but the B E L T  approach does seem 
to be similar to the buying situation and consequently may encounter the 
difficulties, already mentioned, concerning the equating of the utility 
of a bid for a lottery with the utility of the lottery itself.
D) Mid-Point Method
The last of the three measurement techniques having their base in the 
Neumann - Morgenstem Standard gamble is the Mid Point Method. This 
technique is a combination of 'sure thing' and, 'direct rating' in that 
it asks the decision maker to select the outcome that to him is
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equivalent to a 50/5O gamble on two payoffs i.e. Given A and B as two 
outcomes in a problem the subject is asked to consider that each is 
equally likely and to decide what outcome is equivalent to that gamble. 
Having done that, each half can then be further sub-divided.
Despite certain problems that may arise due to a person’s convictions 
about gambling and lotteries and the fear that he may not be describing 
his preferences accurately, these three standard gamble methods have 
found the most favour with researchers both in discrete and continuous 
variable situations.
E) Ordered Metric Method
Decision makers are not always able to look upon their problems as 
being a set of outcomes to rank or a set of problems equivalent to 
a lottery where the outcomes have a given chance of occurring. In 
many decisions, particularly business decisions, the decision maker 
knows the outcome that is least desirable to him. Having ordered the 
outcomes he can then very often, also order the differences between 
the outcomes. In problems where utility is a function of a discrete 
variable, a method relying on ordering, known as the 'Ordered Metric' 
method can be employed. Coombs (,1950) is accorded the credit for this 
technique, which requires very little of the decision maker by way of 
understanding difficult concepts or in providing answers to complex 
questions.
The difficult part of the method is the ordering of differences be­
tween outcomes. Given three outcomes A, B and C the decision maker
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may be sure that A is the worst outcome, that B is next to worse and 
that G is next to B, but when he is asked if the difference between 
A and B is less than the difference between B and C he may experience 
some difficulty. He can be helped by asking himself if a 50/50 gamble 
on A and B is preferred to a 50/50 gamble on B and C. This reintro­
duces the gamble and may not be advisable unless the subject is com­
pletely unable to order the differences. Let us assume that the 
difference between B and C is less than between A and B. If the 
utility of the worst outcome is ranked as 0 and subsequent differ­
ences are ranked 1, 2, 3...n, to the nth difference then this gives:
U(A) = 0, U(C) - U(b ) - 1, U(b ) - U(A) = 2 therefore
U(A) = 0, U(B) = 2, U(G) = 3.
This review of measurement methods has not mentioned the work of
Farrar (I96I), Markowitz (1959) > Arrow (1965), Meyer and Pratt (1968)
and Hakansson (1971) who have concerned themselves primarily with the 
utility of an investor for money. Many assumptions have been made and 
challenged with the aim of avoiding bombarding the investor with a 
series of questions, of the form we have described in the above methods. 
The alternative they were seeking was to ask a few questions to elicit 
basic objectives and risk aversions and then, based on a number of assump­
tions, construct a theoretical utility function. This is very much like 
picking a function ’off the peg'. For this to work it demands a complete 
understanding, on the subjects part, of concepts such as compound returns, 
decreasing and increasing risk aversions. While such concepts may be 
known by many experienced investors it is unlikely that a business de­
cision maker, in the normal course of business, would have reason to be 
aware of them.
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APPLICATIONS OF UTILITY THEORY
One point that was made earlier relating to the formal analysis of 
decisions was that a logical framework for decision analysis existed 
that was quite independent of any particular decision. This is evi­
denced by the application of Decision Theory Analysis to problems as 
wide ranging as the siting of nuclear power plants, Keeney and Nair 
(1975)» family planning decisions Beach et.al. (1976), seeding hurri- 
cames, Howard, Matheson and North (1972) and the choice of handgun 
ammunition for a police department, Hammond et.al. (l975)* In com­
parison to reports of general decision analysis projects there are re­
latively few studies reporting the application of Utility Theory. The 
studies that have been reported, however, cover a wide range of pro­
blems and result in a similar conclusion to that in the paragraph 
above. Namely Utility Theory as a means to aid decision making stands 
distinct from the detail of any one problem. The only common feature 
of the decisions being that they require some form of preference or­
dering of particular attributes.
This study is concerned with management decision making and the appli­
cation of Utility Theory but it is useful to remember that Utility 
Theory can and has been applied to many forms of problems, Krischer 
(1974) addressed the problems associated with the decision to operate 
on patients having a cleft lip. Brown and Peterson (1975) calculated 
utiles related to various political agreements drawn up to ensure 
the Vest's continued supply of oil.
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Business Applications.
The business applications of Utility Theory would seem to have been 
impeded by misunderstanding and lack of knowledge of the basic con­
cept of utility. This is no different from attempts at applying the 
theory in other areas except that the business man places great value 
on his experience and intuition when confronted by a decision. This 
may explain, in part, his reluctance to consider the use of formal 
Decision Theory Analysis, and particularly the use of Utility Theory.
What must be impressed upon managers is that decision models are not 
intended to replace intuition or experience. Knowledge of the formal 
theory and methods of assessing utilities can be a valuable supple­
ment to the usual intuitive approaches to decision making.
The work of Grayson (I960) marks one of the first attempts at assess­
ing utility functions in an operational setting. Grayson confronted 
a number of oil men, engaged in the exploratory search for gas and 
oil, with hypothetical drilling opportunities. They were asked to 
accept or reject them on the basis of the investment required, po­
tential payoff and probability of success in finding oil or gas.
The majority of the oil men were ’wildcatters' so described as they 
were not averse to accepting unfair gambles.
The basic format of the experiments was that the 'wildcatter' was 
asked if he would invest, for example, |20,000 in a drilling venture 
that had a potential, gross payoff of |l00,000 if it were successful 
and had a .4 probability of success. Depending upon the answer the 
probability level was increased or decreased to the point where the 
'wildcatter' was indifferent between accepting and rejecting the in­
vestment.
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If indifference was found at probability p, then:
U(0) = p.u(|80,000) + (1 - p).u(-|20,000)
This equation is founded upon the basic standard gamble and if two 
points on the utility scale are arbitrarily set then any number of 
points could be derived. Grayson obtained, on average, sixteen points 
for each ’wildcatter' and drew a line of ’best fit' through them. He 
had little success at introducing the utility concept to the 'wild­
catters' who seemed to have a mistrust of using graphs and scales to 
represent their judgement. There were also technical problems with 
Grayson's study, many of which were due to the fact that he was one 
of the first to test Utility Theory in a practical business area. One 
such problem was that no attempt was made to mathematically describe 
the relationship between dollars and utiles. Later developments, if 
they had been known at the time, would have greatly enhanced Grayson's 
work. An example of this was highlighted by Kaufman (I963) when he 
found that a logarithmic utility function was a very good fit to the 
data produced for one of the 'wildcatters’.
Green (I963) produced work that underlined the feelings expressed by 
Grayson's 'wildcatters’. Green's subjects were sixteen executives 
from a large chemical company and he attempted to construct utility 
functions for them both as individuals and business executives. 
Scepticism was expressed by the subjects as to the validity of using 
utility functions.
The B E L T  method of utility assessment was carried out by Cramer 
and Smith (I963) ou a number of managers involved with research and 
U-evelopment decisions. The method was found to be time consuming and
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inadequate in determining the utiles at the upper and lower ends of the 
utile scale.
In contrast to the above mentioned studies, which indicated that mana-- 
gers did not place any great value on utilities, is the work of Marshak 
(1965). He reported the use of a prescriptive utility model by accoun­
tants in discussion of mergers and acquisitions. The accountants, men­
tioned by Marshak, had also progressed to the use of maximising expected 
utiles.
Immediately following these early studies came the, now very well known, 
work of Swalm (I966). Swalm’s intention was to describe, rather than 
prescribe, but as a step forward in our understanding of Utility Theory 
it represents a valuable contribution. One hundred executives were in­
volved and a utility function was created along similar lines to Grayson’s 
’wildcatters’. The questioning took the form of realistic business sit­
uations where the manager was being asked to act, as a business decision 
maker, in choosing a certain amount of money in preference to a 50 ~ 50 
chance of gaining or losing a given amount. Each manager was individually 
questioned, which took some considerable time, and utility curves were 
drawn. It is important to note that, despite the findings of Kaufman, 
these curves were still drawn by the ’eyeball* process and no attempt 
was made at expressing a mathematical relationship between dollars and 
utiles.
Swalm concluded his study by asking if business managers really are the 
risk takers that everyone thinks they are. He found that his subjects 
did not attempt to maximise expected dollar income in situations in­
volving risk and that Utility Theory was at least a step in the right
40
direction as far as describing their behaviour was concerned*
Thirty-six executives were used by Spetzler (I968) in his attempt to 
develop a corporate risk policy for capital investment decisions. 
Spetzler recognised the problems encountered by the previous researchers 
and set out to interview each manager and acquaint him with the idea of 
ordering and quantifying preferences.
Having described the role played by Utility Theory and having stressed 
the importance of assessing attitudes towards risk, Spetzler presented 
each manager with an investment opportunity involving two possible 
yields, one representing a high return and the other a low return. The 
probability of achieving a high return was given and then varied to find 
the point at which the subject was indifferent between accepting or re­
jecting the investment project. This method of assessment closely 
follows the earlier work and is again based on the standard gamble.
Later, Spetzler created logarithmic utility functions using a least 
squares error approach and returned to each subject for a further dis­
cussion, The conclusion was that each subject preferred the functions 
prescribed course of action to his original choice. This process of 
combining qualitative risk characteristics and quantitative risk assess­
ment produced appealing results for almost all subjects, but it was long 
and involved. A great deal of time was spent with the managers and the 
practical value of the technique must be called into question.
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UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS AND RELEVANCE OF THIS RESEARCH.
Apart from the studies mentioned above there is little evidence of em­
pirical work among managers, related to the application of normative 
Utility Theory. As was mentioned on page 26 much of the previous re­
search, other than that related to the measurement of utiles, has con­
centrated on an axiomatic treatment of the theory. Some researchers 
moved on from looking exclusively at the axioms to try and classify 
basic principles and increase acceptability, Moskowitz (1974) being a 
good example of this, but their work was still centred on testing the 
validity of certain axioms. Even MacCrimmon and Larssons work (1976) 
on a total re-evaluation of Utility Theory was spurred on by a dimin­
ishing belief in the justifiable nature of the axioms.
This present research is more in the style of the Grayson, Green,
Swalm and Spetzler studies to the extent that it suggests a method of 
measuring utilities for business managers and then sets about using, or 
applying, the resultant utility functions.
Unresolved Problems.
The comparison of actual behaviour with the axioms of Utility Theory 
present a number of unresolved problems, but in view of the direction 
of this study we will leave the discussion on basic postulates and 
concentrate on unresolved problems in the area of the measurement and 
application of utilities.
a) In many of the experimental studies employing a utility 
function the fitting of the actual curve was left to free­
hand drawing or as some have termed it, the eye-balling pro­
cess . The loss of accuracy and the time necessary to use
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such a curve, particularly where a large number of prescriptions 
have to be made, presents problems. It has to be said here that 
some very sophisticated mathematical devices have been employed 
by decision theorists to explain the relationship between utiles 
and different attributes. The various works of Robert Schlaifer, 
Kenneth Arrow, John Pratt, Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa are 
ample evidence of this. It does seem that many of these de­
vices are applicable in particular circumstances and only when 
certain assumptions are made. These assumptions then have the 
effect of reducing the measurement task from one of obtaining ■ - 
a whole curve to one of determining a few parameters in a 
functional form. The utility of an investor for money repres­
ents one of the main areas where assumptions are made and a 
mathematical relationship consequently derived. The functions 
created in this way are theoretical functions, not based upon 
empirical observations, and as a result they are not specific 
to any one individual.
b) Obtaining pound-utile co-ordinates is shown by the literature 
to have been an often long and complex business. The answer, 
as evidenced by previous research, has been to make assumptions 
that reduce the questioning necessitating only the determination 
of certain key parameters. A method is still sought that will 
quickly and efficiently enable co-ordinates to be derived for 
any given individual.
c) having derived a utility function the problem of changes in 
that function over time arises. Bell (1975) examined this
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and tackled the problem of the devastation caused in 
forests by the spruce budworm. This particular problem is 
typical of many where attributes are of a long term nature.
It would seem that little work has been directed at the time 
problem, with the work that has been done concentrating on 
modifying or updating functions, as opposed to making it 
simpler to derive them.
d) The importance of attitudes towards risk in business problems, 
with purely monetary outcomes, has been mentioned, Psycholo- • - 
gists in the utility area have examined risk taking behaviour 
and personality factors. Decision theorists have on occasion 
taken personality factors and related them to decision behaviour 
but there is little trace of emphasis being given to the import­
ant link between underlying attitudes towards risk and de­
cision behaviour.
Assuming that the prescriptive utility model suggests how a 
person should behave in a decision making situation and assum­
ing further that the utility model does itself in part reflect 
attitudes towards risk then there does seem to be some justifi­
cation for examining the relationship between attitudes towards 
risk and what a model suggests a person’s attitude towards risk 
should be.
e) The willingness of a decision maker to use the information pro­
vided by a normative utility function is crucial. The general 
receptiveness of the individual can be as much of a deterent
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in the use of Utility Theory as the validity of the actual prescriptions 
themselves. Conrath (1975) touches on this topic and Wade and Long- 
bottom (1972) report one user of Decision Analysis as saying (p214)»” 0000 
increasing their (management’s) understanding of what we are trying 
to do, should make Decision Analysis more widely accepted and used in 
the future”. In relation to the utility component of Decision Analysis 
the unresolved problems include when to reveal utility prescriptions, 
in what manner is the information to be provided, how long should a 
decision maker be allowed to reflect on differences between actual and 
prescribed behaviour. - -
Relevance'Of This Research.
As with most forms of research the value of this work is not to be found 
as a study in itself but as a contributory link in the knowledge chain.
It is neither possible nor practical to examine the full list of unre­
solved problems shown above, which is itself not exhaustive, but the 
relevance of this present study in relation to certain of those problems, 
and to previous research in general, is as follows:
a) Business managers are used as subjects in the creation and 
application of utility functions. This avoids the problems 
involved in using students or other non-management subjects 
and averts some of the criticisms leveled at earlier work.
b) A new test is devised to obtain pound - utile co-ordinates in 
a manner more appealing to the business manager.
c) A method of describing the relationship between pounds and 
utiles is put forward which brings some rigor to the process 
and allows a comparatively quick calculation of prescriptions
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in any situation.
d) Emphasis is given to the attitude towards risk that is evi­
denced both by actual behaviour and prescribed behaviour and
a formula is derived by which attitudes to risk can be ranked.
e) The strength of belief in original decisions and willingness 
to change in the light of prescriptions is gauged by reveal­
ing utility prescriptions to different subjects at different 
times•
Multiattribute Utiles.
So far we have considered the assessment of a utility function as a 
function of a single variable. In many cases more than one attribute, 
often non-monetary attributes,will be involved. The purchase of 
new machinery may be measured by attributes including cost, design, 
capacity, durability, replacement times etc.,etc.
In situations like this Multiattribute Utility Theory ( M A U T ) 
can be applied. No further mention of M A U T will be made as the 
nature of this present research involves a number of problems in the 
application of Normative Utility Theory that are common to both uni - 
and multi - dimensional utilities.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PROBLEM
The area of decision making is so vast that almost any review would 
be incomplete in some respect. The proceeding survey of past work 
has attempted to portray certain general theoretical points while 
concentrating on those topics that are important to this present 
research.
As was stated in the introduction this study is concerned with 
attitudes towards risk and the use of Utility Theory as a prescrip­
tive decision making aid. Utility has been used in a number of 
disciplines for varying reasons but apart from decision theorists 
possibly the main use of Utility Theory has been made by economists 
and psychologists. Economists have generally relied upon utility 
as a means of explaining choice behaviour in situations involving 
two or more commodities where risk is absent. Psychologists have 
tended to look upon utility as being useful in the analysis and 
description of choice behaviour, whether under conditions of risk 
or not.
These very brief accounts of the role of utility in economics and 
psychology have been provided solely to highlight the different 
approach of the decision theorist in his use of utilities. In de­
cision theory we are not so much concerned with analysis and
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description as we are with prediction and prescription in situations 
involving varying amounts of a commodity and varying degrees of risk.
Many have suggested that if Von Neumann and Morgenstern had selected 
a term other than Utility, to describe their work, much of the criti­
cism of the concept could have been avoided.
The semantic problem has certainly not assisted the growth and 
acceptance of Utility Theory in decision making and this fact has 
been acknowledged by, at least, one writer. Hammond (19.67) entitled 
his paper on Utility Theory, "Better Decisions with Preference 
Theory" and explains his choice of the word "Preference" as being 
a deliberate attempt to avoid any ambiguity.
The term Utility Theory is now firmly established as an important 
part of decision theory and few text books on decision making omit 
reference to it.
We mentioned in the previous chapter that the need for Utility 
Theory arises as people assign different preference orderings to 
the same commodity and also display varying attitudes to degrees 
of risk. Utility Theory, if it is to be viable in a decision mak­
ing situation must take account of both direct preferences and 
attitudes to risk.
Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Raiffa (I968) and Thomas (1972) all intro­
duce the concept of unidimensional Utility Theory as being a mechan­
ism that combines a person's preferences and attitudes allowing
48
utiles to be substituted for real values in any decision problem. In 
situations involving non-monetary outcomes such as levels of pollution, 
social attitudes, health, tourist attractiveness, military efficiency 
and many more, it is clear that each decision maker will have his own 
preference ordering priorities. It is unlikely to have a situation 
where all people ranked differing levels of each outcome exactly 
alike.
When the problem of uncertainty is added to the decision then each 
decision maker's attitude towards the degree of risk involved will . .. 
combine with, and possibly modify, his preference ordering.
When the outcome of a decision or the attribute used to measure the 
extent to which an objective has been attained is in monetary terms 
then the direct preference can almost be assiuaed. Most people will 
prefer progressively higher amounts of money. As we saw in the pre­
vious chapter, the effect that risk has in decisions involving mone­
tary pay-offs is quite substantial. Although most people will exhibit 
very similar preference orderings for the real value of different 
levels of money they will display widely varying attitudes towards 
the risk involved in attaining or not attaining these particular 
amounts.
In business decisions involving monetary attributes the role of 
Utility Theory lies more in its ability to cope with different 
attitudes to risk than its ability to combine direct preferences 
and risk attitudes. This study, therefore, concentrates on 
attitudes towards risk and Utility Theory rather than on the axiomatic
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intricacies of preference orderings. Having decided that utilities 
can he used the major task is how to arrive at a utile value for each 
level of each attribute.
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) sum up their introduction to unidimensional 
utility theory by saying (p.134) '* If someone is sold on the merits 
of the above argument (Utility Theory) as we are, then the critical 
issue becomes: How can appropriate values (utiles) be assessed in
a responsible manner? This is really the essence of our problem".
The study of Utility Theory and its business application is still 
in its early years, and this research endeavours to represent one 
more step along the path leading to an increased knowledge of the 
value of utility in decision making.
The actual location of this present study in relation to previous 
research was discussed on pages 42 to 46 of the last chapter.
What now follows is a statement of the exact problem to be tackled 
together with the various hypotheses that will be tested in an 
attempt to provide a solution to the problem.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.
The main problem, in question form, is as follows:
"To what extent can a workable, utility 
based, normative model be created for
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decision making under risky conditions?"
This general problem lends itself to subdivision into two parts. 
Each of these two parts then gives rise to a number of sub-pro­
blems. It is only when these sub-problems are examined that the 
real direction of this research is made clear. The two divisions 
of the main problem and their various sub-problems are as follows
a ) To what extent can a utility based 
normative model be created for de­
cision making under risky conditions? 
i) In what way Can pound/utile 
co-ordinates be derived? 
ii) Is a self-administered utility 
questionnaire viable? 
iii) How is a curve to be fitted to 
the derived co-ordinates?
B) To what extent will the model be workable?
i) How will prescribed choices compare 
with actual choices in a number of 
decision making problems? 
ii) To what extent will decision making 
behaviour be influenced by knowledge 
of the models' prescriptions?
iii) How will the model reflect risk 
taking attitudes, as defined for 
the purposes of this study?
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iv) Will risk taking attitude be influenced 
by management background and the nature 
of the decisions posed?
A number of hypotheses have been created and these are detailed 
below. Prior to reciting the hypotheses it may be important to 
emphasize that although established statistical techniques will 
be employed in testing them there are hypotheses that are con­
cerned with the methodological problems associated with the 
creation of the utility function*
Some would argue that methodological points do not require to be 
included in the list of hypotheses. This would be the case if es­
tablished methodological procedures were being employed but in this 
study it has been thoi^ht advisable to prepare a comprehensive list 
of hypotheses including those that some may look upon as method­
ological considerations.
HYPOTHESES.
a ) Creating a Utility Function.
1) A self administered test incorporating the choice of 
certainty equivalents, by subjects, can yield pound/ 
utile co-ordinates.
2) A least squares regression programme will yield a 
non-linear monotonically increasing utility function 
from the derived pound/utile co-ordinates.
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b ) The Use of the Utility Function.
5) Any differences between model prescriptions 
and actual choices, in a number of decision 
problems, will be associated with the knowledge 
each subject had of how the model suggested he 
should act#
4 ) Differences between model prescriptions and 
final actual choices, in a number of decision 
making situations, will be smaller for those 
subjects who knew of their prescribed behaviour 
than for those subjects who had no knowledge of 
their prescribed behaviour.
5) Differences between actual and prescribed behaviour 
will be affected by whether a subject a) knew of his 
prescribed behaviour before being asked to make his 
choice or b) was given the opportunity to change 
his first choice in the light of his prescribed 
behaviour.
6) There will be no relationship between the 
risk taking attitudes of each subject as 
displayed by both the prescribed course of 
behaviour and actual behaviour, in a number 
of decision making situations.
C) Attitudes Towards Risk in Decision Making.
A particular method of sample selection was employed, for reasons
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that will he discussed in the following chapter, page 5® , and this 
results in our being able to divide the total number of subjects 
into two sub-sets each representing a different management function* 
Having done this, certain further hypotheses,.relating to sub-pro­
blem (b ) (iv) can now be tested and these are;
7) There will be a relationship between 
risk taking attitude, as defined for 
the purposes of this study, and 
management type.
8) Risk managers will be more risk averse 
than non-risk managers in decisions 
involving potential losses.
9) There will be a relationship between 
risk taking attitudes and different 
probabilities of loss*
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CHAPTER 4.
METHODOLOGY.
The way in which this study relates to previous research has been 
discussed at the end of chapter two and in the last chapter the re­
search problem and hypotheses to be tested were stated. This present 
chapter looks at the methodology employed in carrying out the work. 
Under four main headings the chapter looks at sample selection, 
measurement of risk taking attitudes, creation of a utility function 
and using the utility function.
The central concept was the creation of a utility function and the 
comparison of actual decision making behaviour with the behaviour 
prescribed by the function, for a number of subjects. As is discussed 
at page 5”^ , of chapter 3» it was important to gauge differences in
behaviour dependent upon when a subject was given knowledge of his 
utile prescriptions. The plan for carrying out the experiments is 
illustrated in Pig.6.
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Each subject tackled a number of decision problems and his actual be­
haviour was then compared with what his personal utility function 
suggested he should have done. This comparison of actual with pre­
scribed behaviour also takes account of the timing of knowledge, as 
indicated by the three knowledge groups.
Pig. 6, 
EXPERIMENTAL PLAN
The
Decision
Problems
The Utility Function
Knowledge 
Groups.
Comparison Of Actual And 
Prescribed Behaviour
Knowledge 
Groups•
The Subject
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SAMPLE SELECTION
The previous chapter indicated that this study relied on experiments 
employing practising business managers. The desirability of using 
business managers in experiments involving business decision making 
is evident. A well known formula for the analysis of behaviour was 
given by Lewin (1956) as B = *J‘(P,E). Behaviour is a function of the 
interaction between P, all the person's inner determinants including 
attitudes, and E, all the environmental factors as perceived by the 
individual. In a management sense, the degree of perception of the 
environment will be dictated to a great extent by worldly experience, 
in particular experience of the business world. It is difficult to 
quantify what effect experience has on a manager's day to day work. 
Experience is certainly a word that crops up frequently as being an 
invaluable attribute and one much to be sought after. It may be 
justifiable to say that much of what a manager does is dictated by 
his experience.
When business decision making is being examined we must ensure that 
this valuable input of experience is not relegated to a minor role 
but that it is allowed to play its normal part. One way to ensure 
that this experience factor is not omitted is to use practising, 
mature managers. The use of practising managers has its problems. 
There are problems of selection, of time constraints, of location 
and of persuasion. The use of College or University students has 
been made by some experimenters and in these cases the above pro­
blems are far less important. Assuming that a sufficient number of
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managers can be found, that they are willing to give of their time, 
that their geographical location presents no difficulties and that 
they can be persuaded to take part there remains one final problem* 
How can managers be motivated to tackle the various experiments 
conscientiously?. MacCrimmon (1965) appealed to a number of mana­
gers on academic grounds, Dickson (1978) provided an incentive by 
offering a bottle of whisky to three subjects drawn at random after 
the experiments in exchange for points gained in the experiments. 
Unlike students a manager will not be motivated by the possibility 
of course credits or the offer of a small fee, both of which are 
used with students. Information on the results of the experiments 
would be more likely to interest managers.
With these problems in mind it was nevertheless felt desirable to 
use business managers and to appeal to their interest in management 
education as a motivating factor.
The previous chapter, page 54 , did indicate that a particular 
method of sample selection made it possible to test a number of 
hypotheses related to the nature of work performed by the managers.
It was decided to ensure that the total number of managers was 
equally divided between risk managers, sometimes known as, insurance 
managers, and managers performing some other management role.
The reason for selecting risk managers as one half of the total 
sample is threefold. First was the risk manager's familiarity with 
risk particularly in a loss making situation. The. function of the 
risk manager in the identification, evaluation and economic control
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of risk within a business is described by the author, Dickson 
(1978a) and others, as one dominated by decision making under con­
ditions of risk. It was thought valuable to compare their responses 
with those of managers whose function is not solely related to loss 
making situations. Secondly a previous study carried out by the 
author Dickson (1978b) brought him in touch with a number of risk 
managers who appeared willing to help with any further projects 
and this seemed to provide a ready source of subjects. Thirdly a 
research grant was awarded by the Risk Studies Foundation^ who were 
interested in the general problem of decision making under risky 
conditions but were also interested in the comparison of the re­
sponses of risk managers and non risk managers.
The first approach was made by telephone to a number of risk mana­
gers who were asked to participate in the study. This personal 
contact, although time consuming, was thought more advisable than a 
first . approach by way of a letter. Those who agreed to take part 
were then asked if they could obtain the assistance of one other, 
non-risk manager, from within their company.
No attempt was, therefore, made to select the subjects on a random 
basis as those who were approached were managers who had previously
1
Risk Studies Foundation Inc. 205, East 42nd Street, Suite 1504, 
York, 10017, United States of America.
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assisted the author or who had expressed a willingness to help in
the future. No conclusion will be drawn about a wider population of
managers and all interpretations of the results will be restricted 
to conclusions relating to those who participated.
MEASUREMENT OP RISK TAKING ATTITUDES
The utility function has already been described as a means of re­
presenting attitudes towards risk and direct preferences for diff­
erent attributes. The importance of the utility function-as a re­
flection of attitudes towards risk in decisions with monetary attri­
butes has also been emphasized. The extent to which an individual’s 
utility function reflects his own attitude towards risk can be measur­
ed if we have some method of quantifying a person's risk taking atti­
tude and then of comparing this with what the utility function sugg­
ests his attitude is.
It is essential, therefore, to measure attitude towards risk, as 
distinct from creating a utility function.
As the whole study is concerned with decision making it was felt 
appropriate to measure attitude towards risk as evidenced by decisions 
taken as opposed to utilising attitudinal tests based on other forms 
of behaviour.
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Method Of Observation.
Decision making can be monitored by either observing actual decision 
behaviour or creating a number of hypothetical decision problems. 
Previous studies have made use of both approaches.
The literature is divided on the subject of actual versus hypothet­
ical decisions. To observe adtual decision making behaviour would 
involve lengthy sessions with the researcher closely following each 
action taken by the subject. It is not impossible as Clarkson (I962) ‘ 
showed in his classic study of the investment manager. An alter­
native to observing actual behaviour in this way is to create a 
number of decision problems, where the decision maker still stands to 
win or lose, and monitor behaviour. Suppes and Walsh (1959) gave 
each of their subjects  ^2 and allowed them to make decisions with 
pay-offs in the range of + ^ 1 to - | 1. Tversky (1967) used prisoners 
as subjects and their decisions had actual pay-offs of varying amounts 
of cigarettes. Dolbear (1965) introduced higher values of money when 
he offered his subjects pay-offs in the range + | 9*75 to - § I.50.
It can be seen that where a decision making situation is created and 
behaviour is being monitored, the pay-offs are necessarily restrict­
ed by the finance available to the researcher. This does create a 
less than realistic situation when contemplating the decision making 
behaviour of managers and their attitudes towards risk. The amounts 
of money used as pay-offs would have to be extremely large to be of 
any meaning to the average business manager and even then they 
would be far less than the amounts he was concerned with as a cor­
porate decision maker.
61
Recognizing this problem a number of researchers have used hypothet­
ical decision problems where no actual gain or loss was involved.
The work of Galanter (1962), Marshak (I964), Swalm (I966) and 
Spetzler (1968) is based on such a methodology.
The dilemma of actual versus hypothetical decision behaviour is 
that we do not know, for certain, that the decision maker would act 
as he said he would if money was at stake. Galanter (1962) supports 
his use of hypothetical decisions, and provides a valuable justifi­
cation for their use in general, when he writes (p212) ".^...we have 
asked people about hypothetical increments of money, and we do not 
have any information about what would happen if they actually get 
the money. This is often stated as an argument against techniques 
of this kind : but the fact of the matter is that prior to a de - 
cision one always considers the alternatives as hypotheticals and, 
presumably, bases his action on these considerations.”
We have selected the use of hypothetical decision problems and have 
created a number of decision situations all of which should be fam­
iliar to a business manager. The value of having the decisions in­
corporated in a story line rather than as a set of bare facts is in 
the fact that we want to encourage the decision maker to act as a 
corporate decision maker and not as a participator in a lottery. 
Twenty-four decision problems were included in a questionnaire, see 
appendix 1, which was sent to each manager. The financial amounts or 
the probabilities may not appear realistic to every manager but the 
story itself should bring a certain realism that would be missing in
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a straight forward bet or lottery.
The instructions that precede the decision problems did, inter alia, 
ask the manager to act as a business decision maker, doing what he 
considered he would do in the real world and not what he thinks he 
should do or what he thinks is expected of him.
Type Of Questioning.
It is possible to measure attitude towards risk by comparing a sub- ' '' 
ject’s preferences for certain outcomes over others. Coombs and 
Komorita (1958) provide a good example of this method. The success 
of this technique lies in there being a sufficient number of questions 
to enable averaging to be applied. This method has an appeal as busi­
ness decisions often involve a choice among competing alternatives.
An equally frequent business choice is where the manager must decide 
at what stage he considers one alternative to be less attractive than 
another. He is deciding when he is indifferent between one alternative 
and another, A form of questioning based on this style of decision can 
be created which can reduce the total number of individual questions 
asked but still allow an interpretation of risk taking attitudes.
There are a number of variations on the basic method of having a man­
ager decide his indifference point but they are all rooted in the 
standard gamble, already discussed.
The form of the problem is;
' p.fx + (l - p). £y = £z.
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Where p is a probability resulting in a p chance of getting £x or a 
(l - p) chance of obtaining £y and where p.£x plus (l - p). £y is 
equivalent to obtaining £z with certainty.
The researcher can then omit either £x,£y,£z or p leaving the subject to 
complete the equation.
The standard gamble method has been adopted in this study. All the 
questions involve the manager in providing the value £z in problems
where he has been given £x, £y and p. The questions were phrased in - -
such a way that the z value should represent the highest amount he 
would be prepared to pay in order to avoid taking the chancy alter­
native with the risk of losing a given amount. In problems involv­
ing possible gains he was asked to provide the lowest amount he would
accept below which he would prefer to take his chances. This particular
form of questioning was considered to be more realistic, for business 
managers, than a question that asked for an indifference value. 
Throu^out this study the words 'certainty equivalent' and 'indiffer­
ence value' will be construed as being the value derived in response 
to this line of questioning.
Compelling the manager to select the value of £z, that makes him in­
different to the chance of £x or £y has been prompted by three con­
siderations. The omission of the value of £z can be achieved quite 
easily in a story situation, whereas some difficulty is encountered 
when a story is constructed that omits £x £y or p. The selection of 
p, by subjects, i.e., the indifference probabilities could result in 
a set pattern which would not alter as the pound values changed.
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Such a finding was described by Murray (1970) who also commented on 
the third reason for letting the subject select £z. This is, that 
when either £x or £y is omitted the subject finds great difficulty 
in understanding the form of the problem. Murray concludes that his 
subjects were more readily able to provide the indifference amount, 
£z.
Mention has been made of the need to simulate, as far as possible, 
the actual values that would be involved in a business decision.
This necessitates the use of extremely large sums of money and was 
a sound reason for not using actual decision behaviour, with small 
betting pay-offs, as a measure of risk taking attitude. The criti­
cism of using small amounts is that they may be meaningless to the 
manager. A similar criticism is often levied against the use of 
extremely high values.
The questions in this study are in the range - £55»000 to + £50,000 
and are therefore considerably lower than those used by, for example, 
Swalm (1966) and Spetzler (1968). They are still large enough to be 
realistic. In each question one of the outcomes to the chance al­
ternative will always be zero pounds, and the other will be stated. 
Half of the questions involve the chance of gaining and half involve 
the possibility of a loss. This has been done in a further attempt 
to add realism and to make the subject examine each question care­
fully. Zero is shown as one of the outcomes to ensure that depending 
upon the other outcome, the indifference value £z, will be negative 
in loss making problems and positive in profit making situations.
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With the subject being left to select the indifference value, £z, 
and the values of £x and £y being decided upon, a priori, it was 
then necessary to consider what probabilities should be used. Apart 
from six questions, which will be discussed later, it was decided to 
use p = 0.5* The resultant form of each question is that the sub­
ject must decide the value at which he is indifferent between ob­
taining it for certain and a 50/50 chance of attaining £x or £y, 
whatever they may be.
What is being tested is a person's attitude towards risk,.as measur- - 
ed by his choice of indifference value and to this extent it was not 
thought that any purpose would be served by varying the probabilities. 
It is not certain that subjects could be looked upon as being con­
sistent, in their choice of certainty equivalent, over a range of 
different probabilities.
If a choice, other than a 5^/50 choice, was selected it would mean 
that within each question there would be an unequal chance of winning 
or losing, i.e., there could be a 40/60 chance of winning, meaning a 
40 percent chance of winning and a 60 percent chance of losing.
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) found that gambles involving unequal 
chances of winning or losing produced less consistent responses.
They ascribed this to the fact that with 50/5O choices a person only 
has two dimensions to integrate whereas with an unequal chance, say 
40/60, he has four dimensions.
This difficulty of coping with varying probabilities could not be
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ignored and rather than become involved with the problem we have 
limited our probabilities, with one exception, to .5. Swalm (I966) 
sums up the problem when he writes (p 12?) "because of the possible 
confounding of utility and subjective probabilities, and because 
there was considerable evidence that few could sense fine distinc­
tions between one course of action that had, say, a 90 per cent pro­
bability of success and another that had, say, a 95 per cent pro­
bability, we limited all our risks to those involving a 50/50 chance. 
These were easily understood as equivalent to a flip of a coin."
An exception to the use of 50/5O choices is made in the case of six 
questions where there is a 10 per cent chance of losing a high amount 
of money and a 90 per cent chance of breaking even. These questions 
are included as the low probability, high loss event is one with 
which the risk manager is particularly familiar. The list of hy­
potheses include one related to this particular point and it was 
therefore necessary to deviate from a strict 50/5O choice to allow 
this, hypothesis to be tested.
The Measurement Device.
What is sought is a method of scoring each subject according to his 
risk taking propensities. The data produced by the hypothetical de­
cision problems is in the form of positive or negative monetary 
values, each representing the subjects certainty equivalent from the 
twenty-four decision problems. Three options seemed to exist to use 
this data in obtaining the eventual measure of risk taking attitude.
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The real value in monetary terms could be used, the deviation of 
actual certainty equivalents from the mean certainty equivalent of 
all subjects could be calculated or the deviation of actual certainty 
equivalents from some independent bench mark, static for all subjects, 
could be used.
The latter was selected. The use of the real money values was re­
jected as these values were absolute terms and, in themselves, did 
not reflect any underlying preferences. The subject with the high­
est certainty equivalent need not necessarily be the most risk seek-r . 
ing person. In addition to this was the problem of positive and . 
negative values cancelling each other out and thus concealing risk 
taking attitude.
The use of the mean certainty equivalent was rejected as it is 
simply the mean and not necessarily reflective of risk taking atti­
tudes. The majority of subjects may have exhibited risk taking ten­
dencies in a question and the fact that one subject deviated from 
that pattern does not necessarily mean he was risk averse, he may 
simply have been less of a risk taker than the others, but neverthe­
less a taker and not an averter.
The third option, of finding a suitable bench mark, held out the 
most logical approach. If a base, the same for each subject, was 
selected which represented a particular risk taking attitude then 
deviations from such a base would give a measure of an individual's 
own attitude. The following describes a new approach to measuring
attitude towards risk devised for this study.
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Keeney and Raiffa (197^) look upon expected monetary value as in­
difference to risk when they define risk prone and risk averse be­
haviour. They are not alone in using the expected monetary value 
criterion to represent the actions of a person who is indifferent 
to risk. Using the expected monetary value ( E M V ) of each pro­
blem as the bench mark, any deviation from that could be used to
describe risk taking attitude.
With an E M V of + £2,000 any certainty equivalent (G.E.) greater 
than that would indicate a risk taker and any G.E. less than £2,000. 
would show risk aversion. In other words faced with an E M V cal­
culated to be £2,000 the risk averter would prefer a lesser amount 
for certain rather than run any risk while the risk taker would al­
ways take the chance until he was offered a certainty equivalent 
that was much higher than the expected value of the gamble.
Similarly if the E M V was - £2,000, risk aversion would be in­
dicated by a G.E. that was greater, i.e., the person was willing to 
pay more than the E M V to avoid the chance of possibly losing 
£2,000, Risk taking propensities would be evidenced by someone 
selecting a G.E. that was not as great as the E M V. In such a case
the subject would not be prepared to pay a great deal to avoid the
possibility of losing, he would rather take his chances.
Having decided to use the E M V as the bench mark, two problems 
still remain. The first is that the signs will be different accord­
ing to a positive or negative certainty equivalent. The solution is 
to alter
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the signs to indicate risk aversion or taking attitudes rather than 
losses or gains of actual amounts of money. With an E M V of 
+£2,000 and a subject selects a C. E. of + £1,800 then this would 
be the action of a risk averter and his deviation from the E M V 
would be shown as - £200. If the C. E. had been + £2,500 the person 
would be classed a risk taker and his deviation shown as + £500.
In cases involving negative E M V ’s the same principle can be 
applied. If the E M V is - £2,000 and the C, E. is - £1,700 then 
this represents a risk taker and deviation will be shown as + £500.
If the C. E. had been - £2,300, indicating an averter, the deviation 
would have been shown as - £300,
Large positive scores will indicate risk takers and large negative 
scores, risk averters.
The second problem concerns the use of the C, E'.s in absolute money 
terms. The following set of figures in Eig.7* illustrates the problem, 
and Sg represent two subjects and and represent two different 
questions.
The deviations, in absolute terms, are displayed in brackets directly 
beneath the C, E, figures. \^en these are summed for each subject 
has a score of - 170 and a score of + 230. On this basis is an 
averter and Sg a taker. A closer examination of the details in Fig.7 
shows that this conclusion does not adequately reflect the behaviour 
of these two subjects. By using the deviation figure on its own we
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are ignoring the important relationship between it and the bench 
mark of the E M V,
E M V +2200 
C E +2000 
(-200) 
(-.09]
E M V +2200 
C E +2500
(+300)
(+.14)
E M V -250  
C E -200
(+30)
(-.15)
E M V -230  
C E -300
(-70)
[I.50)
Fig. 7
When these deviations are transformed and shown as a fraction of the 
E M V, as indicated in the squared brackets, the position reverses to 
show as a taker and as an averter. This is a more appealing re­
sult when the extent to which each subject deviated from the E M V,in 
relation to the size of the E M V itself, is studied.
A formula can be presented to represent what has been done and it is;
C E E M V
|e M V
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It is necessary to use modulus E M V, jEMvj^in order to preserve the 
sign of the numerator. It is this sign, positive or negative, that 
is important and must be preserved. Taking the modulus E M V allows 
this to be done.
A score has now been arrived at for each subject and it must now be 
used to rank the subjects according to their calculated attitudes 
towards risk. It is not being suggested that the high scores are 
definitely risk takers or vice versa but simply that among all the 
subjects tested there were differences In risky behaviour and that 
the subjects with high scores are more risk taking, in attitude, 
and those with low scores are more risk averse.
Each subject will have a score for each question as found by the 
formula. These question scores will be summed for the twenty-four 
questions and a mean taken as the eventual total score.
The reason for selecting the mean can be explained using the follow­
ing figures:
Si Sg
+ .30 - .30
«2 - .30 .30
- .20 - .20
+ .10 - .10
+ .10 + .10
0 .20
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Sg appears a lot closer to than the sum of their scores seems to 
suggest and to reduce the possible effect that high and low numbers 
may have, the mean can be employed. In this example the mean score 
of Sg would be -.04.
What is then shown as the score for each subject is the reflection of 
his average attitude towards risk as described in the twenty-four 
questions.
Risk taking attitude can therefore be defined for the purposes of . . 
this research as the mean of the deviations of actual choices from 
the expected monetary values, expressed as a fraction of the ex­
pected monetary values, over a number of decision problems.
It is emphasized that, as yet, it is not suggested that one subject 
is a risk taker and another a risk averter but only that in relation 
to all other subjects each has shown himself to be different.
CREATING A UTILITY JUNCTION.
The problems involved in creating a utility function for an individual 
decision maker can be grouped under two main headings, obtaining the 
pound/utile co-ordinates and fitting a curve. Prior to examining 
the methods used in attempting to solve these problems let us state 
again that it is a utility function for an individual that is being 
created.
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Obtaining the Pound - Utile Co-ordinates.
The literature indicates the traditional method of deriving co-ordin­
ates to be a question and answer session with each subject. This is - 
very time consuming, and demands a degree of expertise on the part of 
the person asking the questions. The questioner probes the subject's 
answers until he is satisfied that the answers reflect the subject's 
'true' feelings.
In an effort to avoid lengthy interview sessions with participating . 
managers a self administered test has been devised. Should this 
test yield information suitable for the creation of utility functions 
then it will not only assist researchers by reducing time, but may 
also encourage more managers to give some consideration to utility 
theory in view of the relatively quick way in which a function can 
be derived.
A copy of the questionnaire used to derive the utility co-ordinates 
is shown in appendix 2. A decision problem was posed which involved 
each subject in the selection of his certainty equivalent. As before, 
the certainty equivalent was looked upon as being the highest amount 
the subject would be prepared to pay to avoid a chance of a possible 
loss or the lowest amount he would accept, for certain, rather than 
take a chance of gaining an amount of money.
The chances were all of the 50/5O type, the reasons for this and for 
having the subject select the certainty equivalent are the same as 
have been put forward in explanation of similar procedures when
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measuring attitudes towards risk.
The additional problem, when trying to derive utility co-ordinates, 
is that there must be some relationship between the various certainty 
equivalents selected by a subject. We have already looked at the 
literature on the measurement of utility and from an examination of 
any one of the methods it can be seen that if the researcher is with 
the subject then he can question and re-question, using previous re­
sponses, until he has a sufficient number of certainty equivalents.
The self administered test must make the subject re-question himself, 
in such a way that previous answers are included in any new questions 
so that a relationship can be built up among the certainty equivalents. 
Depending upon the number of points to be derived, this procedure 
could involve the subject in reading through a large number of 
questions•
A new approach was devised based on a reduction in the number of 
questions to one, with that same question being used several times 
by each subject. The technique developed to obtain the co-ordinates 
is now described and an extract from the questionnaire is shown in 
Fig.8.
Each subject is instructed to read the decision story that precedes 
the columns of boxes wherein he will be given the financial outcomes 
to the 50/50 chance alternative. These outcomes are also shown in 
boxes ^  and[F on line (a) and the subject is
onasked to place his certainty equivalent value in box 3
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line (a). Having done this he is then instructed to move to line
on that line with the amount he(b) and fill in box 3
filled in for it on the line above. In other words he carries
in linedown his answer from line (a) and fills in box 3
(b), By doing this he is presented with a new problem. He re-reads
the story substituting for £58,000 whatever figure is in box 3 
and he then selects his certainty equivalent to this problem and 
inserts it in box This procedure is repeated down to 
line (g) by which time he has provided seven certainty equivalents 
using the same basic story line but with different chance outcomes 
each time.
Outcomes Certainty
equivalents
a l|+8 i OjOQjO 2 | -  5 | 8 | Q 0  0
b q+|8 o j o i d o ] F3i I T  n
c jiHs ojo o |o l 4 t m
d |3| 1111II 14 1 1 IT
8 bl 1M i l l
f 11 1I N N 2 \ - 5 1 M 1 Ô 0
g ITTM i l l
urn
R m
Ml 11 m
R11 ITU 
Ml  I i m
M i l l  in
f i g .  8
16
These seven certainty equivalents are now looked upon as the pound 
values of seven pound/utile co-ordinates. The corresponding utile 
values are obtained in the following manner.
We have decided on a utile scale of 0 to 1 and arbitrarily assign a
utile value 0 to one payoff and utile value 1 to another in order
2that intermediate utiles can be derived . The two initial outcomes 
to the chance alternative, + £80,000 and - £58,000 can be looked 
upon as having a utile value of 1 and 0 respectively, (These par­
ticular monetary outcomes were selected as they encompass all the 
values involved in the risk attitude measurement tests.) Another
way of phrasing this is to say that box 1 has a utile value of 1
and box 2 a utile value of 0.
As the outcomes to the chance alternative are equally likely the 
value that is inserted as the certainty equivalent in box 3 will 
have a utile value of 0,5 according to the following calculations
2
Although we have said that the end points of 0 and 1 were arbitrarily 
assigned to - £58,000 and + £80,000 respectively this is not entirely 
accurate. When considering the fact that a curve was eventually to 
be fitted to the data it was thought desirable to have such a curve 
rise, monotonically, from left to right. Should 0 and 1 utiles be 
assigned to + £80,000 and - £58,000 this would not be the case and 
the result would be a line sloping down from left to right, 0 and 1 
were therefore arbitrarily assigned to the monetary extremes but dis­
cretion was exercised in deciding which utile value to assign to each 
end point.
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where £Z is the certainty equivalent;
0.5 ( + £80,000) + 0.5 1 - £58,000) = £Z
now substitute utiles for the two monetary outcomes,
0.5 1.0 + 0.5 0 = £Z 
0.5 = £Z
Let us assume that a subject selects + £20,000 as his certainty 
equivalent, then + £20,000 has a utile value of 0.5.
The value inserted in box 5 in line (a) is carried down to line 
(b) and becomes one of the alternatives to a new problem, as the 
following calculations show.
0.5 ( + £80,000 ) + 0.5 ( + £20,000) = £Z 
now substitute utiles for the two monetary outcomes,
0.5 1.0 + 0.5 0.5 = £Z
£Z = 0.75
We can now say that whatever value is inserted in box 4 on line 
(b), as the certainty equivalent, has a utile equivalent of 0.75.
What can be concluded is that each certainty equivalent box assumes 
a utile value so that whatever monetary amount is shown in the box, 
and it will vary for each subject, it has the same utile equivalent.
Fig. 9 shows the complete relationship.
Box numbers 0 8 7 9 3 6 4 5 1  
Utile values 0 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875 1.0
Fig. 9
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This display shows that the subject is selecting his personal mid­
point and that value is then equated with the corresponding mid­
point on the utile scale. For example box 3 is the mid-point be­
tween boxes 0 and 1 and if the subject was indifferent to risk the 
value in box 3 would be the pure expected monetary value. It is un­
likely that any subject will select the E M V hence the use of the 
phrase, personal mid-point. Whatever value is selected and placed 
in box 3 it still represents the mid-point on the utile scale i.e., 
0.5. Similar comments apply to box 4 being the mid-point between 
3 and 1 etc.
The certainty equivalent boxes were placed to the side of the 
outcome columns in an attempt to dissuade the subject simply from 
selecting the mid-point, as could have been the case if the "cer­
tainty equivalent" column had been placed between the two alter­
natives columns.
Fitting A Curve.
The above procedure yields seven pound-utile co-ordinates which in 
addition to the two end points of 0 and 1 results in nine co-or­
dinates in total. This number of co-ordinates is greater than some 
have obtained, for example the experiments carried out by Pratt, 
Raiffa and Schlaiffer (1965) with three and five points. Others 
have used many more points than this before fitting a curve.
In this study we were anxious that the subjects did not become
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aware of the idea behind the questions and then provide us with 
figures that they considered were expected of them. In an attempt 
to eliminate, as far as possible, this contamination of data only 
nine point estimates were derived. Had more than nine points been 
asked for we could not have been sure that 'true* responses were 
being given. There is no quarantee that the nine points themselves 
are 'true' in the sense that the subject is revealing his actual 
preferences and not what he perceives as his expected course of 
action. In our estimation it is likely that he will work his way 
through these questions without realising what conclusions are to 
be drawn from his responses.
One major comment on previous work is the extent to which the 
fitting of the curve was left to an "eyeball" process, a free hand 
drawing of a smooth line through a number of point estimates.
Much of the previous literature would seem to suggest that an 
analyst either selects an "off the peg" utility function, or he re­
lies on a freehand drawing of the curve, Keeney and Raiffa (1976), 
in what is one of the most advanced texts on utility theory in re­
cent times, suggest that two steps are necessary before a utility 
function can be selected. First, certain tests must be carried out 
to decide on the qualitative characteristics of the function such 
as monotonicity, risk aversion or proneness and the decreasing or 
increasing nature of such aversion or proneness. Secondly the 
quantitative restrictions on the function must be decided upon 
which they suggest usually involves determining certainty equivalents
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for a "few" lotteries. Having done this they continue by saying 
(p.196) "After we have determined some qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics of the utility function, we must determine whether 
these assessments are consistent, that is, does a utility function 
exist that simultaneously satisfies all of them? If there is such 
a utility function, how restrictive are these assessments, and how 
should an appropriate utility function he determined? If there is 
no such utility function, how should we obtain a consistent set of 
assessments?".
The implication may be that if the assessments do not satisfy the 
assumptions demanded by a number of pre-determined utility functions 
then the analyst is to consider how he can obtain assessments that 
will allow one of such a number of functions to be employed.
We have already discussed this question of using functions based on 
a number of assumptions and have decided not to rely on such a pro­
cedure. In its place we have devised a procedure that relies on 
minimum assumptions but still allows for a mathematical relation­
ship between pound values and utiles.
Our raw data was in the form of nine point estimates, two of which 
had been arbitrarily set and the remainder provided by the subject. 
Nine points did seem to be sufficient in comparison with previous 
studies where assumptions were made as to the qualitative and 
quantitative characteristics of the eventual function. The question 
to be faced was whether or not nine points were sufficient when
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little was to be done by way of ascertaining the basic character­
istics of the function.
This question had to be confronted as, for reasons already discussed, 
we did not wish to ask each subject for more than nine points but at 
the same time wanted to describe the relationship between pounds and ' 
utiles mathematically.
One assumption we can make, regarding the shape of the eventual 
curve, is that it will monotonically increase. This assumption is 
possible due to the nature of the self administered test.' The 
style of the questioning did not allow a subject to give the same 
pound value different utile equivalents nor did it allow for differ­
ent pound values to be assigned the same utile equivalent. This 
has proved to be a problem in previous studies and it was decided 
in this case to force the subject to yield co-ordinates that monoton­
ically increased^. What is required is a method of describing the 
relationship between any pound value and its corresponding
3
Monotonicity is a reasonable assumption when dealing with financial 
outcomes, but can still be broken when subjects are inconsistent in 
their responses, as indicated above. In non-monetary outcome pro­
blems monotonicity is less important. An example of this is the 
treatment of a diabetic and the measure of effectiveness of differ­
ent treatments by the blood sugar count. There will be a normal 
blood sugar count that is most desired and have a certain utile 
equivalent. A lower count will be less desired and have a lower 
utile value and in the same way a higher count may be equally un­
desirable and have a lower utile equivalent than that assigned to 
the normal count.
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utile equivalent, in order that this function can then be used to 
provide prescriptions as to how each subject should act.
The relationship between pounds and utiles is unlikely to be linear, 
as this would represent the completely risk neutral person. Daniel 
Bernoulli utilised a logarithmic function, as explained by Pfeffer 
(1956) but such a function has been found in practice to yield too 
severe a curvilinear relationship. The logarithmic curve allows for 
only one consistent change in the rate of increase of utile values 
for increasingly larger pound amounts.This means that a subject 
will emerge as either a risk taker or risk averter over the whole 
range of monetary outcomes. Such a finding would not accord with 
much of the theoretical rationale for utility work, in particular 
the knowledge that a subject may exhibit risk taking propensities 
over one range of pound values while showing himself to be risk 
averse over another range.
We were eventually attracted to a polynomial function and two 
principal factors led us to its eventual selection. Firstly, the 
data produced by a pilot study, to be described later, showed us 
that the nine point estimates resulted in a curve that had approxi­
mately three points of inflection. When a free hand curve was 
drawn through the original nine points a shape for each person was 
visible quite clearly. Three examples are shown in Fig.10.
It is this basic shape that represents the picture of each subject's 
risk taking attitude and this shape must be captured by means of a 
mathematical relationship,
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Fig. in
utiles
pounds
utiles
(b) pounds
utiles
pounds
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Experiments were carried out using polynomials of various degrees 
but with the higher powered polynomials it was found that the co­
efficients of the high powers contributed very little to the de­
scription of that variance not already explained.
As these higher power coefficients did very little to reduce the 
residual variation it seemed reasonable to omit them. An examina­
tion of the pilot study data, confirmed by the actual data, showed 
that most subjects produced point estimates that, when a line was 
drawn freehand through them, revealed on average three points of 
inflection. For this reason a polynomial to the fourth power, a 
quartic, was decided upon as the most suitable method of describ­
ing the resultant relationship.
The second reason prompting the use of the polynomial was the sup­
port for its use provided by previous scholars, Borch (I963) 
comments on the fitting of a curve to utility - money co-ordinates 
that (p.700) "...... the utility function U(x) can be a polynomial
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of the third degree, and this class of function agrees fairly well 
with our intuitive ideas of the utility of money”. This quotation 
does serve to remind us that we have a basic shape and that the 
task of the function is only to describe the pound utile relation­
ship, not dictate the actual shape or relationship. The polynomial 
is also proposed by Pashigan et.al.,(1966) as being a function that 
closely approximates an individual's own feelings. Finally Murray 
(1971) employed a quartic function and a logarithmic function with 
the same data and found the polynomial to be preferable partly for 
the reasons we have stated above, the polynomial being less severe 
than the logarithmic, and partly because the polynomial seemed to 
represent the shape indicated by the raw data more adequately.
One problem did arise while the data relating to the utility functions 
was being processed. A least squares regression technique was used 
to derive the regression coefficients for the quartic function.
The computer software package which was used also printed a scatt- 
ergram. From the scattergrara for each individual it was possible 
to draw, freehand, a smooth line through the point estimates. The 
graphs shown in fig.10 were produced by this technique.
4
E.S.P. (Econometric Software Package) version 5/1/73 was employed 
for the derivation of the utility function. This was preferred 
over S.P.S.S. (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) as it 
was possible to retrieve the coefficients when it was necessary to 
use the function to prescribe.
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In order to visualise the shape of the curve described by the quartic 
function twelve pound values were chosen, arbitrarily, and the corres­
ponding utiles calculated. These twelve together with the original 
nine point estimates produced twenty-one points.
Fig, 11 displays the result of this exercise for the three examples 
already described in Fig.10.
The result was that in some cases the same utile value was being 
given to different pound values. This was unsatisfactory as it 
produced a part of the curve that decreased thus contravening the 
monotonically increasing assumption.
Prom the nature of the questioning it was impossible to have a de­
creasing curve, therefore the reason was not a lack of consistency 
in the responses.
Further investigation revealed that the problem only arose in situa­
tions where a large gap existed between two of the original nine 
point estimates. Example (c) in Figs. 10 and 11 show that where 
the co-ordinates are evenly spaced the resultant shape described 
by the function was the same as the shape indicated by the nine 
points.
In the cases involving large gaps between two points the function 
was describing a relationship that was completely different from 
that indicated by the basic nine co-ordinates. A number of
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solutions were tried: the power of the polynomial was increased, 
decreased, the end points were cut off but the problem remained 
that in certain cases, 5 in number, 17 per cent of the total number, 
the polynomial was describing a relationship that could not exist.
What has been seen as the solution is rooted in the basic notion 
that the shape of the curve, as displayed by the original nine 
points, is what is important and that the function is intended to 
describe the relationship between pounds and utiles along that 
curve. We have some knowledge of what that relationship should be 
and seek a method of describing it mathematically. This is unlike 
many problems where little is known of the relationship between 
variables.
What was happening was that the original line of the curve was being 
distorted by the sophistication of the function used. The least 
squares programme attempted to fit the best line through the nine 
points, but it had not been told that there was a constraint, namely 
the curve had to monotonically increase. The polynomial regression 
equation was the result of the analysis of the effect of all the 
point estimates and the best line was consequently derived. The 
problem was that when a gap appeared either mid-way on the curve or 
at an end the equation had to consider the influence of the points 
that bounded such a gap. In example (b) in Figs. 10 and 11, the 
result of including the influence of the last two points was that 
the line, which was monotonically increasing up to that stage was 
pulled down. It was as if the best line was proceeding in a
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monotonically increasing fashion but was confronted with a large gap 
before it could reach the next point estimate. The influence of that 
point estimate had to be included and the consequence was that the 
line took what, for it, was the best course to reach it. In this 
way the original shape was being distorted by the function's sophis­
tication.
What was required was some method of giving more direction to the 
equation. The most satisfactory way of achieving this would be to 
have more than nine points but we have already discussed the pro- . . 
blems that could be associated with asking for more than nine point 
estimates.
As the solution to the problem a system of interpolation was devised 
to produce a number of additional points that could be looked upon 
as guiding points intended to assist the regression equation in de­
scribing the relationship that was indicated by the curve drawn 
through the original nine points.
This interpolation was carried out along the pound axis. The pound 
axis was divided to produce thirty-two equally spaced points. If the 
utile values could be derived for these points then they, together 
with the original nine points, would result in forty-one co-ordinates, 
which should assist the fitting of a curve.
When an upwards projection was made from these thirty-two points 
they landed somewhere between any two of the existing co-ordinates.
A method of assuming at exactly what point each projection would 1
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intersect the line joining the two co-ordinates was required.
Fig. 12 graphically represents what has been said so far
M
Fig.12
The exact line that the curve will take between any two points is 
not known. All that is known is that it is monotonically increasing. 
From the position of the two points we could make some assumptions 
as to whether the line would be concave or convex but this would be 
an estimate. In order to obtain the guiding co-ordinates a linear 
relationship was assumed for pound and utiles lying between any two 
original co-ordinates. Each set of two original co-ordinates was 
joined by an imaginary straight line and this assumption then allow­
ed the derivation of the thirty-two guiding co-ordinates to be com­
pleted. The result was forty-one point estimates. The least squares 
programme was run again with this new data and the decreasing curves 
disappeared leaving all subjects with a monotonically increasing
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curve that followed closely the shape indicated originally. The 
programme used to carry out this interpolation is shown in appendix 3*
An interpolation along the utile axis was considered but this only 
allowed for exactly the same number of guiding co-ordinates to be 
placed between any two original co-ordinates, regardless of the 
range of pound values covered by these two points. For example if 
the utile axis had been divided to produce thirty-two equally spaced 
utiles this would have meant four utiles in the spaces left by each 
of the nine basic utiles. As Fig.12 shows there is a considerable 
range of pound values covered by the space between points L and M. 
Despite this, the utile interpolation would only give four new 
points.
Interpolation on the pound axis allows for these large ranges to be 
'filled' by more guiding co-ordinates. The space between points J 
and K is small and only three new co-ordinates would be placed in 
the gap.
The reason for interpolating is to provide guidance to the function in 
the large spaces between point estimates and this seems to be achieved 
more satisfactorily by interpolation on:the pound axis*
In conclusion all that has been done is to 'eyeball' the shape of 
the curve and to give the programme enough information to compel it 
to fit a curve which corresponds to the image presented by the ori­
ginal nine points. The visual view of the shape is closer to reality
92
than the computed shape which is constrained by the type of function 
chosen.
The fact that the lack of monotonicity was apparent in five cases 
only, does not imply that the curves for the remaining subjects were 
satisfactory. There could well have been distortions in them but 
not so pronounced as to result in a downward sloping curve. The 
five subjects who contravened the monotonicity assumption could be 
looked upon as the tip of the iceberg and consequently the solution, 
as described above, had to be employed with all subjects.
Reliability.
The self administered utility test provided for the creation of two 
separate utility functions. These two separate functions can be 
used to assist in establishing the reliability of the function. The 
external validity will be considered when the functions are used to 
prescribe courses of action.
One method of testing reliability would have been to take two cer­
tainty equivalents, for example the values shown in boxes 6 and 9> 
and ask the subject to choose a certainty equivalent to a gamble in­
volving a 50/50 chance of securing either of these two amounts.
We know that the value in box 6 equals a 0.575 utile and that the 
value in box 9 is equal to a 0.625 utile. Any certainty equivalent 
to a 50/50 gamble involving these values as outcomes should have a
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utile equivalent of 0.5 in the following manner,
0.5 . U(6) + 0.5 . U(9) = U(Z)
0.5 .0.375 + 0.5 .0.625 = U(Z)
0.5 = U(Z)
Where TJ(6) and U(9) = the utile equivalent of whatever value is
shown in box 6 and 9 respectively.
U(Z) = the utile value of the certainty
equivalent Z, to a gamble involving 
a 50/50 chance of securing either 
the amount in box 6 or the amount, 
in box 9 .
Whatever certainty equivalent is selected we can say it has a utile 
value of 0 .5, but we know already that the value having a utile 
equivalent of 0.5 is shown in box 3> as per Fig.9 .
It would then be necessary to examine the relationship between the 
value of Z and the value in box 3* It is unlikely that they would 
be identical as subjects select their certainty equivalent from 
within some subjectively assessed range. To comment on reliability 
would require some boundary to be placed on this range so that if the 
two values were outwith the range the function could be looked upon 
as unreliable.
This form of reliability test could not be achieved easily by means 
of a self administered test and if a question to this end was insert­
ed it would be extremely difficult to decide, a priori, what the
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boundaries of the acceptable range were.
Having accepted that a subject is unlikely to produce exactly the 
same answer a second time round, two separate functions were de­
rived, each according to the method described above.
Each function resulted in a curve and both curves indicated the 
subject’s risk profile. A different utile value for the same pound 
amount may be shown by each function. These utile equivalents are 
absolute amounts and in themselves did not reflect any particular 
attitude i.e., a utile equivalent on one curve could be 0.45 and 
for the same pound value the utile on the second curve could be 0.40. 
The second utile of 0.40 although less in real terms does not necess­
arily imply that the person is less risk averse or less risk prone.
It is the shape of each curve that is important and a method was 
sought of combining the implications of these two curves.
The solution was to construct a new curve by taking the mean co­
efficients of the individual quartic functions:
1 2  ,1 ,2 2 1 2 3 ,1 ,2 4y = C + C + a + a x + b + b x + c + c x + d + d x
where; y is the utile
C is the constant
X is the pound value
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a )
b 
c 
d
are the regression coefficients
1 2a + a X represents the mean of the regression 
2
coefficients, as shown by the first 
and second quartic functions, for the 
value associated with x.
This procedure gave the mean coefficients that described a line 
midway between the two original curves, as shown in Pig.13.
derived curve
original curve
Fig.13
The two separate functions were tested to ascertain the extent to 
which each represented the same risk taking attitude of the subject
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USING THE UTILITY FUNCTION.
One aspect of the research problem, stated in the previous chapter,
was the comparison of risk taking attitude as displayed by the
utility function and risk taking attitude as defined for the purposes 
of this study.
The reason for creating a utility function is the hope that it may
be of some assistance as a decision making aid and the remainder of
the research problem was concerned with testing the prescriptive 
qualities of the function.
Having derived a mathematical relationship between pounds and utiles 
it is possible to arrive at the prescribed course of action in any 
decision problem quite accurately. The polynomial regression
equation is of the following form:
2 3 4y = C + a x  + b x  + c x  + d x
where y is the utile
C is the constant
X is the pound value. (As the pound values are high amounts
and as they are taken to the fourth 
power they have been transformed so 
that £1 = £10,000).
a ) 
b
• Î
ai
are the regression coefficients.
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The decision problems in the questionnaire used to measure attitude 
towards risk, shown in appendix 1, were utilised again.
Each decision involved two alternatives. On the one hand there was
a 50/50 chance of breaking even or gaining or losing a given amount. 
(As mentioned earlier, six questions involved a 10 per cent chance 
of losing). On the other hand there was a course of action leading 
to a definite monetary outcome. The problem was, what is the maxi­
mum the subject would be prepared to pay rather than take the risky 
alternative involving the chance of losing? In questions incorporat­
ing the possibility of gaining money or breaking even the problem
changed to be, what is the minimum amount the subject would accept
for certain below which he would rather take his chances on possibly 
gaining an amount of money?
The response given to each of the twenty-four decision problems in­
cluded in the questionnaire represented that subject's actual cer­
tainty equivalent. To obtain what his utility function prescribed 
as his course of action in each problem it was necessary to calcul­
ate the utile equivalents of the monetary outcomes to the chance al­
ternative, These were then combined with the chance involved, i.e., 
50/50 or 90/10 in order to calculate the certainty equivalent in terms 
of utiles. Whatever utile value was found it could then be transform­
ed back to pounds.
To simplify this procedure the pound and utile axes were adjusted to 
the point where zero pounds equalled zero utiles. This had the effect
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of reducing the calculations involved in each question as one of the 
outcomes, to the chance alternative, was always 'break even' which 
would now have a utile value of zero. Had this not been done it 
would have been necessary to calculate, for each subject, what his 
utile equivalent of zero pounds was.
In a problem where there was a 50/50 chance of breaking even or 
gaining £5,000 it was only necessary to calculate the utile equiva­
lent of £5,000 as zero pounds equalled zero utiles.
The certainty equivalent to this chance alternative is:
Z = 0.5. 0 + 0,5 . £5,000
where Z is the certainty equivalent.
The utility of Z (U (Z) ) can be expressed as:
U(Z) = 0.5 . U(0) + 0.5 . U (5,000)
but U(o) = 0
U(Z) = 0.5 .U(5,000)
Let us assume that the utile value of £5,000 is found to be 0.45: 
U(Z) = 0.225
This utile value of 0.225 can be looked upon as the y value in the 
basic regression equation and when this equation is solved for z we 
are left with the corresponding pound amount. If this figure is 
found to be say £4,250 then it can be said that such a person is a
risk taker, i.e., he would require a far higher amount than the
straightforward E M V of the chancey alternative before he would 
forego his option to select the risky alternative.
9.9
A list of the functions prescriptions was printed for each of the 
twenty-four questions for each subject.
As we are not predicting how people will act but are prescribing 
how they should act, given that they want to be consistent, it is 
likely that actual choices, in the twenty-four decisions, will vary 
from the utility prescriptions. This is to be expected and tests 
will show to what extent the actual varied from the prescribed. The 
particular research problem that was raised earlier concerned the ex­
tent to which a subject would use the prescriptions provided by the 
utility function.
In order to carry out these tests the subjects were divided into 
three groups. The self administered utility test was sent to each 
subject first and as they were returned each respondent was assign­
ed to one of three groups in turn. Group one were then sent the 
second questionnaire together with a letter explaining that the 
answers given to the first questionnaire had been analysed to enable 
prescriptions to be made as to how that person should act. A brief 
description of the role of utility theory was provided and the sub­
ject was asked to refer to a separate sheet of paper that showed how 
it was thought he should act in the twenty-four questions. It was 
made clear that he could make whatever use of the prescriptions 
he wanted.
Subjects in group two were sent the second questionnaire together 
with a sealed envelope marked "not to be opened until after the
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questionnaire has been completed". On completion of the question­
naire and on opening the sealed envelope the subject received a 
similar letter to the subjects in group one and was asked to re­
fer to a sheet showing how it was thought he should have acted. The 
instruction was to look back at the answers he had given and malce 
any alterations he wanted, in the light of the functions prescrip­
tions.
Group three subjects were given the second questionnaire and no 
other information at all.
Both questionnaires involved in the study were pilot tested by 
practising managers prior to the final form being arrived at. This 
testing of the whole questionnaires was preceded by separate tests 
relating to choice of wordings and the general phraseology of cer­
tain questions,
LIMITATIONS
There were certain limitations inherent in the form of experimen­
tation described in this chapter. The first is that hypothetical 
decisions were used to create the utility function and in the 
measurement of attitudes towards risk. The decisions were framed 
as realistically as possible and involved monetary values that 
seemed appropriate but there is still a limitation in any interpre­
tation of results. The use of hypothetical problems was made 
throughout and to this extent there is an element of consistency.
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A second limitation is that the pressures to which a manager is ex­
posed in the real world cannot he simulated when experiments of the 
form used in this study are performed. Each subject was instructed 
to act, as far as possible, as if he was making decisions on behalf 
of his company. He was asked to make the choice that he would make 
if faced with the problem in real life. It cannot be stated cate­
gorically that subjects responded to this instruction and it may 
be that some were influenced by what they thought was expected of 
them or by how they thought they should act.
A third limitation is the lack of motivation. When students are 
utilized in experiments it is often possible to stimulate motiva­
tion in a number of ways but with practising^ managers who are to 
face decisions with high monetary values the problem is more acute.
All that could be done was to appeal to their interest in manage­
ment education and their general sympathy with research and de­
velopment. This was done by way of personal contact with each subject 
but nevertheless the lack of. any more specific motivation is a 
limiting factor.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RESULTS.
This chapter contains the results of testing each of the hypotheses 
stated in chapter 3» and also the interpretation of these results.
This method of approach has been preferred to one that separates the 
display of results from the analysis.
At page 52 of chapter 3 the hypotheses were grouped into three 
categories, those concerned with creating a utility function, the 
use of the utility functions and attitudes towards risk in decision 
making. This present chapter maintains these categories and is split 
into three sections, each dealing with one of the groups of hypotheses.
This review of results is preceded by details of the numbers of 
managers who participated together with a general biographical de­
scription of respondents.
RESPONSE,
The experiments that each subject was asked to assist with fell into 
two parts and it was necessary for both parts to be completed.
Fifty-nine subjects returned the first questionnaire, out of which 
fifty-one returns were able to be used for the creation of a utility
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function. The reasons for discounting eight questionnaires are 
discussed on page 108 . Twenty-nine, of the remaining fifty-one ,
subjects completed the second questionnaire and it is on their 
responses to both forms, that the final testing of hypotheses is 
carried out.
As was stated when the method of sample selection was discussed, 
original contact was by telephone with a number of risk or in­
surance managers who were asked to obtain the support of one other
manager from within their company. The response' of twenty-nine
1managers represents returns from thirteen companies, in certain 
cases the return was only that of the risk manager. Table 1 dis­
plays the age and working experience of the respondents.
Of the twenty-nine respondents, fifteen or 51*7 percent are risk or 
insurance managers and 48*3 are non-risk managers. The particular 
management function carried out by these non-risk managers was not 
asked for but from some returns it can be seen that they range 
through business development, corporate planning, finance and pro­
duction.
1
Some companies had a risk or insurance function of such size that it 
involved more than one person in a management capacity. These com­
panies were therefore in a position to return forms from two risk/ 
insurance managers and two non-risk managers.
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TABLE 1.
Number of subjects related to 
type of manager, age and working 
experience.
Subjects
No. Percentage
Risk Managers 15 51.7#
Non Risk Managers 14_..... 48.-3#
TOTAL 29 100.0#
Age.
less than 30 3 10.3#
30 - 39 11 37.9#
40 - 49 7 24.2#
50 - 59 6 20,7#
over 60 2 6.9#
29 100.0#
Working experience.
less than 6 years 1 3.4#
6 - 10 years 3 10,3#
11 - 15 years 4 13.8#
16 - 20 years 4 13.8#
over 20 years 17
22. 100.0#
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The ages^  of respondents showed that 51.8 percent were beyond the 
age of forty while 89.7 percent were at least thirty. Experience 
of working life is shown by the fact that 86.3 percent of respond­
ents had been in full time employment for more than ten years and 
some 58.7 percent had worked for more than twenty years. The re­
spondents brought age and considerable experience of business life 
to the experiments.
Table 2 shows the educational qualifications of respondents.
Table 2,
Type of manager related to 
educational qualifications.
Risk
Manager
First degree - Yes 
- No
Professional jYes 
)
qualification)No
14
‘6.6#
93.4#
Non-risk
Manager
 ^35.7# 
 ^64.3#
l^ioo.o# 100.0#
Post graduate )Yes 1
)
qualification ^No 14
6.1
93.4#
7.1#
13 92.*
1Ü0.0# 100.0#
12 80.0# 42.9#
 ^ 20.00  ^ 57.1#
100.0# 100.0#
TOTAL
23
20.7#
79.3#
29 100.0#
27
6.9#
93.
29 100.0#
18
11
62.0#
38.0#
29 100.0#
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This comparison is drawn to add to the biographical data already 
mentioned, relating to the respondents. No further cross-tab­
ulations will be done to compare this biographical data with risk 
taking attitudes and decision behaviour.
At the moment it is interesting to note the age and working experience 
of subjects compared with the low numbers of managers holding qual­
ifications indicating higher education. Slightly more non-risk 
managers than risk managers have a university qualification while 
this is reversed when looking at professional qualifications. 80 
percent of the risk managers hold a professional qualification 
compared to only 43 percent among the non-risk managers. This can 
perhaps be accounted for by the lack of university courses in the 
area of risk and insurance, when these respondents were starting 
their careers, and the comparative strength of professional education 
in this area. It may also be that certain non-risk managers operate 
in areas where no professional qualification exists.
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SECTION A ~ CHEATING A UTILITY FUNCTION.
In chapter 5? page 51 , the problems associated with creating
a utility based normative model were described. The first two 
hypotheses are related to these problems.
Each will be discussed in turn and that will be followed by an 
examination of the prescribing function and the shape of the 
plotted utility curves.
HYPOTHESIS 1.
"A self-administered test incorporating 
the choice of certainty equivalents, by 
subjects, can yield pound/utile co-ordinates".
Eight returns to the first questionnaire could not be used and the 
subjects involved were not asked to continue with the study.
From these eight questionnaires it was noted that the difficulties 
were of two types, the subject either did not select a certainty 
equivalent from within the range bounded by the outcomes to the 
chance alternative or a mistake was made in the carrying down of 
figures from one row to the next. An example of the former is the 
subject who, faced with a situation involving a 50/50 chance of 
losing either £10,000 or £75»000 chose £8,000 as his certainty 
equivalent. Subjects were asked to make their choice from within
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the range hounded, by the outcomes to the chance alternative. This 
instruction could have been left out as any choice of certainty 
equivalent outside that range, whether involving losses or gains, 
could not be correct. The amount of £8,000 selected by this subject, 
would not seem to be reasonable, as the best outcome to the chance 
situation is still a loss of £10,000*
The second problem, of carrying down the wrong figures, may have 
been ameliorated by changes in the design of the question but no 
difficulties were experienced either during the pilot study or by 
the majority of subjects. The mistakes in this category could have 
been due to working too quickly with signs being switched and figures 
transferred incorrectly. Once such a mistake had been made then the 
certainty equivalent to a chance alternative incorporating an in­
correct alternative, was meaningless.
The evidence would seem to suggest that the self-administered test 
incorporating certainty equivalent selection can produce pound/utile 
co-ordinates.
HYPOTHESIS 2.
"A least squares regression programme 
will yield a non-linear monotonically 
increasing utility function from the 
derived pound/utile co-ordinates".
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The poxind/utile co-ordinates were obtained and were found to be 
satisfactory but when the quartic function was derived it was ob­
served that, in five cases, the same utile value was being assigned 
to different pound amounts thus contravening the monotonicity rule. 
The analysis of this finding and the solution to the problem are 
both contained in chapter 4» pages 86 to 95 • In summary all
that was done was to provide the programme with enough information 
to compel it to fit a curve that corresponded to the image pre­
sented by the original co-ordinates. The visual view of the shape 
of the curve was closer to reality than the computed shape which 
is constrained by the dictates of the selected function.
Given a very large number of co-ordinates then it would be reason­
able to say that a least squares regression programme will yield a 
non-linear, monotonically increasing function. In this study, 
hypothesistwo has to be read in the context of the whole project and 
particularly in the light of hypothesis one.
It is being hypothesised that after having used a self-administered 
test to obtain pound/utile co-ordinates, a least squares regression 
programme will yield a monotonically increasing function. A con­
straint when using the self-administered test is the number of co­
ordinates that it is reasonable to obtain. The arguments in support 
of the self-administered test itself and of the number of points 
obtained have been set out in the previous chapter.
When the original nine co-ordinates were employed the quartic
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function proved suitable for twenty-four out of the twenty-nine 
subjects. After interpolating along the pound axis the downward 
sloping curves were eliminated for all five subjects.
2
R, the coefficient of determination, is high for each subject, 
with four exceptions, the average being 0.9815* In excess of 
ninety-eight percent of the variance of each utile value is de­
termined by the combination of the various powers in the regression
equation.
Four exceptions were mentioned above, these relate to subjects who 
exhibited tendencies that revealed complete indifference to risk.
Each of the two utility functions created for these subjects and
the mean function used for prescription purposes were linear. In
2
these cases the R value was 1.0000 and the regression coeffi­
cients associated with the powers of each pound value were such 
that the null hypothesis could not be rejected i.e., there was in­
sufficient evidence to suggest that these coefficients differed 
significantly from zero. This could have been expected and if a 
stepwise programme had been used it would almost certainly not have 
gone beyond the equation of a straight line, y = a + bx.
In conclusion, the hypothesis that a least squares regression pro­
gramme will yield a non-linear monotonically increasing function, 
when the co-ordinates are derived from a self-administered test of 
the form used in this study, can be supported when it is implied that 
interpolation will take place.
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THE PRESCRIBING FUNCTION.
A utility function was created for each subject in order that it 
could be employed in prescribing decision making behaviour.
As was discussed in chapter four it was decided to plot a mean curve 
between two derived curves and use the function describing that de­
rived line to prescribe. This attempt at testing internal reliability 
was made as it was not known which of the two independent curves 
was "correct", if either, and with this doubt the mean curve should 
represent, fairly, the mean risk taking characteristics of the sub­
ject.
It was anticipated that should one of the original curves show a 
person to have a certain pattern, as far as risk taking character­
istics were concerned, then the second curve would reveal a similar 
pattern. It was not thought likely, for example, that one subject 
would produce one curve showing him to be a risk taker and the 
second suggesting him to be an averter.
This was confirmed when the original two curves were plotted and the 
shape of the two curves was seen to be extremely close. This added 
more strength to the mean curve as now it would represent the same 
risk taking characteristics as the two original curves but with the 
smoothing of minor variations. The use of a mean curve would have 
been more difficult to justify if the independent curves were quite 
different.
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To gauge the actual degree of association between the two original 
functions a rank order correlation test was carried out. Each 
function in turn was used to calculate the utile equivalent of 
twelve pound values for each subject, these pound values being 
equally spaced over the range of money covered by both functions.
The utile equivalents of the twelve pound, amounts were summed for 
the first and second functions. The total of the utile equivalents 
was taken as the score for that subject on each of the two functions. 
As it was the ability of each curve to prescribe the same character­
istics that was being tested, and not necessarily the accuracy of 
the prescriptions as absolute amounts, the subjects were ranked 
according to the magnitude of the sum of their utiles for each 
function.
Spearmans coefficient of rank correlation was calculated to ascer­
tain the degree of association between the two sets of ranking. Un­
like Pearsons product - moment correlation computed from ranks, 
Spearmans rho considers only the ordinal position of each score and 
not the weight given to the absolute magnitude of the scores. In 
cases, such as this, when the original scores are not ranks the 
Spearmans rho will not be identical to a Pearson r computed from 
the same data.
It was, however, the ability of each curve to prescribe actions 
that represented similar risk taking characteristics for each sub­
ject that was important and for this reason Spearmans rho seemed to 
be the most suitable test.
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The Spearmans rho, r^, was calculated as 0.8122 which would suggest 
a reasonably strong relationship between the prescriptions made by 
each of the two functions. The mean function that describes the 
line lying between the two original curves should, therefore, re­
present the same characteristics as was evident in the individual 
curves, subject to an element of smoothing.
The Pearson r computed on the same data was 0.8812 thus showing the 
difference as a result of utilising the absolute value of scores 
and not their ordinal position.
Having derived the prescribing function, a curve was plotted for 
each subject to reveal the basic shape. The pound -values used to
provide the co-ordinates were the twenty-four financial outcomes to 
the problems contained in the risk taking attitude questionnaire, 
shown in Appendix 1.
All subjecis fell into five categories according to the basic shape 
of their utility curves. Pig. 14 illustrates the shapes involved.
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utility Curve Shapes.
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Shown with each graph is the number of subjects in that category, 
with the percentage indicated in brackets. The shapes are familiar 
utility curve patterns. The convex curve indicates risk aversion 
and the concave curve reveals risk taking tendencies. One half of 
the respondents indicated both aversion and taking characteristics 
which is revealed by a curve that is concave over certain pound 
values and changes to be convex over different pound amounts.
Graphs (c) and (d) show this feature, with those subjects in the 
category represented by graph (c) being risk averse over positive 
values of money and risk takers over negative amounts. The oppo­
site is the case for those subjects in category (d).
Risk aversion would appear to be the most prevalent attitude with 
the utility curves of 80 percent of respondents indicating aversion 
over some ranges of pound values. Constant risk aversion was indi­
cated by the curves of 9 respondents whereas only 2 subjects revealed 
a consistent risk taking attitude.
One interesting group is represented by graph (b). These 4 subjects 
showed themselves to be linear, meaning that they are entirely in­
different towards risk, Howard Raiffa (1968) would refer to these 
subjects as E M V ’ers, people who take decisions based on the ex­
pected monetary value criterion. In an experimental study such as 
this, it is not possible to state that such people are or will be 
guided by the E M V of alternatives in real world problems, A 
number of reasons can be suggested to explain their linearity; they 
may have chosen the simplest way to solve the experiments, they may
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have assumed that they were expected to use some mathematical basis 
for decision making, they may have lacked interest and sought the 
quickest method, they may have thought that they should be consis­
tent in their responses and regarded the E M V as a safe way of 
achieving this.
All the results, not just those where linearity is apparent, have to 
be interpretated with care as each subject was responding to hypo­
thetical situations and there can be no guarantee that he would act 
as he said he would if faced with the same problems in real life.
This problem of interpreting results is one that is not peculiar to 
this study or even to this area of work but is common throughout 
many areas of experimental research.
DIEPEHENCES IN UTILITY CURVES
Examples of actual utility curves are displayed in appendix 4 and 
show how different these curves can be. Each subject responded to 
the same set of questions and yet quite different shapes are apparent 
for each person. These differences highlight the very personal 
nature of the utility curve.
To illustrate the different attitudes represented by these curves 
let us pose a decision problem and, from a visual examination of the 
curve, attempt to identify what action a particular subject should 
take.
Let us assume that the subject is managing director of a company
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that is involved in litigation over damage to company property 
alleged to have been caused by the fault of some third party. A 
judgement is due to be made shortly and the best legal advice is 
that there is a 50 percent chance of success. Should the company 
succeed it will be awarded £43,000. The third party has made an 
offer of £24,000 to be accepted or rejected immediately.
The decision facing the managing director is whether to recommend 
acceptance of the definite £24,000 or proceed with the action and 
take the chance of either being awarded £48,000 or losing the case 
and gaining nothing.
For subject 078 in appendix 4, and also shown in Fig.15, the utile 
equivalent of the expected value of the chance alternative, continue 
with court proceedings, is shown to be about 0.090. This is calcul­
ated by drawing the indifference line which is represented by a 
straight line drawn through the origin at 45 degrees. This line in­
dicates complete indifference towards risk with increases in income 
being shown by proportional increases or decreases in utiles.
It can, however, be seen that subject 078 has exhibited risk aversion 
tendencies and is consequently not indifferent to risk. His personal 
utile equivalent of the expected value of £24,000 is far greater than 
0.090, at about 0.180. As a result he should want to recommend accep­
tance of the definite amount rather than run the risks associated 
with continuing the action.
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Fig. 15
Utility Curve For Subject 078
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When a horizontal line is drawn from the point where the indifference
line is cut by the value £24,000 it can be seen that this intersects
the utility curve at a point equivalent to £12,000. In other words
0.090 utiles have a monetary equivalent of £12,000. This subject
should then accept any definite amount down to £12,000 below which 
he would prefer to take his chances in court.
One interpretation of this person's risk averse behaviour is that 
he did not look upon the chance of winning or losing as a 50/50  
possibility. His fear of losing was far greater than his hope of 
success and consequently his perception of the risks involved was 
affected. Even if the chance of success was 75 percent this subject 
would just be indifferent between taking the £24,000 for certain and 
going to court. This can be seen by projecting the vertical line 
through £24,000 beyond the indifference line until it cuts the
utility curve. This yields a utile of 0.180 as already indicated.
The expected value of a gamble having 0.I8O as its utile equivalent 
is found by drawing a horizontal line to the indifference line and 
dropping down to the pound axis* The monetary amount found is about 
£56,000 which represents the expected value of a situation holding 
out a 75 percent chance of securing £48,000 and a 25 percent chance 
of gaining nothing.
Compare this to subject 05I who displays a predilection for risk. 
Faced with exactly the same decision this subject assigns a personal 
utile value of 0.270 to the value £24,000, which is far below the 
worth of the gamble measured by the E M Y criterion. The result is 
that he should recommend continuing the action and should do so until
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the out of court offer is increased to £57,500. When offered an 
amount in excess of £57,500 subject 05I should then prefer to accept 
the amount rather than take his chance as the utile value of any such 
higher amount would exceed the utile value of the chance alternative.
For this subject the hope of success is a far greater influence than 
the fear of failure. His liking or insensitivity towards risk is so 
marked that he would continue to recommend proceeding with the legal 
action even where the chance of success was forecast as being very 
low.
It is not only in comparisons between concave and convex curves 
that such.differences in prescribed behaviour become apparent.
Subject 091 is also risk averse but less so than subject 078. This 
can be judged by the convexity of the respective curves but can 
also be shown in their prescribed behaviour faced with the legal 
problem posed earlier. Subject 091 would accept any certain amount 
down to £1,500 rather than go on with the action. Even if offered 
£2,000 his utility curve suggests that he would accept rather than 
take his chance of possibly not being successful in his action.
For this subject the chance of winning the action and being awarded 
the £48,000 would have to be extremely high before he would be in­
different between accepting the £24,000 for certain and taking his 
chance of winning.
Although each subject responded to the same set of questions when 
the utility curve was being derived, the resultant utility curve
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for each person is personal to him. Should each subject want to be 
consistent among choices in terms of attitude towards risk then each 
should act differently. It may be necessary to state again that 
utility theory is being looked upon as a prescriptive theory in 
this study and consequently it is not being suggested that know­
ledge of a person's utility curve will enable us to predict how he 
will act. In the legal problem, quoted above, differing attitudes 
towards risk have been identified and guidance could then be given 
to the decision maker as to how he should act, assuming he wishes 
to be consistent.
SIMILARITIES IN UTILITY CURVES
Appendix 4 illustrated how different the shapes of individual utility 
curves could be. Appendix 5 on the other hand, shows some examples 
of curves that display similar characteristics. Subjects 047» 079 
and 006 are all risk averters. There are differences in the degree 
of risk aversion exhibited by each one but the similarity in shape 
is quite marked. One feature of these three curves is the decreas­
ing risk aversion over high negative amounts. Prom about -£27»000 
to - £55»500 the utility curve becomes closer to the indifference 
line. This is quite apparent, in particular, for subject 006 where 
his own utility curve runs alongside the indifference line prior to 
breaking away.
The remaining subjects in Appendix 5» 106, 057» 06$, 098 and 112 are 
also an example of similarity within category shape. These subjects
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display characteristics of risk aversion over one range of pound 
values and risk taking over another. Almost 55?^  of all subjects 
displayed these characteristics. The degree of risk aversion and 
seeking is different for some as can be seen when 057 is compared 
to 106 but two interesting results can be identified.
a) Risk Taking Over Negative Values.
Firstly, all the subjects exhibit their risk taking tendencies over 
large negative values. They appear to be conservative, to varying 
degrees, over positive values or small to medium sized negative 
amounts. They seem to prefer certainty when decisions involve a 
possible gain or only a small loss but when a large loss is at 
stake they begin to take on the characteristics of the risk taker.
An example of this can be illustrated by taking subject O63, Fig.l6.
Ry drawing the indifference line, as described earlier, it can be seen 
that for values between approximately - £19,500 and - £55,000 this 
subject is a risk taker. For all values between - £19,500 and 
+ £50,000 he takes on the characteristics of a risk averter. Let 
us assume two problems, one involving a 50 percent chance of securing 
£48,000 and the other involving a 50 percent chance of losing £48,000.
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In the first the E M V is -f £24»000 and the utile equivalent of this 
gamble is approximately 0.070, The subject's personal utility for 
£24»000 is however much higher at 0.270. When a horizontal line is 
drawn from the point of intersection of the indifference line by 
the vertical line drawn through £24»000 it can be seen that this 
cuts the utility curve at a point equivalent to £6,000, The impli­
cation is that this subject should prefer to accept any amount down 
to about £6,000 in preference to the gamble which holds out the 
prospect of gaining £48,000.
In the second problem, if the same procedure is followed, it is
found that the utility of the gamble having an E M Y of - £24,000 is
greater than the actual utile equivalent of the amount - £24,000.
In fact this same subject would only pay up to £21,000 to get out
of the gamble but no more than that. In other words while he was
prepared to accept a definite amount less than the E M V when con­
sidering potential profits he is only prepared to pay a definite 
amount that is less than the E M Y when contemplating a possible 
loss.
It is important to note here that while certain subjects exhibited 
this change in attitude, ten in total, the questions used in the 
measurement of attitudes towards risk contained in the questionnaire 
shown in appendix 1 did not involve high negative values. Where the 
subject was required to provide a negative amount as his certainty 
equivalent it has been found that they are all in sections of the 
respective utility curves that are convex i.e., in areas where the
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subject is risk averse.
b) The Change From Aversion To Seeking.
The second point to note concerning those subjects who became risk 
takers over large negative amounts relates to the points at which 
they changed from being averters to seekers of risk. Prom the entire 
monetary range of £105,000 all subjects who exhibited these character­
istics of aversion and seeking, began to assume the characteristics 
of the risk seeker within a comparatively narrow range of monetary 
amounts.
When a vertical line is drawn from the point on each subject's 
utility curve where it first becomes concave, to the horizontal 
axis,it is found that the range of money is approximately £4 ,500.
All ten subjects who showed these tendencies changed from being 
averters to seekers within the range - £24,000 to - £19,500.
The finding that some subjects tended to be risk averters for
positive and low negative amounts and risk takers over larger
negative amounts does not seem to have an immediate, intuitive
appeal. The popular image of the entrepreneurial risk taker does
2
not compare well with these findings . The vast majority of
2
There is no implication that the results of this study will hold 
good given a far larger sample of managers. Reference to this 
point and the need for further research will be made later.
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subjects in this study, 80 percent did not appear to be risk takers 
where a potential profit existed# The opposite was in fact the case 
as they were prepared to accept a small, but certain, profit rather 
than take any chance of not securing a profit at all. When confront­
ed with possible large losses they changed their attitude and were 
prepared to assume much more risk. A number of possible reasons can 
be suggested as to why this should be.
i) The cautious decision taker who is prepared to accept the low but 
certain profit is rewarded by his company to a far greater extent 
then the person who is prepared to take chances. This reward may
be sufficient motivation to encourage the manager to be cautious in 
his choices and to avoid the chance situation, even where the risks 
involved may be acceptable to the firm.
ii) Another factor to explain the behaviour of these subjects may be
that they are unfamiliar with loss making situations. They may
not deal with potential losses in the ordinary course of business. 
They certainly deal with degrees of profit and if a lower profit 
than expected is secured may refer to this as a loss, but this is 
significantly different from those situations where only losses are 
possible and decisions have to be made in such an environment.
This unfamiliarity with losses could lead them to conclude that the 
loss will really not happen to them. In other words they are pre­
pared to take the chance that they will escape free of loss as they 
believe that the loss is unlikely. This is a common enough attitude
among the public at large and it may well be that it prevails in
management to some extent.
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iii) A further explanation may be that once a person knows that losses 
are a real possibility he could have a tendency to disregard common 
sense in an effort to retrieve lost ground. The gambler who has lost 
in a series of bets could be prone to increase his stake in any further 
round in order to recoup his outlays. In the business world stakes 
may also be increased in the sense that chances are taken that or­
dinarily would not be taken, in an effort to regain ground. This 
pattern is often evident in business failures where there is evi­
dence of care being cast to one side once losses are being ex­
perienced.
The entrepreneur, like the "professional" gambler, is not a person 
who seeks risk. He prefers to play safe and take those decisions 
where the chancy element has been reduced to the minimum. The 
shapes of the utility curves in this study reinforce that view but 
also bring to the surface the problem of decision taking in loss 
making situations,
iv) A final reason may be that much of a manager's formal education 
is centred on profit maximisation and many decision making aids
and investment appraisal techniques are concerned almost exclusively 
with profit or degrees of profit. Later hypotheses will make fur­
ther reference to this question of aversion and taking tendencies in 
decisions involving potential losses and will, in particular, examine 
the behaviour of the risk managers whose background should lead to a 
different attitude in such problems.
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SECTION B - THE USE OP THE UTILITY PUNCTIONS.
Prior to examining the particular hypotheses relating to the use of 
the derived functions it is necessary to comment on the statistical 
tests employed in the analysis of the research data.
Whenever statistical tests are used certain assumptions are made.
A number of conditions must be met if the use of particular tests is 
to be said to be valid. The existence of such conditions allows a 
researcher to be more specific in his conclusions and consequently 
the most powerful tests are often those that have the strongest or 
most extensive assumptions.
Parametric statistical tests are those that specify certain con­
ditions relating to the parameters of the population from which 
the research sample has been drawn. These conditions are mainly 
that;
a) the observations are independent,
h) the observations are drawn from populations
that are normally distributed,
c) the variance of each population is the same.
With the possible exception of the homoscedasticity assumption it 
is not normal for tests to be carried out in an attempt to validate 
these conditions. It is assumed that they hold and the strength 
of any conclusions depends a great deal on the validity of such 
assumptions.
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When there is reason to believe that the parametric assumptions are 
being satisfied in the research data then the parametric test will 
be the most powerful for rejecting a null hypothesis when it should 
be rejected.
The difficulty arises where there is no evidence to suggest that the 
parametric conditions are being met. Kerlinger (1975) indicates a 
number of studies where scholars have found the normal parametric 
tests to be robust against violations of basic assumptions. He 
concludes a discussion on the problems of parametric conditions by 
supporting the view that as parametric procedures are the standard 
tools of behavioural statistics they should be preferred. This 
view has not been accepted for this present study.
Much of the work on the robustness of parametric tests was carried 
out in the early to mid sixties and since then the use of alternatives 
to parametric procedures has become far more widespread. In addition 
the increasing sophistication of tests that do not make assumptions 
about the population from which the sample is drawn has led many 
more researchers to make use of them.
The decision has therefore been taken to utilize non-parametric 
statistical tests in the analysis of the remaining hypotheses. A 
non-parametric test is, as Siegel (1956) (p3l) describes it ".... 
a test whose model does not specify conditions about the parameters 
of the population from which the sample was drawn".
The three principal reasons for making use of non-parametric
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procedures were firstly that the research sample in this study is 
comparatively small at twenty-nine subjects. In addition, for cer­
tain hypotheses, this number is divided into three groups and in 
these cases the non-parametric tests seem to be more appropriate 
than the corresponding parametric procedures.
Secondly the probability statements obtained from the non-para­
metric tests are exact probabilities in that they do not rely on the 
shape of the population distribution from which the sample was drawn. 
The nature of the experiments in this study, the fact that certain 
subjects are given guidance in taking decisions, does cast some 
doubt on the equal variance assumption. With this in mind and no 
knowledge that normality could be relied upon, the non-parametric 
alternative seems more appropriate.
Thirdly and finally, the results from the non-parametric tests will 
be accurate for this data. Had parametric tests been employed with 
some doubt as to the validity of assumptions, or even with the pre­
sumption that the underlying conditions had been satisfied, then the 
results may have been less than accurate. To balance this argument 
it has to be said that if all the parametric assumptions are met 
then the non-parametric equivalent is wasteful of data. The level 
of this waste is not however high and was thought to be an accept­
able price to pay when little evidence was available about the pop­
ulation parameters.
The non-parametric procedures that will be used are the Mann-Whitney 
U Test, Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test and the Kruskal - Wallis One
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Way Analysis of Variance. Spearmans Rank Correlation Coefficient 
has already been used and will he employed further.
The decision process in accepting or rejecting a research hypothesis 
is the same as for hypotheses to be tested by parametric procedures.
With the research hypothesis in mind a null hypothesis (H^) is 
framed. This is tested against the alternative hypothesis (H^) 
which is the operational statement of the research hypothesis. The 
phrasing of will dictate whether a one-tailed or two-tailed test 
is called for. The most suitable statistical test is selected, in 
this study one of those mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the 
level of significance is set. The test statistic is calculated and 
its associated probability of occurring under is found. This
probability is compared to the previously set level of significance
and a decision is taken as to whether or not the can be rejected.
Bach of the non-parametric tests makes use of rankings and in one
case the signs associated with these rankings. Whenever they are 
used in the testing of hypotheses the test statistic has been shown 
together with its associated probability of occurrence. In some 
cases the hanks, sums of ranks or mean ranks have also been indicat­
ed where this information is valuable in the interpretation of the 
data. A description of the method employed by each of the tests is 
also given whenever the test is used for the first time.
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HYPOTHESIS 3.
"Any differences between model 
prescriptions and actual choices 
in a number of decision problems, 
will be associated with the 
knowledge each subject had of 
how the model suggested he should act".
It is the normative property of the utility function, as opposed to 
its predictive ability, that is being tested in this study. Any 
strength a utility function may have as a normative decision aid will 
lie, largely, in the use to which it is put by managers. The series 
of hypotheses in this section of chapter 5 is aimed at gauging the use 
subjects made of knowledge they were given of their utility prescrip­
tions ,
Subjects were divided into three groups as follows, group one were 
given details of their utility prescriptions prior to embarking upon 
the questionnaire containing the decision problems, group two gave 
their answers to the problems in the questionnaire and were then 
informed of their prescriptions and group three were given no in­
formation at all concerning their utility prescriptions*
Risk taking attitude as defined by the formula CE - EMY was calcul-
|e m y|
ated for each of the twenty-four questions contained in the question­
naire shown in appendix 1 and the mean taken as the score for each 
subject. As a first test of the use made of the prescriptions, by
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subjects, a significance level of 0.05 was set and the following 
null hypothesis was stated:
There is no difference among the average 
risk taking attitude scores of subjects 
divided into three groups according to 
the knowledge they had of their utility 
function prescriptions.
The three groups are not the same in 
their average risk taking attitude scores.
A Kruskal - Wallis one-way analysis of variance was carried out to 
provide evidence to accept or reject the hypothesis. The Kruskal - 
Wallis is a non-parametric alternative to the parametric analysis of 
variance to the extent that it is employed to test whether K inde­
pendent samples are from different populations. Unlike the para­
metric analysis of variance the Kruskal - Wallis does not rely on the 
assumption that the observations are from normally distributed pop­
ulations having equal variance. It does assume at least ordinal 
measurement of the variable being considered and that the variable 
has a continuous distribution, both of which are met by the data in 
this study. Differences will invariably arise in sample values and 
the problem is whether these differences signify actual population 
differences or whether they are chance variations. The null hy­
pothesis that K independent samples come from identical populations 
is tested against the alternative that the means of these populations 
are not all equal.
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The scores for each subject are ranked in one series, from lowest to 
hipest* Each subject will then have a rank and it is possible to 
sum the ranks for subjects in the different treatment groups. In 
this study there are three groups and the sum of ranks for subjects 
in groups 1, 2 and 3 can be calculated. The test statistic H, which 
is proportional to the variance of these sums of ranks is then cal­
culated by the following formula:
H - 12 ^--- R .  ^ - 3(N + 1)
H(N + 1) n,
j . 1 ^
where k * number of samples
Uj = number of cases in the j^^ sample.
N - the number of cases in all samples combined.
Rj = sum of ranks in the j^^ sample.
Where the individual groups do not differ they should all have about 
the same proportion of high, medium and low ranks, in which case the 
sums of ranks will have low variance. Where the average rank for one 
group is higher than the others then the variance of the averages will 
be high. The test determines whether these sums of ranks are so dis­
parate that they are not likely to have come from samples which were 
all drawn from the same population.
If the null hypothesis is true, that the samples are from identical 
populations, the sampling distribution of H can be approximated 
closely with a chi - square distribution with k - 1 degrees of
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freedom. The probability associated with the occurrence, under H^, of 
a value as large as that of the computed H is ascertained by reference 
to a table of critical values of chi - square. The null hypothesis can 
be rejected and the alternative accepted, that the groups are not the 
same with respect to their mean ranks, when the value of H is such 
that the probability of its occurrence under for degrees of free­
dom k - 1 is equal to or less than the chosen significance level.
Table 3.
Kruskal - Wallis one-way analysis 
of variance on risk taking attitude
Knowledge
group
Number
of
Subjects
Sum of 
ranks
Mean
ranks
1 11 176.00 16.00
2 9 162.00 18.00
3 9 97.00 10.78
Table 3 displays the individual groups, the sums of ranks and mean 
ranks. Having ranked all twenty-nine subjectsin one series, the 
sums of ranks for individual groups are found and the mean ranks for 
groups calculated. The H statistic was 3*482 and the probability of 
having an H statistic of this size, under is 0.175* It was not 
therefore possible to reject at the 0.05 level of significance.
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Insufficient evidence was found to suggest that risk taking attitude 
varied significantly with the knowledge subjects had of their utility 
prescriptions•
The meaning of the group rankings suggests that group three subjects, 
with a mean rank of 10.78 portrayed a higher degree of risk aversion 
than these in groups one or two. Ranking was carried out from lowest 
to highest and it could therefore be expected that group two subjects 
were least risk averse of all.
This is confirmed by Table 4 where it is shown that all group means 
indicated risk aversion, as might have been expected from our earlier 
interpretation of the utility curves, with group two revealing, the 
least degree of aversion.
Table 4.
Risk Taking Attitude Scores
Knowledge
Group
Number
of
Subjects
Sum of 
Scores
Mean
Scores
Standard
Deviations
1 11 -1.614 -0.147 0,161
2 9 -0.710 -0.079 0.115
3 9 -2.865 -0.518 0.344
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Those subjects who had knowledge of their utility prescriptions 
appear considerably less risk averse than those who were left to 
answer the twenty-four decision problems with no guidance# Although 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected there does seem to be some 
evidence to suggest differences in mean risk taking attitudes among 
knowledge groups. The differences were not large enough to produce 
a Kruskal - Wallis statistic that enabled the rejection of but 
further work in this area would be of interest to examine the hy­
pothesis that utility prescriptions tend to be less risk averse than 
initial choices. When risk taking attitudes were calculated using* 
the prescribed choices in place of actual certainty equivalents in
the formula CE - EMV the mean risk taking attitude over all subjects 
|EMY!
was -O.IO7. This compares with -0.179 when actual choices were used 
in the formula and does provide some evidence to suggest that the pre­
scriptions tended to be less risk averse than original, actual choices.
Hyplthesis three was, however, more concerned with the direct use to 
which subjects put their knowledge of utility prescriptions than with 
their attitudes to risk. The extent to which prescriptions were em­
ployed was measured by calculating the absolute differences between 
prescriptions and actual behaviour in the twenty-four decisions 
shown in appendix 1.
The difference was calculated in absolute terms, the direction of the 
difference not being important at this time, and these differences 
summed and the mean taken. This mean difference is looked upon as 
each subject's score and the scores for all subjects are shown in 
Table 5. The absolute difference was used as otherwise, negative
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values would cancel out positive values and the magnitude of the dis­
crepancies would be impossible to determine.
Table 5*
Mean absolute difference 
behaviour for all
between actual and prescribed 
subjects in rank order.
Rank Knowledge
Groun
Subject Mean absolute 
Difference
1 2 006 492
2 2 096 825
3 2 078 1117
4 1 066 1162
5 2 070 1258
6 1 005 1471
7 3 095 1717
8 2 075 1821
9 2 091 2204
10 1 115 2479
11 1 097 2600
12 1 113 2721
13 1 047 2775
14 3 025 2835
15 1 057 3062
16 2 Oil 3383
17 3 055 5608
18 1 029 3683
19 5 106 3971
20 2 082 4517
21 1 094 4417
22 1 079 4579
23 3 112 4883
24 3 098 4921
25 1 031 5325
26 2 084 6006
27 3 058 6796
28 3 080 8O94
29 3 012 9223
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Table 5 displays subjects scores in rank order, from the lowest dif­
ference to the highest. There were no ties. The table also indicates 
each subject's knowledge group and a scan of these groups does show 
that groups one and two dominate the lower ranks* This does indicate 
that subjects who displayed the smallest mean difference between 
actual and prescribed behaviour were, predominantly, in groups that 
had some knowledge of their prescriptions.
Using the scores from table 5 & further Kruskal - Wallis one-way 
analysis of variance was carried out to see if evidence could be 
found to support the view that differences between actual and pre­
scribed behaviour vary significantly with knowledge given.
Table 6 displays the sums and mean ranks used in the test.
Table 6.
Kruskal - Wallis one-way analysis of 
variance on differences in actual and 
prescribed behaviour related to knowledge 
groups._________________________________
Knowledge Number Sum of Mean
of
group Subjects ranks ranks
1 11 157.00 14.27
2 9 90.00 10*00
5 9 188.00 20.89
What do the mean ranks used in the Kruskal - Wallis test signify?
The rank accorded to any subject describes that subject's score,in 
this case mean absolute difference between actual and prescribed
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behaviour, in relation to all other scores. The sum of ranks and con­
sequently the mean rank within groups is evidence of that group's per­
formance as, indicated by the score of each member of the group. Table 
6 shows that those in group two had a very low average rank indicative 
of the fact that the scores for subjects in that group were also low 
and hence the mean absolute difference between actual and prescribed 
behaviour for these subjects was small.
The comparison of mean ranks between groups is evidence of the spread 
or dispersal of rankings, and consequently scores, across groups.
The mean rank for group three, in table 6, shows that a large number 
of subjects with high scores were likely to be in that group.
The level of significance was set at 0.05 and the null hypothesis 
stated as:
There is no difference in the average 
deviations of actual behaviour from 
prescribed behaviour among subjects 
divided into three groups according 
to the knowledge they had of their 
prescriptions.
The three groups are not the same in 
their average deviations of actual 
from prescribed behaviour.
A considerable difference in group averages is indicated by table 6 
and confirmed by an H statistic of 7*489 which has an associated 
probability of 0.024* The probability of obtaining an H Statistic
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of this size under is lower than the previously set level of sig­
nificance and the alternative hypothesis can be accepted.
The mean ranks for groups can be different without the being re­
jected, as was seen at page 156 but for this present the probability 
associated with the occurrence of the H Statistic allowed its rejection 
and the alternative was accepted that the three knowledge groups are 
not the same in their average deviations of actual from prescribed 
behaviour.
What does rejection of the null hypothesis imply in this case?
Firstly, the variation in mean ranks between groups is due to more 
than just chance as is shown by the probability associated with the 
H statistic. Secondly, at least one group has a significantly higher 
mean rank than the others. Thirdly, the difference between actual 
and prescribed behaviour, reflected by the mean ranks, does vary 
significantly with the knowledge given to subjects of their utility 
prescriptions.
The Kruskal - Wallis test suggests that there are differences between 
groups but the test does not address itself to the question of var­
iance. There is no underlying assumption that the group distribu­
tions have equal variance.
The dissimilarity between the mean ranks of groups may not be due to 
one group being comprised of predominantly one set of closely related 
scores. The means may have been similar apart from one or two extreme
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scores that have influenced the average for the group and thus brought 
about the difference.
The sums of differences, the means and standard deviations for each 
group are shown in table 7 and there is no evidence, in these figures, 
of disproportionately high variance. If such a high variance had ex­
isted it should also have been reflected in the sums of differences 
and the standard deviations.
Table 7*
Mean difference between actual 
choices and prescribed choices 
related to knowledge groun.
Knowledge
Group
1
2
5.
Number
of
Subjects
11
9
9
Sum of 
differences 
54275.01 
21422.97 
46047.96
Mean Standard
differences deviations
3115.91
2380.53
5116.44
1284.68 
1840.13
2 4 7 4 . 5 9
The decision to accept the alternative hypothesis can be re-affirmed, 
The mean differences between actual and prescribed behaviour vary 
with knowledge given of utility prescriptions and it is this diff­
erence in means and not a high within group variance that brought 
about the H statistic of 7*489*
143
The next question is to consider exactly where the identified differ­
ences between groups arises.
HYPOTHESIS 4.
” Differences between model prescriptions 
and final actual choices in a number of 
decision making situations will be smaller 
for those subjects who knew of their prescribed 
behaviour than for those subjects who had no 
knowledge of their prescribed behaviour ".
Table 5 displayed the mean absolute differences, for all subjects, 
between actual and prescribed behaviour in relation to the decisions 
posed in the questionnaire in appendix 1. The monetary range covered 
by the questions in appendix 1 was £105,000 and the mean difference 
for all subjects between actual and prescribed behaviour was £3,508. 
The range of differences was £492 to £9,225 with a standard deviation 
of £1,787.
Considering the range of money embraced by the decision problems 
a mean difference of £5,508 would seem to be reasonably small.
Some minor element of error will be incorporated in this figure as 
the model prescriptions were made to two decimal places whereas no 
subject displayed an actual choice to a degree of accuracy greater 
than £50, that is, the vast majority of subjects gave answers round­
ed to the nearest hundred pounds with some rounding to the nearest 
fifty pounds but no one going below this.
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As a predictor of behaviour the function could be said not to have 
performed too well but this study is concerned with it as a pre- 
scriber of behaviour. In this connection hypothesis 4 continues the 
investigation started in the previous hypothesis and attempts to show 
that the differences that have already been highlighted, between 
groups, is between those having knowledge and those not having 
knowledge of their utility prescriptions.
In order to identify where the differences, highlighted by the 
analysis of variance, arose it was decided to carry out a Mann - 
Whitney U Test. The hypothesis relates to whether those haviaig 
knowledge of their prescriptions acted differently from those with 
no knowledge. A further hypothesis, dealt with as hypothesis five 
addresses itself to any differences that may exist between those 
groups who received knowledge of their prescriptions at different 
times.
All hypotheses, including this one and hypothesis five, were for­
mulated prior to the experiments being carried out and consequently 
prior to the results being analysed. They were set up, a priori, 
based upon the theory of utilities and the nature of these particular 
experiments.
As the non parametric, Kruskal - Wallis analysis of variance had 
been carried out it was not possible to test these internal com­
parisons by means of Scheffes or Duncans Multiple Range tests, as 
would have been the case if the Parametric A.N.O.V.A. had been used, 
hence the need for the separate Mann - Whitney calculations.
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The Mann - Whitney is described by Siegal (1956) p.116, as ".......
one of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests, and it is a 
most useful alternative to the parametric t: test when the researcher 
wishes to avoid the t tests’ assumptions....". The test is one of 
the significance of differences in central tendency between inde­
pendent groups when the research score has been replaced by a rank.
The assumptions, like the Kruskal - Wftllis test, are that at least an 
ordinal scale of measurement has been achieved and that the variable 
being considered, in this case, differences between actual and pre­
scribed behaviour, has a continuous distribution.
The following was set up to test against the alternative hypothesis 
that there was a larger difference between actual and prescribed be­
haviour for subjects ^ o  had no knowledge of their utility prescrip­
tions.
Any difference between actual and
prescribed choices for those having 
knowledge of their utility prescriptions 
will be the same as those for subjects 
who had no knowledge of their utility 
prescriptions.
Where subjects have no knowledge of 
their utility prescriptions the 
difference between actual and 
prescribed choices will be larger 
than for those with knowledge.
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To carry out this test it was necessary to combine groups one and two 
as they both received knowledge of their prescriptions. The timing 
of their knowledge was different but this was not important for this 
present test.
Each subject's score was the mean of the absolute difference between 
actual and prescribed behaviour in the decision problems shown in 
appendix 1. These scores are ranked in increasing order of size re­
gardless of group. The ranks for combined group one and two are then 
compared with the ranks of those in group three. If the is true 
then it would be reasonable to assume that the means of the ranks 
assigned to the scores in both experimental groups would be very 
similar.
When the alternative hypothesis is true there should be a pronounced 
difference in the means of the ranks, thus indicating that most of 
the lower ranks were associated with one group while most of the 
hi^er ranks were linked with the other group.
A U statistic is calculated that relates to the number of times in 
the grand ranking that a subject from one group precedes a subject 
from the other. This U statistic can be found by counting, but 
when the number of scores are large, the following formula, which 
gives identical results, is used*
U » n^ n^ + n^ (n^ + l) -
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where = number of subjects in the first group,
n^ = number of subjects in the second group,
= sum of ranks assigned to the group having sample
size n^•
When and n^ are both greater than 10 the sampling distribution of 
U can be approximated closely with a normal curve and the significance 
of an observed IT can be determined by the formula;
2 =
(n^)(n2)(n^+n2+1)
12
where Z = deviation of the observed value from the population
mean under H * o
Ü = the test statistic calculated according to the 
formula on page 147« 
n^  =number of subjects in the first group, 
n^ =number of subjects in the second group.
The probability associated with the occurrence under of a value 
as extreme as the calculated Z is found by consulting a table of 
probabilities associated with observed values of Z in the normal 
distribution.
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Table 8,
Mann - Whitney test on differences 
between actual and prescribed behaviour 
for groups having and not having knowledge 
of their utility prescriptions.
Knowledge Number Group means Mean TJ
of of actual
Group Subjects differences rank _
1 & 2 20 2784.89 12.55 57.0 -2.498
5 9 5116.44 20.89
Table 8 shows a substantial difference in the group means and this 
is reinforced by the mean rank of 12.55, accorded to those with 
knowledge, and 20.89 to those subjects with no knowledge of their 
utility prescriptions. From what has been said above, in the de­
scription of the Mann - Whitney test, it could be expected that 
sufficient evidence existed to enable rejection of the null hy­
pothesis. The one tailed probability associated with the 2 value of 
-2.498 is 0.006 and the can therefore be rejected at that level 
of significance.
There is a significant difference in scores between those who had or 
had not knowledge and moreover the disparity between actual and 
prescribed choices was far larger where no knowledge was given of 
utility prescriptions.
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The Research hypothesis can be accepted as there is a significantly 
smaller discrepancy between actual and prescribed behaviour for 
those having knowledge than for those without knowledge. The in­
terpretation of this result however is less straight forward than 
the statistics may suggest.
Although evidence does exist to support the hypothesis it does not 
necessarily mean that it was knowledge of their prescriptions that 
resulted in each subject having a small difference between actual 
and prescribed behaviour. As in many forms of social science re­
search it is not possible to control all the variables and in de­
cision making problems of the form used in this series of experi­
ments, other influencing factors may have existed. Having accepted 
this there does still exist a considerable difference between the 
two groups, those having knowledge and those not, which would sug­
gest that a variable or variables did bring a large measure of in­
fluence to bear on the subjects. It does not therefore appear un­
reasonable to suggest that it was the knowledge held by those sub­
jects in amalgamated group one and two that resulted in or contri­
buted to the smaller difference, between actual and prescribed be­
haviour.
One other point that could be made is that there was no reason why 
managers in groups one or two should utilize the knowledge they 
were given of their prescriptions, unless they considered it to be 
useful information. It is certainly unlikely that they would have 
made use of their prescriptions in order to "please" the researcher, 
in fact, the opposite could possibly be the case in view of the
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scepticism that often meets attempts to analyse business decision 
making.
HYPOTHESIS 5.
"Differences between actual and 
prescribed behaviour will be 
affected by whether a subject 
a) knew of his prescribed behaviour 
before being asked to make his choice 
or b) was given the opportunity to 
change his first choice in the light 
of his prescribed behaviour "•
No view was held, a priori, as to whether pre or post knowledge of 
prescriptions would result in the same or a different degree of 
useage by subjects# An intuitive thought was that those who were 
given their prescriptions prior to starting the decision questions 
would be more inclined to be guided by those prescriptions. This 
guidance may not have been sought consciously but having knowledge 
of how it was thought they should act, they may then fall into that 
pattern subjectively.
For those who answered the decision problems and were then asked to 
examine their initial answers in the light of the new knowledge of 
their prescriptions, it was felt that they might find it more diffi­
cult to consider that their first choice should be amended.
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When the two groups were compared and the mean differences calculated, 
as shown in table 7, on page 143 , the result was not as expected.
Group two subjects, who received knowledge of their prescriptions 
after they had made their initial choices had a smaller discrepancy 
between actual and prescribed behaviour than those in group one.
The two smallest mean difference scores, between actual and pre­
scribed choices were found among group two subjects. Those were 
scores of £492 and £825. Out of the entire range of monetary values 
covered by the decision problems these mean differences reflect a 
very narrow gap between actual and prescribed choices. The subject 
who scored £492, subject 006, returned a questionnaire that showed 
a difference of only £50 between his choice and the prescription in 
one question and several questions where the difference was between 
£50 and £150 pounds. Bearing in mind, again, the values concerned 
in these decisions then there was a striking similarity between his 
own action and what had been prescribed.
A Mann - Whitney Ü test was used to test the significance of the 
difference between groups one and two and with the level of signi­
ficance set at 0.05 the null hypothesis was stated as;
Differences between actual and prescribed 
behaviour will be the same regardless of 
when subjects received knowledge of their 
prescriptions.
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Whether subjects received knowledge 
of their prescriptions before or 
after making their choices will 
affect the difference between actual 
and prescribed behaviour.
The mean rank of scores of those having prior knowledge was 12.18 
and of those with post knowledge, 8.44*
The U statistic was calculated as 51 which has an associated two- 
tailed probability of O.I6O. Insufficient evidence was found to 
enable rejection of the and we must conclude that the time 
knowledge of prescriptions was given to the subjects did not affedt 
the difference between actual and prescribed behaviour.
This is an area where more work is necessary both in the style of 
presentation of prescriptions and in the timing of delivery of this 
knowledge. There would seem to be reason to suggest that if initial 
choices are made, left for a while and then returned to, there would 
possibly be changes made. Whether such changes are as a result of 
the time lag alone or are in part due to the knowledge acquired 
in the interval, of prescriptions, is one that would require study. 
It may also be the case that too much thought is given to answers 
when a subject is presented with a note of his prescriptions prior 
to answering a problem. The initial first response, that may reveal 
his underlying attitudes, may be suppressed by some thought that he 
should consider the prescription and perhaps re-examine his own 
choice. This re-examination of his initial answer should, according
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to the theory of utilities, result in his moving closer to the pre­
scribed course of action. It could be, however, that an opposite 
effect may be caused where a subject reflects too long on both 
prescription and his initial choice resulting in him deciding that 
neither is representative of how he wants to act.
HYPOTHESIS 6.
" There will be no relationship between 
the risk taking attitudes of each 
subject as displayed by both the 
prescribed course of behaviour and 
actual behaviour in a number of 
decision making situations "•
This is the final hypothesis in section B dealing with the utility 
function. The remainder of this chapter, section C, concentrates on 
the attitudes towards risk of the various managers according to their 
backgrounds and the nature of the decisions posed.
To provide evidence for hypothesis six the risk taking attitude
score was calculated for each subject according to the formula al-
ready^mentioned in previous tests, CE - EMV This formula is
jEMYj
applied to each of the twenty-four decisions in the questionnaire 
shown in appendix 1 and the mean score for all questions is cal­
culated for each subject. To provide the comparison between this 
score, that is looked upon the subject's attitude towards risk,and
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the attitude revealed by the utility function, the same formula was 
utilized but this time the prescribed choice was substituted in place 
of C E (the subjects actual choice). In this way two scores were 
calculated for each subject, one showing his attitude to risk as re­
vealed by his answers to the twenty-four decisions and the second 
showing his attitude to risk as indicated by his utility prescrip­
tions of how he should act in the same decisions.
Subjects were ranked according to each of these scores and a rank 
order correlation test was carried out to calculate Spearmans rho. 
The Tg for all subjects was 0.0970 which suggests no relationship 
at all in rankings based on the two separate attitude to risk scores.
The research hypothesis can be supported in that the ranking of sub­
jects by these two methods was not the same and as a result the risk 
taking attitude of the managers as determined from their actual be­
haviour was different from that revealed by their utility prescrip­
tions. This was what was hypothesised and indeed there was no need 
for there to be any relationship between the two attitudes. The 
lack of any positive relationship between attitudes in different 
decisions is one of the main reasons why a prescriptive model is 
put forward. It was not suggested that the utility model would 
be a good predictor of behaviour and this view has been justified 
by the size of Spearmans rho. It was to be expected that a diff­
erence in attitude as described by the two scores would exist and 
the almost total lack of association between rankings has shown 
this to be so.
155
Table 9*
Rankings on attitude towards
risk as displayed by actual
choices and prescribed choices
for those with knowledge of
their prescriptions._______
Subjects
Actual
Choices
Rankings
Utile
Prescriptions
Diff. Diff
005 14 14 0 0
006 8 8 0 0
Oil 18 18 0 0
029 1 1 0 0
031 2 20 18 324
047 3 3 0 0
057 11 11 0 0
066 13 10 3 9
070 16 16 0 0
075 12 12 0 0
078 7 9 2 4
079 19 6 13 169
082 20 13 7 49
084 5 2 3 9
091 4 5 1 1
094 6 4 2 4
096 10 15 5 25
097 15 19 4 16
113 9 7 2 4
115 17 17 0 0
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Table 9 shows the rankings and differences in rankings for subjects 
in groups one and two. Table 10 shows similar figures for those 
having no knowledge at all of their utile prescriptions, i.e., those 
in group three»
Table 16
Ranlcings on attitude towards 
risk as displayed by actual 
choices and prescribed choices 
for those with no knowledge of 
their prescriptions.__________
Subjects Hanlüings Diff, Diff*
o
012
Actual
Choices
1
Utile
Prescriptions
9 8 64
023 7 6.5 0.5 0.25
055 3 5 2 4
058 4 8 4 16
080 2 1 1 1
095 5 6,5 1.5 2.25
098 9 3 6 36
106 8. 2 6 36
112 6 4 2 4
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The similarity in rankings in table 9 is quite marked for those sub­
jects who had knowledge of their prescriptions. This is as expected 
as earlier hypotheses had shown that where subjects had knowledge, 
the difference between actual and prescribed behaviour was narrower. 
As a result the underlying attitude towards risk displayed by actual 
choices would be very similar to the attitude revealed by the utile 
prescriptions. In nine cases the rankings were identical and in 
only two cases i.e., subjects 051 and 079 was any significant diff­
erence identified. Spearmans rho for the rankings in Table 9 was 
calculated as 0.538 which is less than might have been expected 
but is probably due to the two subjects mentioned above* Spearmans 
rho for Table 10 was - 0.564* The negative value of r^ indicates 
that the ranking in the two scores is diametrically opposed and 
this is certainly confirmed by the figures in Table 10.
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SECTION C - ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK^ MANAGEMENT 
TYPE AND NATURE OF DECISIONS.
The remaining hypotheses are related to sub problem (b) (iv) as 
shown at page 52 in chapter three, that is, will risk taking atti­
tude be influenced by management background and the nature of the 
decisions posed?
% e  method of sample selection, as already described, involved a 
number of risk managers in obtaining the assistance of non risk 
management colleagues for the experiments. The reasons for this 
method of selection are shown at page 58 % Having subjects split 
into two categories, that is, risk and non risk managers it was 
possible to carry out a series of additional tests using their 
attitude to risk scores. These tests are concerned with differ­
ences in behaviour exhibited by the different management groups and 
also in their response to different forms of decision problems. No 
further tests were carried out on the utility functions other than 
to ascertain that there was no difference in the use made of thé 
utility prescriptions by the two management groups. A Mann - Whitney 
U test produced a U statistic of 99 with an associated probability of 
0.7948 when the differences between actual and prescribed behaviour 
was calculated and the two management groups compared. This did not
I
allow rejection of the null hypothesis, there is no difference in
f
the use made of the model between management groups. There was no 
reason to believe that differences would arise between the two groups 
and the evidence is that there was very little difference. The mean 
difference between actual and prescribed behaviour for risk managers
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was £5,532.46 and for non-risk managers was £5,482.64.
HYPOTHESIS 7 .
" There will be a relationship 
between risk taking attitudes, 
as defined for the purposes of 
this study, and management type ".
The earlier examination of utility curves suggested that the majority 
of respondents should want to be risk averters when attempting the de­
cision problems contained in the questionnaire shown in appendix 1.
The risk taking attitude scores for subjects supports this view with a 
mean score, for all subjects, of - 0.179* The range of scores was 
- 1.029 to + 0.292 with only three scores from the total number of 
subjects being positive that is only three people showed themselves
to be risk takers, according to the formula CE - EMV.
lEMVl
Hypothesis seven was phrased as it was, because it was felt that 
risk managers may have a different attitude to risk in view of their 
constant dealings with problems that only hold out the prospect of a 
loss or no loss. The non-risk managers will not be so limited in 
their dealings with risky situations as they will be involved in 
many decisions where the outcomes may include a gain.
Table 11 displays the risk taking attitude scores for both manage­
ment groups.
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Table 11.
Risk taking attitude scores and rank by management type,
Rank Score Subject Rank Score Subject
2 -0.537 080 1 -1.029 012
3 -0.464 029 4.5 -0.451 055
4.5 -0.451 051 10 -0.à39 112
6 —0.410 058 13 -0.181 078
7 -0.533 095 15 -0.147 006
8 -0.255 047 16 -0.102 113
9 -0.215 091 20 -0.053 066
11 —0.201 084 22.5 -0.040 097
12 —0.186 094 22.5 -0.040 106
14 -0.148 025 24 -0.014 070
17 -0 .0 6 9 096 25 -0.013 115
18 -0.059 057 26 -0.006 Oil
19 -0.055 075 28 +0 .174 082
21 -0.043 005 29 +0.292 098
27 +0.052 079
Sums :
178.5 -3.370 256.5 -I.8I9
Means ;
11.9 -0.225 18.5 -0.150
l6l
The risk managers appear considerably more risk averse as a group 
than the non risk managers. This is evidenced both by the means of 
their respective scores and the mean rank of 11.9 accorded to the 
group of risk managers compared to a mean rank of 18.3 for the 
non risk managers.
The null hypothesis was stated as;
Risk taking attitude will be the same 
for risk managers and non-risk managers.
Risk managers will reveal a different risk 
taking attitude from non-risk managers.
The direction of any difference was not hypothesised, a priori, and 
a two tailed probability was therefore calculated by means of the 
Mann - Whitney U Test and the level of significance set at O.O5.
The U statistic was 58 which has an associated two tailed probability
of 0.040.
The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected and the alternative 
accepted that risk taking attitude will not be the same for both 
management types.
The following hypothesis attempts, therefore, to identify where the 
differences in attitude lay.
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HYPOTHESIS 8,
" Risk managers will be more 
risk averse than non-risk 
managers in decisions involving 
potential losses
A difference in decision making behaviour was identified in hypoth­
esis 7* This was expected and it is now hypothesised that the 
difference arose in view of the risk manager’s attitude towards 
risk where a potential loss is possible.
The decision problems in the questionnaire shown in appendix 1 had 
been designed so that one half of the problems held out the pros­
pect of a loss only, while the remainder only held out the prospect 
of a gain. In each type of question the subject was being asked to 
state the certain amount, either to be paid or received, beyond 
which he would just prefer to accept the gamble entailing the pros­
pect of a loss or gain respectively. As a first step towards test­
ing hypothesis 8, decision making behaviour was compared for each of 
the two types of problems.
The scores for subjects were computed for each type of question and 
the results are shown in table 12 with those problems only holding 
at the prospect of a loss being termed "risk cost" and those involving 
a gain, "risk price".
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Table 12,
Risk taking Attitude Score and Rankings for
Subject Risk Cost 
Score
Risk Price 
Score
Difference Rank of 
Difference
005 + 0.073 - 0.158 + 0.231 + 16
006 - 0.^78 - 0.216 + 0.138 + 12
Oil + 0.483 - 0.496 + 0.979 + 26
012 - 2.008 - 0.050 - 1.958 - 29
023 — 0.264 - 0.051 - 0.253 - 17
029 - 0.668 - 0.259 - 0.409 - 25
031 - 0.992 + 0.091 - 1.083 - 27
047 - 0,274 - 0.196 — 0.078 - 7
055 - 0.829 - 0.072 - 0.757 - 25
057 + 0.041 - 0.159 + 0.200 + 13
058 - 0.422 - 0.398 - 0.024 - 3
066 + 0.110 0.217 + 0.^ 327 + 21
070 0.000 - 0.029 + 0.029 + 4
075 - 0.090 - 0.020 - 0.070 - 6
078 - 0.187 - 0.175 - 0.012 - 1
079 - 0.086 + 0.150 - 0.236 - 18
080 - 1.081 + 0.007 - 1.088 - 28
082 + 0.108 + 0.240 - 0.132 - 11
084 - 0.315 - 0.086 - 0.229 - 15
091 - 0.168 - 0.261 + 0.093 + 10
094 - 0.305 - 0.068 - 0.237 - 19
095 - 0.667 0.000 - 0.667 - 24
096 - 0.055 - 0.075 + 0.020 + 2
097 - 0.150 + 0.070 - 0.220 - 14
098 + 0.467 + 0.117 + 0.350 + 22
106 - 0.074 - 0.007 - 0.067 - 5
112 - 0.254 - 0.164 - 0.090 - 9
115 + 0.051 - 0.256 + 0_307 + 20
115 - 0.056 + 0.030 - 0.086 - 8
Mean; - 0.266 - 0.093
Standard Sum of ' - ' ranks 289
Deviation; 0,497 0.162 Sum of ' + ' ranks I46
164
The null hypothesis was stated as:
risk taking attitudes in decisions 
only involving the prospect of a 
loss will be no different from 
attitudes in decisions where the 
outcome will be a gain* 
there will be a difference in risk 
taking attitudes as revealed by 
questions only involving a loss
and those only involving a gain* _
The Wilcoxon matched pairs test was employed to test for any signi­
ficant difference in attitude scores between the two types of de­
cisions and the significance level was set at 0*05
The Wilcoxon test is used in the case of matched pairs or, as in this 
study, where each subject is exposed to both treatments* Each subject 
is given a score for both treatments, in this case his attitude to­
wards risk in risk price and risk cost decisions. The difference be­
tween the scores is found and these differences are ranked according 
to the absolute value of the difference, that is without regard to 
sign. The sign of each difference is then assigned to the corres­
ponding rank. This has been done for the scores in this hypothesis
and the results are shown in table 12*
If there is no difference between the two treatments, i.e., is 
true, then the sum of the negative - sign ranks should be very
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similar to the sum of the positive - sign ranks. This meeins that if 
either the sum of the negative - sign ranks or the sum of the positive 
- sign ranks is too small then can be rejected. The smaller of 
these two sums of ranks is taken as the test statistic and termed T.
For sample sizes greater than twenty-five T is approximately normally 
distributed and the significance of any T value is then determined by 
the formula,
T
Z = ________ J ,_____
/  ÎT ( Ï Ï+1 )(2 Ï Ï+1 )
V 24
Where Z = Deviation of the observed value from the
population mean under 
T = The smaller of the two sums of ranks.
F = The total number in the sample.
A table of probabilities associated with observed values of Z in the 
normal distribution can then be consulted to ascertain the probability
connected with the occurrence under H of a value as extreme as theo
calculated Z.
The differences in table 12 produce a Z value of - 1.54& with an 
associated two tailed probability of 0.122. There is insufficient 
evidence, therefore, to reject the
On referring back to table 12 it may appear strange that cannot be 
rejected despite the difference between the mean scores but the test 
was between different treatments, i.e., risk cost and risk price de­
cisions, for each subject. The Wilcoxon test gives more weight to
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pairs that show a large difference than to pairs that only show a 
small difference and the discrepancy between the means in table 12 
could be due to the three large differences displayed by subjects 
012, 051 and 080.
The standard deviation of scores in those decisions involving a loss 
of 0.497T should be noted particularly. A standard deviation, some 
three times larger than the corresponding figure for decisions in­
volving a gain does indicate a wide variety in attitudes in loss 
making situations. The mean score for these decisions involving 
losses indicates a far higher degree of risk aversion than for those 
involving gains but the deviation about this mean for gains was con­
siderably less than for losses.
Although there was no significant difference, over all subjects, 
between scores on risk cost and risk price decisions there was some 
evidence to suggest that subjects were less homogeneous in attitude 
where losses were involved than where a gain was in prospect*
This line of enquiry was pursued with research hypothesis 8 in mind, 
risk managers will be more risk averse than non-risk managers in de­
cisions involving potential losses.
The risk taking attitude scores in the loss making decisions were 
calculated for both management types and the result is shown in 
table 15.
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Table 15*
Risk taking attitudes in loss making 
decisions related to management type.
Management Number of Mean Standard
Type Subjects Scores Deviations
Risk managers 15 - 0.3516 0.354
Non-risk managers 14 - 0.172? 0.615
A null hypothesis was formed and stated as:
H : There will be no difference between o
the risk taking attitudes of risk 
managers and non-risk managers in 
decisions involving only the prospect 
of a loss.
Risk managers will be more risk 
averse than non-risk managers in 
decisions involving only the 
prospect of a loss.
A Mann - Whitney U Test was utilized to test whether these two scores 
were drawn from the same population. The alternative hypothesis, 
against which is being tested, is that the score for risk managers 
will be higher i.e., a larger negative value, than for non-risk
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managers. This hypothesis can be accepted if the tJ statistic is so 
small that the probability associated with it under is equal to or 
less than the significance level chosen.
With the level of significance set at 0.05 the U statistic was cal­
culated as 57* stated the direction of the predicted difference 
and the one-tailed probability associated with the TJ statistic was 
0.018. The null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative 
accepted that risk managers are more risk averse than non-risk 
managers in decisions that only involve the prospect of a loss.
Non - risk managers were much less risk averse thsui risk managers 
in the loss making problems and the high standard deviation of 
0.615 would also suggest a lack of homogeneity among members of 
that group. Risk managers, as a group, were certainly more risk 
averse but in addition the standard deviation of their scores was 
much lower at 0.354»
These figures tend to suggest that where losses are concerned there 
was a high degree of variation, on the part of the non-risk managers, 
around a mean attitude score that was almost identical to the over­
all mean for all subjects in all questions of - 0.179* The fact that
only losses were involved did not have any real effect on their mean
risk taking attitude although the standard deviation of O .615 was 
considerably higher than the overall standard deviation for all sub­
jects in all questions of O.25O.
A discussion on attitudes to risk in loss making situations as
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reflected in the utility curves for all subjects is contained on 
pages 123 to 128.
The findings shown abcrve, in relation to hypothesis 8, refer primarily 
to the group of risk managers and indicate that they may have acquir­
ed a respect for the potential loss that does not appear to be held by 
the non-risk managers. This respect could then have led them to be 
more risk averse than their colleagues.
As a comparison to what was being hypothesised above, a similar set 
of figures was collated for these decisions that held out the pros­
pect of profit only. Table 14 displays the results of this collation.
Table I4.
Risk taking attitudes in profit 
making situations related to 
management type.
Management 
type .
Number
of
Subjects
Mean
Scores
Standard
Deviations
Risk managers I5
Non-risk managers I4
■0.0975
-0.0874
0.144
0.184
When dealing with decisions that only involved degrees of profit 
there was very little difference between the scores for each manage­
ment group.
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The standard deviations of these scores, for each group, were very 
similar at the same time as being less than the standard deviation 
of scores for all subjects in all questions.
No significant difference in risk taking attitudes between groups 
was detected in decisions involving profit only, suggesting that 
risk managers, as a group, reacted in a very similar manner to the 
group of non-risk managers. Although risk managers normally handle 
decisions holding out degrees of loss they were nevertheless capable 
of adjusting to the profit problem and of responding in a fashion 
almost identical to the non-risk managers.
This may imply that while the subjects are familiar with decisions 
involving levels of profit or gains either as a result of their 
business or private experience they are less familiar with loss 
making situations and are consequently more willing to take risks to 
avoid losses. The exception to this general rule would seem to be - 
risk managers who reacted in much the same way as non-risk managers 
in profit decisions but differed significantly in attitude when 
deciding in loss making situations.
HYPOTHESIS f.
*' There will be a relationship between 
risk taking attitudes and different 
probabilities of loss ".
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This final hypothesis was included to reflect the fact that many of 
the decision problems faced by risk managers involve high potential 
losses with low probabilities. This high loss, low probability 
event is found, for example, in the purchase of certain forms of 
insurance. The risk of a building being destroyed by earthquake 
in the United Kingdom is remote but should it happen the cost 
would be substantial. The earthquake risk is offered as a standard 
extension of cover on industrial property insurances and is effected 
by most insureds.
This hypothesis attempts to identify any difference in risk taking 
attitude between decisions involving a fifty percent chance of loss 
and those with a ten percent chance of loss. A Wilcoxon Matched 
Pairs test was carried out using the risk taking attitude scores in 
each of the two types of problem mentioned above.
The null hypothesis was:
H : There will be no difference in the o
risk taking attitude of subjects 
between decisions having a fifty 
percent chance of loss and those 
having a ten percent chance of loss.
Subjects will not reveal the same 
attitude towards risk in decisions 
with a ten percent chance of loss as 
they will in decisions with a fifty 
percent chance.
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Tîie significance level vas set at 0.05 and the Wilcoxon test 
statistic calculated as 3.88. The associated two tailed probab­
ility was so low as not to be shown on most statistical tables and 
therefore enabled rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance 
of the alternative. There was a significant difference in attitude 
towards risk between situations holding out a fifty percent chance 
of losing or breaking even and those with a low probability of a 
high loss.
The actual scores show a greater degree of aversion to risk in de­
cisions with the ten percent chance of a high loss than in those 
with the fifty percent chance of losing.
When the scores were split according to management background it 
was found, as might have been expected from previous hypotheses, 
that the risk managers were again more averse to risk than their 
non-risk management colleagues.
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CHAPTER 6.
CONCLUSIONS,
Decision making is more than just the final act of selecting an 
alternative course of action. It implies the construction of a 
decision with each component linking together to form the complete 
problem. The resultant examination of each part of the decision 
problem is then likely to be more beneficial than an attempt at 
trying to deal with all the various factors of the decision as 
one problem.
When the decision is broken down many areas of study become clear 
and the literature on formal decision analysis comprises several 
studies aimed at clarifying difficulties associated with individual 
parts of the decision structure. Such studies have been accompan­
ied by attempts at applying decision aids in practical situations.
This study was confined to the business decision and to one aspect 
of the decision problem, namely the placing of some value on po­
tential outcomes. When referring to outcomes it is necessary to 
distinguish between courses of action and their consequences. This 
study was concerned with the measurement of consequences. This 
aspect of the decision is as important as the identification of 
alternatives, evaluation of probabilities and the ascertainment of 
states of nature as if the outcomes, in real terms, influence the
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decision taker and this fact is not taken into account, then much 
of the work that has been done in the building of the problem will 
have been in vain.
When outcomes are stated in absolute terms there is the possibility 
that different people will assign different preference orderings 
to them. In addition there is the chance that people will be in­
fluenced in some way by the likelihood that a particular outcome 
will come about.
When outcomes are restricted to monetary values the preference 
ordering becomes less of a problem but the decision taker's atti­
tude towards risk is extremely important. Given simple decision 
problems the business manager may be able to perceive the risks 
and cope with them but when the risks are contained in a complex 
choice problem it is more likely that he will begin to be incon­
sistent among choices, despite the fact that he may be endeavour­
ing to be true to some basic, underlying attitude towards risk.
Utility theory has been put forward as a means of meeting this pro­
blem. Actual values of money are replaced by their utile equiva­
lents which then represent the decision taker's attitude towards 
risk combined with the absolute value of the monetary amount.
In this study utility theory was looked upon as a prescriptive de­
cision aid. It was not suggested that utility equivalents of money 
would enable an accurate prediction of behaviour. What was
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hypothesised was that utility theory can be employed to guide de­
cision makers in making choices that they should make if they want 
to be consistent among choices and to some underlying attitude to­
wards risk.
The research problem was to ascertain to what extent a workable, 
utility based, normative model could be created for decision making 
under risky conditions.
THE METHOD.
Business managers took part in the study in an effort to avoid the 
criticisms levelled at earlier work where subjects with little or 
no business experience were used. A utility function was derived for 
each manager and subjects were then assigned to one of three groups.
All subjects were subsequently presented with twenty-four business 
decision problems, each contained in short narrative form. Those 
managers in group one also received a note of how their utility 
function suggested they should act and were instructed to make what­
ever use they wanted of this additional information. Group two sub­
jects responded to the decision problems and were then informed of 
their utility prescriptions and given the chance to make any altera­
tions they wanted. Those in group three did not receive any know­
ledge of their prescriptions. In this way it was possible to note 
any variation in decision making behaviour among knowledge groups.
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utility functions were derived for fifty-one subjects but only 
twenty-nine of these subjects eventually completed the decision 
problems. As it was necessary for both parts of the study to be
completed the results were based on the twenty-nine managers.
Certain techniques were devised specifically for use in this study.
a) A Self Administered Test. Previous work relating to the 
creation of utility functions involved subjects in lengthy 
and often complex interview sessions. As business managers, 
who would only have a limited amount of time to, offer, were
being utilized in this study, a test was devised that could
be completed by a subject on his own and in his own time.
The test was designed to minimise the possibility of results 
becoming contaminated either by boredom or subject learning.
b) A Mathematical Relationship Between Pounds and Utiles*
One major weakness in previous research relating to the 
creation of personal utility functions is the lack of soph­
istication in the description of the resultant relationship 
between pounds and utiles. Very many studies involve a 
free hand drawing of a smooth line through a number of 
points. In this study a least squares regression programme 
was employed to fit a quartic function to the co-ordinates 
derived from the self administered test. The resultant 
polynomial equation was then used to prescribe behaviour
as pounds could be transferred to utiles and utiles back 
to pounds as required.
c) The Measurement of Risk Taking Attitudes.
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As utility theory was being looked upon as prescriptive 
and representative of underlying risk taking attitudes 
it was also decided to measure such attitudes, as dis­
tinct from any measurement contained in the utility 
function. This was done and each subject was given a 
risk taking attitude score which was used to compare with 
what his utility function suggested his attitude should be. 
Further tests on risk taking attitude related to the nature 
of the decision problems and the background of the managers 
were also carried out using this risk taking attitude score.
THE RESULTS.
The results can be classified in three parts, the creation of the 
utility function, the use of the utility functions and attitudes to­
wards risk in decision making.
a ) The Creation of Utility Functions.
i) The self administered utility test was completed 
satisfactorily and pound/utile co-ordinates were 
obtained. Eight out of the fifty-nine subjects who 
completed the utility questionnaires made errors that 
resulted in their response being rendered invalid. 
These were human errors but some further work on the 
form of the self administered test is referred to 
later and may reduce the possibility of mistakes,
ii) A least squares regression programme performed satis­
factorily in deriving a function that described the
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mathematical relationship between pounds and utiles.
For five subjects the curve described by the function 
included a downward sloping line. Such a curve meant 
that different pound amounts were being described by 
a single utile value. The line of questioning used in 
the self administered test had been designed to obviate 
this problem and produce co-ordinates that conformed to 
the basic assumption of monotonicity. The conclusion 
was that the dictates of the function resulted in a 
shape that was not representative of the image pre­
sented by the original co-ordinates. All that was 
sought was a method by which the relationship between 
any pound value and its corresponding utile equivalent 
could be described mathematically while still retain­
ing the general shape of the curve as indicated by the 
initial point estimates. The existence of additional 
co-ordinates may have solved the problem but this 
would have resulted in a longer, more complex and time 
consuming questionnaire bringing with it all the diff­
iculties" that the test had been designed to avoid.
A system of interpolation along the pound axis was de­
vised and additional, guiding co-ordinates were derived. 
The result was the elimination of the decreasing slope 
and creation of function, for each subject, that corres­
ponded to the image presented by the original co-ordinates. 
The visual image of the shape dictated by the original. 
co-ordinates was closer to reality than the computed
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shape which had been constrained by the type of 
function chosen. What had been achieved by inter­
polation was to compel the least squares regression 
programme to bear in mind this original shape,
iii) It was expected that the responses to the self ad­
ministered test would represent, for each subject, 
the selection of one figure from within a range of 
possible figures. With this in mind it would not be 
possible to say how accurate the utility function was. 
Two curves were therefore derived and a mean curve 
plotted by using the mean of the coefficients of 
each of the two individual quartic functions. It 
was this mean function that was then used to provide 
the prescriptions. Some doubt would have been cast 
on this mean line if the two independent lines had 
been very dissimilar. In fact there was a marked 
similarity between the two initial curves which was 
confirmed when a rank order correlation test was 
carried out using each of the functions to prescribe 
behaviour. Subjects were ranked according to their 
eventual prescriptions and a high level of correlation 
in rankings was found, 
vi) The utility curves described by the prescribing
functions revealed that the most prevalent attitude 
was one of risk aversion. Risk aversion of some de­
gree was evidenced by the curves of twenty-three out 
of the twenty-nine participating subjects. The
180
largest single group of subjects, almost thirty- 
five percent displayed aversion to risk when potential 
profit was involved or a small loss was possible but 
where large losses were possible they began to assume 
the characteristics of the risk taker. This change 
from aversion to seeking took place within a very 
narrow range of pound values.
The concept of the entrepreneurial risk-taker is not 
borne out by this study. What was evidenced was a 
tendency to be conservative in decisions involving 
potential profit or small losses. The rewarding of 
’’effective" decision making, the nature of manage­
ment education, unfamiliarity with decisions only 
holding out the prospect of a loss and changes in 
attitude when losses are being experienced were dis­
cussed in an effort to explain the predominance of 
aversion and the shift to seeking for large losses.
B) The Use Of The Utility Functions.
i) The main thrust of the experiments was to e:mmine the 
use subjects were prepared to make of their utility 
prescriptions. Comparing actual with prescribed be­
haviour, in itself, would not address this problem 
as if utility theory is a normative theory it could 
be expected that differences between actual and pre­
scribed behaviour would exist. It is because there 
are inconsistencies that a prescriptive decision
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making aid has been developed.
Comparing actual with prescribed behaviour would be in 
order as long as subjects had knowledge of how they 
should act and their actual behaviour was observed 
after they had received such information. In this 
study subjects were in three groups some with prior 
knowledge, those with post knowledge and others with 
no knowledge of their prescriptions.
r Using the mean of the absolute difference between 
actual and prescribed behaviour, in the twenty-four 
decision problems, as each subjects score, a signifi­
cant difference was detected between the three know­
ledge groups.
ii) The smallest difference was for those who had post
knowledge of their prescriptions and by far the largest 
difference was displayed by subjects who had no know­
ledge of their prescriptions and had been left to 
tackle the decisions unaided.
Combining those with pre and post knowledge and com­
paring them with subjects having no knowledge of their 
prescriptions also produced a significant difference. 
The timing of knowledge of prescriptions did not,how­
ever, seem to result in any significant difference in 
the use made of the information.
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With other variables controlled as far as possible, 
subjects subjected to identical decision problems 
and assigned to groups in a random fashion^knowledge 
would seem to have influenced their actual behaviour 
in as much as they behaved in a manner very similar 
to that prescribed for them.
There was certainly no reason to suggest that the 
subjects made use of their prescriptions because 
they thought this was expected of them, or. as they 
wanted to "please" the experimenter. The opposite 
may be more appropriate as managers are often scep­
tical about attempts to analyse their behaviour in 
decisions. These subjects were mature managers with 
a considerable number of years experience behind them 
and were free to accept or reject the information they 
had been given.
iii) The monetary range embraced by the decision questions 
that the managers were asked to answer was £105»000. 
The mean difference between actual behaviour and pre­
scribed behaviour for all subjects was £3,508.48.
For some subjects the difference was as low as a mean 
of £492.00 over the twenty-four decisions with the 
difference in individual questions being as low as 
£50.00. For other subjects the mean difference for 
the twenty-four decisions was as high as £9 ,222.91.
In addition to the finding that knowledge groups
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exhibited varying differences, the differences 
themselves, in real terms, were comparatively small, 
vi) There was no relationship between risk taking atti­
tude as described by the model and as evidenced by 
actual behaviour. Such a finding, for all subjects, 
could have been expected as the function was not being 
looked upon as a predictor of behaviour.
The only relationship between these two methods of 
describing attitudes towards risk was found among 
subjects who had had knowledge of their prescrip­
tions .
C) Attitudes Towards Risk in Decision Making.
Of the twenty-nine subjects who participated in this study, fifteen 
were risk managers. The risk manager, or insurance manager, within a 
company is responsible for the management of firm’s insurance port­
folio, any self insurance fund, risk financing, investment in loss 
reduction or prevention equipment and the general ongoing evaluation 
and economic control of risk. The selection of risk managers was 
intentional as their familiarity with decision making in situations 
where there is only the prospect of a loss or status quo may have 
led them to have a different attitude to risk, in certain problems, 
than other managers.
The twenty-four decision problems presented to each subject were 
equally divided between these where only a loss or break even c
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existed and those where only a profit or break even was possible.
i) There was a significant difference in decision making 
behaviour, as evidenced by risk taking attitude score,' 
between risk and non-risk managers. Over all questions 
the risk managers showed themselves to be much more 
risk averse than their colleagues,
ii) In analysing the decision making behaviour of risk 
managers where only a profit or break even position 
existed it was found that there was an insignificant 
difference between their behaviour and that of the 
non-risk managers.
The risk managers, however, were considerably more 
risk averse than others when confronted with the de­
cisions that only held out the prospect of a loss.
In addition they were, as a group, far more homogeneous 
in their behaviour. The non-risk managers by com­
parison, exhibited wide variation around a mean risk 
taking attitude that was much less risk averse.
Rather than their familiarity with potential losses 
resulting in them being less cautious, the risk mana­
gers were prepared to pay high amounts to be freed 
from risk. Their knowledge and experience of the 
loss producing event may have given them a respect 
for the potential loss that was not held by the other 
subjects.
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iii) All subjects were more averse to risk where there was 
a low probability of losing a high amount than where 
the chance of loss was only fifty percent. This low 
probability, high loss phenomena is very common in 
industrial and commercial life.
While all subjects were risk averse when faced with 
such a problem the group of risk managers were far 
more so than their colleagues. This may again be 
attributable to the management role they perform as 
many of the perils against which they will purchase 
insurance protection will fall into the category of 
low probability h i ^  loss events. The purchase of 
insurance against material damage caused by earth­
quake in the United Kingdom is a good example of this 
situation in practice.
FURTHER RESEARCH.
a ) The most important aspect of future research would be to expand 
the number of subjects selected and carry out the sample selec­
tion in such a way as to enable statistical inferences to be 
made concerning a larger population of managers. This could 
not be carried out without considerable effort and support 
from business managers. The benefits of such a large scale 
study do, however, merit further attention being given to the 
problem.
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B) The self administered utility test questionnaire does cut
down the amount of time required in obtaining pound - utile 
co-ordinates but further work is necessary on its design.
One particular area that should be examined is the possi­
bility of concealing answers once they have been made, in 
an attempt to minimise any learning effect that might exist 
at the moment.
Most managers would have access to a computer and it may 
be possible to write an "interactive" programme that would 
work in conjunction with a video display unit. Such a pro­
gramme could ask the subject the questions that appear on 
the present questionnaire and possibly include many more 
while only showing one problem on the screen at any one 
time. An extension of this idea may be that such a pro­
gramme could also fit the function to the co-ordinates that 
were derived. In this way an almost instantaneous utility 
function could be created and applied to an existing pro­
blem by feeding in the pound values of the problem and trans­
ferring them into utiles.
Should such a concept be possible then managers would have 
the ability to utilize utility theory on a day to day basis 
as and when required.
C) The problem of attitudes and preference orderings changing
over time is still one that requires attention. In the
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absence of a system as mentioned above, some delay will 
inevitably exist between creating a function and using it 
in problems. The longer it is between testings of a per­
son's utility function the more likely it is to become 
out of date.
D) The value of a normative utility theory is in its ability
to point out what a manager should do if he wants to be 
consistent among decisions. More work is required into 
how knowledge of utility prescriptions should be disclosed 
to decision makers.
The choice would seem to be between giving them as much in­
formation as possible on the nature and theory of utilities 
or providing them with the basic facts they require, that is, 
the utile prescriptions. In this study each subject was given 
a little information on what the prescriptions represented.
This is possibly one of the crucial areas of future study.
It is being suggested to a manager that he may have made a 
choice that he should not have made if he wants to be con­
sistent. This fact can be difficult to convey to experienced 
business men and work is required to see whether more or less 
knowledge of what utility theory purports to be would be 
beneficial.
E) It would also be interesting, in any future work, to return
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to subjects sometime after the experiments had been completed 
and try to ascertain why they did or did not make use of the 
utility prescriptions that had been provided for them.
This could give an insight into the problems people may have 
in accepting guidance in decision making tasks.
F) The form of management education and decision making education
in particular has been mentioned during this study. An as­
pect of further research that could be beneficial would be 
into how best normative decision making aids can be taught.
Should it be possible to write an 'interactive* programme, 
as mentioned earlier, this could have substantial benefits 
to students in introducing them, in a personal way, to the 
problems of differing risk taking attitudes.
G) The rationale behind this study is that management decision
making may benefit. Decision making in the real world is 
far removed from a choice between alternatives in a hy­
pothetical problem. Further research is required in the 
application of normative utility theory to actual business 
decisions,
This is difficult in view of the questioning of managers' 
initial choices that would be required when differences are 
observed between actual and prescribed behaviour.
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This should not, however, deter further work being started.
H) Decision making In loàs producing situations did seem to be 
erratic on the part of those managers who had no great fam­
iliarity with the form of decision that only held out the 
prospect of a loss. More work is required in an effort to 
identify the causes of this change in attitude between pro­
fit making and loss producing problems,
I) Finally a closer examination of the relationship between 
attitudes towards risk and certain biographical information 
is necessary. This would have some application in the per­
sonnel function but would also be of value in determining 
what factors contribute to various risk taking attitudes.
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APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE CONTAINING 
TWENTY FOUR DECISION 
PROBLEMS.
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U N I V E R S I T Y  OF G L A S G O W
A STUDY OF 
MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING
On the following pages you will find a series of decision making 
problems. Each problem involves you in a decision and what we want 
to know is how you would act if this was a decision you were facing, 
at work, today. Please approach these choices as a corporate decision 
maker not as a private individual and do not be influenced by what you 
feel you should do or what you think we expect you will do but rather 
make a choice based on what you consider you would do in real life.
All the decision making problems involve a choice between two mutually 
exclusive alternatives. The two alternatives will always be of the 
same basic form i.e., on the one hand there will be a chance situation 
involving a possibility of either breaking even or gaining a given 
amount of money (some of the chance situations will also involve a 
possibility of breaking even or losing a given amount). On the other 
hand, the second alternative will always be in the form of an option 
yielding a certain amount of money. You are being asked to decide 
what that certain amount of money would have to be so that you would 
prefer to take, or pay, it rather than take the alternative involving 
the chance situation. You must respond to each question. There is 
no correct answer to any of these questions, all that is being 
examined is how you, personally, respond.
All values in the problems can be taken as the present values of all 
cash flows, net of taxes, with payments and receipts taking place in 
the near future. The financial amounts involved and the probabilities 
may not always appear realistic but the basic choices have been 
incorporated in a story line to make it appear as a decision and not
simply a lottery. Please try and place yourself in the position of
the decision maker and answer the questions as you would if actually 
faced with these problems in real life. Please accept the facts
given in each story and base your response on these facts alone, i.e.,
without giving consideration to facts not provided.
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By looking at the following two examples you will see that your 
response, to each of the questions in this booklet will take the form 
of an amount of money which is to be inserted in the boxes provided.
This amount of money could really be looked upon as a certainty 
equivalent i.e., it is the certain amount of money you would be 
prepared to lose, or gain, rather than choose the alternative with 
the chance outcomes of possibly breaking even or losing/gaining. In 
the problems with the chance of losing you are asked to indicate the 
maximum definite loss you would bear rather than take the risky 
alternative. In cases involving a chance of profit you are asked to 
indicate the minimum definite profit you would accept rather than 
take the risky alternative.
It is important that you show the maximum amount or the minimum 
amount you would bear or accept and before moving on to the next 
question you should spend a moment satisfying yourself that your 
answer adequately reflects your attitude.
In each question you will be given the profit/loss for the risky 
alternative and also what the chances are of you .making that profit/ 
loss. The non-risky alternative will always lead to certain profit/loss 
and it is the minimum profit or maximum loss you are asked to arrive 
at so that you would just still prefer the non-risky alternative to 
the risky one.
The following two examples should clear up any remaining problems you 
may have.
Prior to starting the questions would you please place a tick in one
of the boxes at the top of page 6. Place a tick in box RIM if
you are the risk or insurance manager or tick box In RMI if you 
perform some other management function.
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EXAMPLE I
Certain long term securities held by your company are about to mature 
and you must decide how to use the money. After consideration it is 
decided that the money is not required for any immediate purpose and 
can be reinvested. You have the opportunity of purchasing some shares 
with a high possible net profit of £20,000, during the next accounting 
period. There is, however, the possibility that the shares will not 
rise but will stay at the same value. The expert advice you have 
received indicates there is a 50/50 chance of the shares rising or 
staying the same. If they rise it is assumed they will give a profit 
of £20,000. An alternative open to you is to reinvest the money in 
Government Securities where the profit will be smaller but certain.
What would be the minimum amount you would be prepared to accept as 
a definite profit on the Government Securities rather than take your 
chance of possibly gaining £20,000 or breaking even?
+ 1 S’ |o o
Please satisfy yourself that if the profit from 
the Government Securities was any lower than the 
figure you have selected, you would prefer to 
take the risky alternative.
In this example, which involves a possible gain, the respondent has 
inserted £19,500 as the minimum definite profit he would look for 
instead of taking the risky alternative. This would be an unusually 
high amount to insist upon and most people would select a figure 
somewhat less than that.
By inserting £19,500 this person indicates that should the profit 
from the Government Securities be, say £19,400 he would prefer to 
take the chance alternative of gaining £20,000 even although by doing 
so he also takes the equally likely chance of gaining nothing.
On the other hand someone else may have inserted £150 as the minimum 
definite amount he would look for meaning that should the profit 
from the securities be, say £200 he would buy the securities rather 
than take the chance of gaining nothing by buying the shares, 
despite the fact that he also would have the chance of gaining £20,000.
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These are exaggerated extremes and most people would select a 
definite amount that lay somewhere between them.
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EXAMPLE II
Your company has been sued for libel as a result of an article 
published in a trade journal and written by your technical manager. 
You have taken expert legal advice and find that there is only a 
10 per cent chance that you will be held liable. Should the other 
side win their case they will be awarded £17,500, should they fail, 
you will break even as they will pay costs.
You have heard that they will consider a reasonable "out of court" 
settlement figure. What is the maximum offer you would make to avoid 
becoming involved in litigation with the chance of breaking even or 
losing £17,500? Your firm is not insured for this risk.
o o
Are you satisfied that if the other side said they 
would accept a little more than the figure you have 
shown, you would then prefer to take your chances 
in litigation?
This is an example involving a possible loss situation and again the 
figure inserted of £17, 000 is an unrealistically high amount. It 
means in fact that if the other side said they would take £16,900 
he would pay this rather than take the chance of losing £17,500, 
despite the fact that there is only a 10 per cent chance of losing 
the case.
On the other hand if a person had said It bat the maximum amount they 
would pay "out of court" was £100 then this implied that if the other 
side said they would accept £12Q he would not pay it but prefer to 
take his chance of paying nothing, despite the fact that there is 
still a 10 per cent chance of having to pay £17, 500,
These two definite amounts £17,000 and £100 are obviously quite 
extreme and most people would probably select a figure somewhere 
between them. However, there will be considerable variation in the 
amount actually selected by people.
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RIM
IMRM
1 Your company presently trades in one foreign market in addition 
to the home market. The experience in this foreign market has not 
been good and consistent losses have been made. Your evaluation is 
that if you continue to trade there, you will lose £28^000 in total. 
You consider there to be a 50/50 chance of losing this amount or 
breaking even.
You could leave the foreign market immediately, and rely on the 
domestic market only, but by doing so would incur a definite loss in 
view of certain fixed costs that have already been paid.
What is the maximum loss level would you accept, by leaving the 
foreign market immediately, rather than take the chance of breaking 
even or losing £28^ 000?
Were you to find that the definite loss from leaving 
the foreign market was slightly higher than the figure 
you have shown above, are you satisfied that you would 
then prefer to take your chance, by continuing to trade, 
of breaking even?
205
2 You ara engaged in the analysis of a decision as to whether you 
should expand your business by entering a foreign market or should 
concentrate on the less uncertain alternative of expanding domestically
Should you enter the foreign market, the best advice you have is that 
there is a 50/50 chance of achieving a net profit level of £40,000 
otherwise the enterprise will fail and only provide sufficient funds 
to break even.
Should you expand domestically there is no doubt that the increased 
profit level could be exactly calculated.
What is the minimum increased profit level you would require, from 
domestic expansion, lower than which you would choose to enter the 
foreign market?
+
If the definite profit from domestic expansion 
was just a little lower than the figure you have 
shown above, are you convinced you would then 
prefer to take your chances in the foreign market 
of possibly gaining £40,000?
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3 Your company has purchased an amount of iron ore from a foreign 
producer and now find that you cannot obtain an import licence for 
it.
You have decided that you could attempt to sell the ore in some ■ 
other foreign market. The chance of being able to sell the quantity 
of ore in question is put at 50/50 and if you succeed then you would 
break even. If you fail in selling the ore then the loss will be 
£25,000 being the purchase price and lost revenue.
The producer of the ore has also offered to buy it back at a figure 
obviously lower than the purchase price you paid, thus resulting 
in a definite loss.
What is the maximum certain loss you would accept before you would 
prefer to take your chances on selling the ore?
If the producer of the ore offered you a price 
that resulted in a loss which was just a little 
more than what you have inserted above, are you 
satisfied that this would persuade you to take 
your chances on selling the ore and possibly 
breaking even?
207
4 You have been given the chance to make a bulk purchase of iron 
ore from abroad but you are not sure that an import licence would 
be granted. You must, unfortunately, decide whether or not to buy 
the ore before you know the outcome of the Government’s deliberations 
over your import licence. A friend in the relevant government depart­
ment has told you that there is only a 50/50 ohance of getting the 
licence. If you get the licence the profit from selling in this 
country would be £20,000. If you fail to get the licence you would, 
of course, break even.
An alternative course of action is to spend the money on buying 
finished metal sheets in Britain which would be more expensive but 
will yield a definite profit.
What is the lowest definite profit you would accept rather than make 
the bulk purchase with the chances involved in doing that?
Should the profit from buying finished metal 
sheets be lower than what you have inserted 
above are you sure that you would then prefer 
to take your chance by buying the ore,of 
possibly gaining £20,000?
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5 After a recent take-over you have found that a large quantity 
of foreign products, all of the same kind, are lying unsold in a 
warehouse owned by the firm you have just aoquired. The goods 
have only been partly paid for. There is, without doubt, a 90 per 
cent chance of you being able to sell the goods and if you do sell, 
you will break even, bearing in mind the outstanding purchase price 
and that the price will be so low in view of the age of the goods 
and the recent introduction of a more attractive modern version of 
the same item. You, therefore, have a 10 per cent chance of losing 
£55,000, the amount still owed. A foreign importer has offered to 
buy the goods from you but the amount he has offered will not allow 
you to ’make a profit, in fact you will definitely make a loss and you 
can calculate this loss exactly.
What is the highest definite loss you would bear rather than attempt 
to sell the foreign products?
Should the price offered by the importer result 
in a loss just a little higher than you have 
indicated, are you sure you would then prefer 
to try and sell the products with the chance of 
breaking even?
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6 Although you do not normally import goods you have received the 
opportunity of obtaining, by bulk purchase, a foreign product, very 
similar to one manufactured in this country which you presently 
market successfully. You have had little time to examine the 
market's potential response to this imported product but on the 
strength of all available evidence you conclude that there is a 50/50 
chance of the item selling as well as the British version. The 
foreign product is much cheaper to make and if it does sell as well 
as the British equivalent the increased profit, in the coming 
accounting year, will be £28,000. The alternative to buying this 
bulk order is to acquire a local retail outlet and expand the 
marketing of your existing product. The shop to be purchased has 
produced a steady rate of profit over recent years and your accountants 
have forecast a target profit for the forthcoming accounting - year, 
which they are certain will be attained.
What is the lowest certain profit you would accept from the shop 
beyond which you would prefer to take your chances by importing the 
foreign goods?
On looking back at the figure you have shown above, 
are you satisfied that if the profit from the shop 
was lower than it, then you would prefer to take 
your chances, by importing the foreign products, of 
gaining £28,000?
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7 After a recent take-over you have found that a large quantity 
of foreign products, all of the same kind, are lying unsold in a 
warehouse owned by the firm you have just acquired. The goods have 
only been partly paid for. There is, without doubt, only a 50/50 
chance of you being able to sell the goods and even if you do sell, 
you will only break even, bearing in mind the outstanding purchase 
price and that the price will be so low in view of the age of the
goods and the introduction of a more attractive modern version of
the same item. You, therefore, have a 50/50 chance of breaking even 
or losing £15,000, the amount still owed.
A foreign importer has offered to buy the goods from you but the
amount he has offered will not allow you to make a profit, in fact 
you will definitely make a loss and you can calculate this loss 
exactly,
What is the highest definite loss you would bear, rather than 
attempt to sell the foreign products?
If the loss from selling to the foreign importer 
was .more than you have shown above, are you sure 
you would then prefer to attempt to sell the 
goods with the chance of possibly breaking even?
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In the remainder of the decisions you are not asked to look back at 
the figure you insert, to check that you are satisfied with it.
The principle does however remain that you should make sure you 
are completely happy with the amount you choose before moving on 
to the next decision.
a Your company is considering purchasing a new warehouse. The 
new premises will enable you to handle a wider variety of goods more 
speedily than before. You have carefully analysed all the issues 
involved and consider there to be a 50/50 chance that the new 
improved warehouse, with its wider range of goods, will yield 
additional profits, per year, of £25,000.
You are also considering an alternative and that is to redesign your 
existing warehouse so that the goods you presently handle can be 
processed more quickly and efficiently. This option will, without 
doubt, lead to additional profits, per year.
What is the minimum definite additional annual profit from redesigning 
you would accept rather than take the chance of the £25,000 profits 
increase by moving?
4-
9 Your Firm's premises are now too small for the level of production 
presently being achieved and anticipated in the future. You have the 
opportunity of purchasing a new bustom built ready to enter factory 
unit in a neighbouring town. You fear that you may lose some of your 
market, by making this change, and have carefully evaluated there to 
be only a 10 per cent chance that you will lose some of your market.
The amount you consider you would lose would be £47, 500 over the 
period under discussion. The alternative is to completely refurbish 
your existing premises which will ameliorate the problem but will 
result in a definite loss, as the factory will be closed for these 
alterations, during the period under discussion.
What is the greatest definite loss you would be prepared to accept 
rather than take the chance of possibly losing £47,500 or breaking even?
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10 A new product had been launched by your company sometime 
ago. Unfortunately it has not done well and a decision must be 
made whether or not to continue to market the product. Your 
marketing departments research shows a 90 per cent chance of you 
regaining lost ground and breaking even during the period under 
consideration. If you should fail to break even then the net loss 
would be £45,000.
You could decide to immediately withdraw the product as a result 
of which there would be a definite loss in view of initial expenses 
etc.
What is the greatest loss you would accept, from withdrawing the 
product, rather than take the chances involved in continuing- to 
market it with the possibility of breaking even or losing £45,000?
11 You are engaged in the analysis of a decision as to whether 
you should expand your business by entering a foreign market or 
should concentrate on the less uncertain alternative of expanding 
domestically.
Should you enter the foreign market, the best advice you have is 
that there is a 50/50 chance of achieving a net profit level of 
£47, 500 otherwise the enterprise will fail and only provide sufficient 
funds to break even.
Should you expand domestically there is no doubt that the increased 
profit level could be exactly calculated.
What is the minimum increased profit level you would require, from 
domestic expansion, lower than which you would choose to enter the 
foreign market?
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12 Your company presently trades in one foreign market in addition 
to the home market. The experience in this foreign market has been 
variable and losses have been made. Your evaluation is that If you 
continue to trade there, there is a 10 per cent chance that you will 
lose £40,000 in total. There is, therefore, a 90 percent chance of 
breaking even.
You could leave the market immediately, cut your,losses, and rely on 
the domestic market only.
What is the maximum loss level you would accept, by leaving the 
foreign market immediately, rather than take the chance of breaking 
even or losing £40,000?
13 Certain Government Securities, held by your company, are about 
to mature and you are deciding what is now to be done with the 
available funds. After consideration it is decided that the money 
is not required for any immediate oapital investment project, it can 
therefore be re-invested. You have been given the opportunity of 
purchasing some shares with a high possible net profit of £10 000 
during the next accounting period. There is the possibility that 
the shares will not rise but will stay at the same value. The 
experts in the field suggest that there is a 50/50 chance of the 
shares giving a profit of £10,000. The alternative is to re-invest 
the available funds in Government Securities where the profit will be 
smaller but guaranteed.
What is the lowest profit from the Government Securities you would 
accept below which you would buy the shares with the chance of 
gaining £10,000 or breaking even?
14 Certain Government Securities, held by your company, are about 
to mature and you are deciding what is now to be done with the 
available funds. After consideration it is decided that the money 
is not required for any immediate capital investment project, it 
can therefore be re-invested.
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You have been given the opportunity of purchasing,some shares with a 
high possible net profit of £17 500 during the next accounting period. 
There is the possibility that the shares will not rise but will stay at 
the same value. The experts in the field suggest that there is a 
50/50 chance of the shares giving a profit of £17,500. The alternative 
is to re-invest the available funds in Government Securities where 
the profit will be smaller but guaranteed.
What is the lowest profit from the Government Securities you would 
accept below which you would buy the shares with the chance of gaining 
£17,500 or breaking even?
15 Your Firm's premises are now too small for the level of.production 
presently being achieved and anticipated in the future. You have the . 
opportunity of purchasing a new custom built ready to enter factory 
unit in a neighbouring town. You fear that you may lose some of your 
market, by making this change, and have carefully evaluated the chance 
to be 50/50 that you will lose or not lose any market. The amount 
you consider you would lose would be £40,000 over the period under 
discussion. The alternative is to completely refurbish your existing 
premises which will ameliorate the problem but will result in a 
definite loss, as the factory will be closed for these repairs, during 
the period under discussion.
What is the greatest definite loss you would be prepared to accept 
rather than take the chance of possibly losing £40,000 or breaking 
even?
16 You have been given the chance to make a bulk purchase of iron 
ore from abroad but you are not sure that an import licence would 
be granted. You must, unfortunately, decide whether or not to buy the 
ore before you know the outcome of the Government's deliberations 
over your import licence.
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A friend in the relevant government department has told you that there 
is only a 50/50 chance of getting the licence. If you get the licence 
the profit from selling in this country would be £50,000. If you fail 
to get the licence you would, of course, break even.
An alternative course of action is to spend the money on buying 
finished metal sheets in Britain which would be more expensive but 
will yield a definite profit.
What is the lowest definite profit you would accept rather than make 
the bulk purchase with the chances involved in doing that?
17 Certain shares your company holds have been falling steadily in 
value. An investment analyst, employed by your firm, has examined 
the position carefully and has reported on the prospects during the 
next year. The analyst’s opinion is that there is a 50/50 chance 
that the shares will regain their purchase value and if they don’t, 
then the total loss to your company will be £20,000. A client of the 
company with which the analyst works has expressed an interest in the 
shares, from a speculative viewpoint, and is prepared to make an offer 
for them. The offer, in view of the shares uncertain future, will be 
less than the price you paid for them and this will mean a..loss, but 
a loss that you could calculate exactly.
What is the greatest certain loss you would be prepared to suffer, 
as a result of selling to the analyst's client, rather than retain 
the shares with a 50 per cent chance of breaking even or losing 
£20,000?
18 Your company is considering purchasing a new warehouse. The 
new premises will enable you to handle a wider variety of goods more 
speedily than before. You have carefully analysed all the issues 
involved and consider there to be a 50/50 chance that the new im­
proved warehouse, with its wider range of goods, will yield additional 
profits, per year of £45,000.
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You are also considering an alternative and that is to redesign your 
existing warehouse so that the goods you presently handle can be 
processed more quickly and efficiently. This option will without 
doubt lead to additional profits per year.
What is the minimum definite additional annual profit from redesign­
ing you would accept rather than take the chance of the £45, 000 
profits increase by moving?
19 A major competitor has recently left the market and you are con­
sidering production of one of their lines. The expected profit is 
£35 000 but due to the uncertainty as to whether you would be . 
successful in cornering a share of the ‘market or not the chance of 
you achieving this profit is put at 50/50. If you fail in your bid 
to capture the market you know that you will only gain enough to 
cover costs and thus break even.
There is an alternative and that is to extend the range of your own 
similar products. Extensive market research has indicated a certain 
profit level if this was done.
What is the lowest certain profit you would accept below which you 
would take the alternative of producing the competitor's product 
with the possibility of gaining £35^000 or breaking even?
4-
20 Your company has purchased an amount of iron ore from a foreign 
producer and now find that you cannot obtain an import licence for it.
You have decided that you could attempt to sell the ore in some other 
foreign market. The chance of being able to sell the quantity of ore 
in question is put at 90 per cent and if you succeed then you would 
break even. If you fail in selling the ore then the loss will be 
£35,000 being the purchase price and lost revenue.
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The producer of the ore has also offered to buy it back at a figure 
obviously lower than the purchase price you paid, thus resulting in a 
definite loss.
What is the maximum certain loss you would accept before you would 
prefer to take your chances on selling the ore?
21 Although you do not normally import goods you have received 
the opportunity of obtaining by bulk purchase a foreign product, 
very similar to one manufactured in this country which you presently 
market successfully. You have had little time to examine the market’s 
potential response to this imported product but on the strength of all 
available evidence you conclude that there is a 50/50 chance' of the 
item selling as well as the British version. The foreign product is 
much cheaper to make and if it does sell as well as the British 
equivalent the increased profit, in the coming accounting year, will 
be £5,000. The alternative to buying thisbulk order is to acquire a 
local retail outlet and expand the marketing of your existing product. 
The shop to be purchased has produced a steady rate of profit over 
recent years and your accountants have forecast a target profit for 
the forthcoming accounting year, which they are certain will be 
attained.
What is the lowest certain profit you would accept from the shop 
beyond which you would prefer to take your chances by importing the 
foreign product?
22 Certain shares your company holds have been fluctuating in value, 
always below the original purchase price. An investment analyst, 
employed by your firm, has examined the position carefully and has 
made a report to you. The analyst’s opinion is that there is a 
90 per cent chance that the shares will regain their purchase value, 
at which time you could sell and break even, and a 10 per cent chance 
they don’t when the total loss to your company would be £50,000.
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A client of the company with which the analyst works has expressed 
an interest in the shares, from a speculative viewpoint, and is pre­
pared to make an offer for them. The offer, whatever it is, will 
still result in your company making a loss on these investments.
What is the greatest certain loss^would you be prepared to suffer, 
as a result of selling ^o the analyst's client, rather than retain 
the shares with a 10 per cent chance of losing £50,000 ?
23 A new product had been launched by your company.sometime ago. 
Unfortunately it has not done well and a decision must be made 
whether or not to continue to market the product. Your marketing 
departments research shows a 50/50 chance of you regaining lost 
ground and breaking even. If you should fail to break even then 
the net loss would be £10,000,
You could decide to immediately withdraw the product as a result of 
which there would be a definite loss in view of initial expenses etc,
What is the greatest loss you would accept, from withdrawing the 
product, rather than take the chances involved in continuing to 
market it with the possibility of breaking even or losing £10,000?
24 A major competitor has recently left the market and you are 
considering production of one of their lines. The expected profit 
is £31,500 but due to the uncertainty as to whether you would be 
successful in cornering a share of the market or not, the chance of 
you achieving this profit is put at 50/50. If you fail in your bid 
to capture the market you know that you will only gain enough to 
cover costs and thus break even.
There is an alternative and that is to extend the range of your own, 
similar, products. Extensive market research has indicated a certain 
profit level if this was done.
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What is the lowest certain profit you would accept below which you 
would take the alternative of producing the competitor's product with 
the possibility of gaining £31^500 or breaking even?
"h
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INSTRUCTIONS.
The following questions are designed to provide some biographical information 
that will eventually be compared with your responses to the decision 
situations, which form the main part of the study. The information you 
provide here is, of course, entirely confidential,
As you work your way through the questions please place a tick in the box 
corresponding to the answer you select.
1. Are you the risk/insurance manager or do you perform some other 
management function?
Risk/insurance 
manager 
non-risk/ 
insurance manager
2, What, age will you be on the 1st. January 78?
Less than 30 
30 - 39 
40 - 49 
50 - 59 
over 60
3. Do you hold a university first degree? If the answer is yes please 
indicate the faculty.
No 
Yes B
4.
5.
Do you hold a university post-graduate degree?
No
Yes B
Do you hold a professional qualification appropriate to your present 
position?
Yes 
No
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6, Do you hold any other form of post-experience, post-qualifying diploma 
or certificate?
Yes * 
No
* please indicate type.
B
7, How long have you been in full-time employment?
Less than 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
Over 20 years
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APPENDIX 2
SELF ADMINISTERED UTILITY 
QUESTIONNAIRE.
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UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
A STUDY OF 
MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING
INSTRUCTIONS
The two decision problems shown on pages 5 and 6 of this booklet 
represent the first part of a two part programme designed to give 
an insight into certain aspects of management decision making.
Both of the questions you are aéked to answer are of the same 
basic style. You will be faceb-withha decision situation where 
you are forced to act in choosing between two mutually exclusive 
alternatives. One alternative will always involve a chance 
situation where there will be two possible financial outcomes 
with a 50/50 chance of either occurring. ‘i'^T-e other alternative 
will result in a definite amount of money.
You will be given the two chancy financial, outcomes and will 
be asked to decide what level the definite amount of money 
would have to be , at its limit , so that you would prefer to 
take the alternative leading to it rather than the one leading 
to the chance situation.
Depending upon the outcomes, to the chancy alternatives, you 
may be willing to accept a minus amount rather than take the 
chancy alternative, i.e. you would be willing tq pay up to a 
certain amount of money rather than choose the risky alternative 
and risk losing a lot more. If this is the case then your answer 
should represent the maximum negative amount you would consider 
i.e., the maximum you would be prepared to pay. In other cases 
the alternatives will be such that you would require a positive 
amount before you would forego the risky alternative, i.e., 
you would accept an amount of money, down to some minimum figure, 
rather than take the risky alternative. In these cases your 
answer will be the minimum amount you.would require, i.e.,
the minimum amount you would accept, below which/you would 
just prefer to take your chances with the risky alternative.
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The values in the chance outcome will be high and you are asked 
to look upon these decisions as a business decision maker and 
not as a private individual. It is important to remember that 
there are no correct answers to these questions, you must try 
not to be influenced by what you think you should do or think 
is expected of you but, rather, make a choice based on what 
you think you would do in real life.
An example of the form of decision problem follows together 
with some explanatory notes on the responses shown.
You will see that beneath the problem itself there are seven 
lines, (a ) to (G) , with 3 boxes in each line. The first two 
boxes in each line are under the heading of "OUTCOMES” and the 
last box in each line is under the heading of "CERTAINTY 
EQUIVALENTS". Certainty equivalent is the name given to the 
definite amount of money that you would choose rather than take 
the alternative leading to the chance of securing one of the 
two outcomes you will have been given.
The boxes are numbered 1 to 9 and you will see that in line (A) 
boxes 1 and 2 show the outcomes from the
problem itself. Once you have selected your certainty equivalent 
and put this in box you are ready to move on to
line (B).
carrying down the value for box
box 3
3 in
in line (B) by
 line (A) , and
by using the same basic story you now have a new decision with 
outcomes of 1 and 3 . There are two important
restrictions, the first is that your certainty- equivalent is to 
lie between the two outcomes , whatever they may be , and the 
second is that you cannot select one of the outcomes as your 
certainty equivalent.
By following this pattern you will see that the person ended up
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by giving seven certainty equivalents in seven different decision 
situations by using the one original story and changing the 
outcomes as he worked from line to line.
Prior to starting the questions would you please place a tick 
in one of the boxes at the top right hand corner of page 5. Tick 
box RIM if you are the risk or insurance manager or tick
box NRM if you perform some other management function.
EXAMPLE
You are faced with the following decision where you are compelled, 
to act in selecting between two mutually exclusive alternatives.
The first alternative represents a chance situation which could 
result in one of two possible financial outcomes, either + £10,000 
or - £1,000, there is a 50/50 chance of either occurring.
The second alternative is a course of action leading to a definite 
financial outcome about which there is no risk.
What you are asked to do is to decide at what level that definite 
amount of money would have to be, at its limit, so that you would 
prefer to take that alternative rather than the chancy one with 
the possibility of + £10,000 or - £1,000. This definite amount 
of money will be called a cert'ainty equivalent.
Depending upon the outcomes, to the chancy alternatives, you may 
be willing to accept a minus amount rather than take the chancy 
alternative. If this is so then your certainty equivalent should 
represent the maximum negative amount you would accept. In other 
cases, the alternatives will be such that you would require a 
positive amount before you would forego the risky alternative.
In these cases your certainty equivalent will be the minimum 
amount you require.
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You will notice, from this example, that as the person moved from 
line to line he filled in the blank boxes, in the outcomes column, 
with the figure he had already used for that number of box in the 
certainty equivalent column of lines above, eg in line (O) he 
filled in boxes and with the values he had
inserted for these boxes in the certainty équivalent column of 
lines (a ) and (B).
You will also see that, for example, in line (B) he would pay up 
to £200 rather than take the chancy alternative and stand to lose 
£500, This person obviously lays more importance on the amount 
to be lost than on the amount to be possibly gained. Another 
person may have inserted + £9 000 in box 4 on line (B)
meaning that even if he found that the definite amount turned out 
to be £8,500 he would refuse it and prefer to take his chance of 
gaining £10,000. These are extremes, as you will have realised 
and most people would select a certainty equivalent between these 
figures.
If you are not entirelv sure of what is to be dona then a further 
explanation is given on the last page. If you feel quite happy with 
the explanation so far then you should proceed to the questions 
themselves.
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1 You ars faced with the following decision where you are 
compelled to act in choosing between two mutually exclusive 
alternatives.
On the one hand there is an alternative that leads to a 50/50 
chance of the outcome being + £80,000 or - £58,000.
On the other hand you can follow a course of action that you 
know will result in a definite financial amount that you can 
calculate. What is the limit you would allow that definite amount 
to reach at which you would just prefer to take it rather than 
the alternative leading to the 50/50 chance of + £80,000 or 
- £58^000?
Depending upon the outcomes in the chancy alternatives, you may 
be willing to accept a minus amount rather than take the chancy 
alternative. If this is so then your answer (your certainty 
equivalent) should represent the maximum negative.amount you 
would accept. In other cases, the alternatives will be such 
that you would require a positive amount before you would forego 
the risky alternative. In these instances, your answer will be 
the minimum amount you would require.
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2 You are faced with a decision where you must act. There are 
two mutually exclusive alternatives. On the one hand there is an 
alternative leading to a 50/50 chance of the outcome being either 
+ £60,000 or - £75,000.
On the other hand there is an alternative which will result in a 
definite financial outcome about which there is no risk. What is 
the limit you would allow that definite amount to reach, at which 
you would just prefer it rather than the alternative leading to 
the 50/50 chance of + £60,000 or - £75,000? Depending upon the 
outcomes in the chancy alternatives, you may be willing to accept 
a minus amount rather than taka the chancy alternative. If this 
is so then your answer (your certainty equivalent) should represent 
the maximum negative amount you would accept. In other cases, the 
alternatives will be such that you would require a positive amount 
before you would forego the risky alternative. In these instances 
your answer will be the minimum amount you would require.
OUTCOMES
CERTAINTY
EQUIVALENTS
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Each of the decision problems is rather like a situation where 
a person has presented you with two alternatives, on the one hand 
he has offered you £10 if a coin, he is- about to flip, lands 
heads up and nothing if it lands tails up. On the other hand 
he is prepared to give you a definite amount of money , now, 
regardless of the outcome of the coin tossing. What you must 
decide upon is the minimum amount you would be prepared to 
accept, now , rather than take your chances on possibly winning 
£10 or breaking even.
Once you decide on this amount it could be looked upon as a 
certainty equivalent , in that it is the minimum amount you would 
prefer to have , for certain, as an alternative to choosing the 
risky alternative.
You might also have found a situation where you would have to pay 
£10 if a coin landed heads up and nothing if it landed tails up. 
An alternative is that you can pay a fixed amount of money now 
in preference to taking the risky alternative. In such a case 
the certainty equivalent would be the maximum amount you would 
be prepared to pay,now, rather than run the risk of possibly 
having to pay £ 10 or break even.
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APPENDIX 3
COMPUTER PROGRAMME FOR . 
INTERPOLATION ON THE POUND 
AXIS.
iNTERPuLATiNG EXTRA POINTS AT EQUAL INTERVALS OF CE 
REAL UTILEl (H-1 ) ,UT1L£2 ( A n  
REAL C E I (9) ,CE2(9) ,C 1 (A 1) •C 2 (41)
R E A D (5,111) C E I (5),C E I (3),C E I (2),C E I (A),C E I (7),C E I (8),C E I (6) 
R E A D (5,111) CEI (1) , C E 1 (9)
R E A D (5,111) CE2(5) ,CE2(3) ,CE2(2) ,CE2(A) ,CE2(7) ,CE2(d) ,CE2(b) 
R E A D (5,111) C £ 2 ( 1 ) ,CE2(9)
111 f o r m a t (ôX,7F10.0)
112 FORMAT(bX,7F10.A)
NINT=33
CElNT=i350ü0.0/NlNT
NK=NlNt+8
Jl = l
J2=l
DO 10 K=10,iNK 
CEINC=(K-9)*CEINT 
Cl(K)=80000-CEINC 
C2 (K) =t)OOGO-CEINC
30 IF(C1(K) .GE.CEl (Jl + 1) ) GOTO 31 
Jl=Jl+i
GOTO 30
31 CONTINUE
AO I F ( C 2 ( K ) . G E . C E 2 (J 2 + 1 ) ) GOTO Al 
J2=J2+1 
GOTO AO 
41 CONTINUE
U T I LEI(K)= ( Cl(K)-CEI(Jl))/(CEl(Ul+l)- CEI(J l ) ) + Ji-1
U T I L E 2 ( K ) = ( C 2 ( K ) - C E 2 ( U 2 ) )/(C E 2 (J 2 + i )- C E 2 (J 2 )) + J2-1 
UTILEI(K)=UTILE1(K)*.125 
UTlLE2(K)=UTILE2(K)*.12b 
10 CONTINUE
DO 20 K=l,9 
Cl(%)=CE1(K)
C2(K)=CE2(K)
UTILEI(K)=(K-1)*.125 
UTILE2(K)=(K-i)*.l2b 
20 CONTINUE
W R I T E (10,112) UTILE!
W R I T E (10,112) UTILE2 
W R I T E (10,111) Cl 
W R I T E (10,111) C2 
STOP 
END
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TILE HAS WEEN CALCULATED FOR VALUES UF EUV FROM EMlN iN STEPS UF ESTEk 
SSUME LINEAR INTERPOLATION BETwEEN VALUES UF UTILE 
DIMENSION U P R E D ( 2 a ) ,U T I L E ( b U l ) , E U V (24)
INTEGER IEUV(24)
ESTEP=100.Ü
E m IN = -250 00 .0
READ(Sfb55) I DENT 1,IDENT2
5 F O R M A T (A3,IX,A2)
W R I T E (6,666) I DENT 1,1UENT2
6 F O R M A T (*ISUBJECT NUMBER ».A3,1X ,A 2 / / / )
R E A D (9,111) UPRED
R E A D (9,ill) POUND 
R E A D (9,ill) UTILE
1 F O R M A T (4( U(,G19.0) )
W R I T E (6,222)
2 F O R M A T (* QUESTION P R EO.UTILE EUV')
DO 10 0=1,24
DO 20 K=l,60l 
UT2=UTILE(K)
IF(UPRED(J) .LT.UTILE (K) ) GOTO 21 
UT1=UT2
0 CONTINUE
1 CONTINUE
P A R T = ( U T 2 - U P R E D (J ) ) / (UT2-UTI)
EUV(J)=£ST£P^(K-1-PART)+EMIN 
IEUV(J ) = I F I X ( E U V ( J ) )
W R I T E (6,333) U , U P R E D ( J ) ,lEUV(J)
3 F O R M A T (19,F13 . 5 , 111)
0 CONTINUE
DO 5 K=l,2 
Kl=K+2 
02=K*12 
01 = 02-11
5 W R I T E (10,444) IDE n T I , K 1 ,IDENT2, (lEUV (0) ,0 = 01,02)
4 F O R M A T (A3,I1, A 2 , 2 X , 1216)
.. STOP
END
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APPENDIX 4
EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENCES IN 
UTILITY CURVES.
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APPENDIX 5
EXAMPLES OF UTILITY CURVES 
DISPLAYING SIMILAR 
CHARACTERISTICS.
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